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Abstract 
 
The global financial crisis had devastating effects on the financial system, economic growth 
and national debt of Western countries. The focus of this thesis is an examination of certain 
identifiable weaknesses in the corporate governance at UK banks which, it is posited, 
constituted an underlying cause of the crisis. It then considers the main regulatory 
responses to these identified weaknesses and assesses to what extent these have led to 
improvements in corporate governance at banks. This research is based on an examination 
of all the major failures at UK banks during and after the crisis, and of its related responses. 
In addition to UK responses, several solutions to the weaknesses identified at UK banks are 
also currently addressed through EU legislation and by the international Basel Committee. 
These are also reviewed. The principal conclusions are that: board effectiveness was low 
due to a lack of knowledge and of challenging of senior management; there was a culture 
placing growth and profit over risk management; and remuneration was inappropriately 
structured leading to unacceptable risk taking and scandals. It is further concluded that the 
mechanisms to limit the impact of a failure of a bank on its stakeholders, such as depositors 
and the taxpayer, were inadequate.  A comparative case study of the financial crisis in 
Japan during the 1990s is also undertaken to consider whether, and to what extent, the 
Japanese regulatory response offers lessons to UK regulators and legislators. The principal 
finding is that comparative analysis of regulation and corporate governance at banks is 
problematic. Although there were similarities between the two financial crises and their 
impacts, the organisation and culture of the UK and Japanese banks is so different that 
different regulatory responses follow. Despite similarities in financial crises, different 
regulatory responses are more likely due to distinctive national contexts. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1. The Background and Importance of this Project 
On Friday 14 September 2007, account holders were queuing outside the Northern Rock 
branches.1 They were desperately trying to withdraw their savings so they could deposit 
them with other banks. Two days earlier, Northern Rock had acquired a liquidity support 
facility from the Bank of England as it was no longer able to provide its own funding from 
the money markets. On this news, its share price practically collapsed. Despite assurances 
from politicians that people did not have to worry about their savings, on the first day that 
the branches opened following the news, people queued outside to withdraw their savings 
as quickly as they could. After the weekend, the share price collapsed further, and 
depositors continued to withdraw even more money. To turn the tide, later that Monday, 
the UK government announced that it would guarantee all deposits at Northern Rock. 
Whilst changes to the board were made, a private sector solution was sought. In the end, 
on 11 January 2008, Northern Rock was effectively nationalised. 
On the morning of 7 October 2008, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, 
was on his way to Luxembourg in a chartered plane to meet with the other EU finance 
ministers to discuss the financial crisis.2 The morning newspapers were running the story 
that the bosses of the UK’s largest banks had visited the Treasury the night before to 
discuss their desperate need for capital to stay afloat. Banks’ shares were collapsing and by 
the time Mr Darling’s plane had landed, RBS’s share price had already dropped by forty 
percent. Later that morning, Mr Darling was called out of the meeting by his aides to take a 
call from Sir Tom McKillop, chairman of RBS. His question had been simple: his bank would 
go bust that afternoon, what would the government do? The problem with RBS was that, 
unlike Northern Rock, it was one of the world’s largest financial institutions and its default 
would very swiftly bring the global financial system down with it. 
It is perhaps one of the most astounding observations that at the height of the financial 
crisis there was almost nobody, apart from those who were intimately familiar with 
financial markets, who would have had any idea about the potential disaster that was 
hanging over their heads. About how close the financial system had come to a meltdown, 
where markets would effectively freeze and shut down, branches would close and cash 
                                                          
1 BBC, ‘Northern Rock shares plunge 32%’ (14 September 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6994328.stm> accessed 4 July 2016 
2 Alistair Darling, Back from the Brink: 1,000 Days at Number 11 (Hart Publishing 2011) 
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machines would no longer provide cash. For the remainder of that 7 October, the Bank of 
England provided as much liquidity support as was needed. The next morning, before the 
markets re-opened, the UK banks, including RBS, had received a capital injection from the 
UK government. 
This thesis focusses on the weaknesses of corporate governance at UK banks during the 
crisis of 2007 to 2009 and on how to diminish these weaknesses. The suggested approach 
is, first, to provide a solid theoretical background of corporate governance and, second, to 
analyse the failures at UK banks and the responses that followed. A case study is 
introduced, which entails a comparative analysis with corporate governance reforms in 
Japan following their financial crisis in the nineties. The objective is to compare the 
weaknesses of corporate governance at Japanese and UK banks as well as to compare the 
measures taken to address these. Any parallels that can be drawn between the weaknesses 
or reforms would strengthen the conclusions. The case study of Japan will present a 
problem of comparative analysis, because of difficulties associated with translated source 
material. Another difficulty is the fact that the case study will contain a comparison 
between two completely different countries and legal systems. The case study is therefore 
also expected to provide insights into how far such a comparative case study can deliver 
new insights. 
The background of the research is formed by the recent global financial crisis, including the 
failure and rescue of several large financial institutions, and the introduction of new 
legislation to ensure future financial stability.3 Swift responses, such as regulatory 
measures, have followed the crisis. However, bailing out large financial institutions has 
created a large burden on governments’ finances and the global economy. Several of these 
debt-laden countries are now facing the prospect of potentially defaulting on their debts, 
whilst the general public feels the pain of the economic crisis through measures of austerity 
imposed by governments to restore public financial health. It is no wonder that many 
people feel anger and resentment towards the financial institutions who, correctly or not, 
they see as responsible for their drop in living standards. 
This puts pressure on policymakers to improve the banking system, but a deeper analysis is 
required if one is to go beyond mere banker-bashing. There is no doubt that corporate 
governance at banks at the time of the financial crisis was generally very weak, although 
                                                          
3 See for an overview: David Wessel, In FED We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 
(Reprint, Crown Business 2010). 
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some institutions stood out. It is important to establish what exactly was wrong with it, 
how it is changing as a result of the measures taken and how it can be further improved. 
These insights can show how the overall stability of the banking system can be improved. 
Furthermore, it can help to define what realistic expectations one can have of the banks’ 
role and behaviour in our society. Although they are companies whose objective is to make 
a profit, they perform an important role in the economy and in the functioning of society as 
a whole. Banks are the primary place to go to for savings, loans, mortgages, credit cards, 
cash machines and any other forms of financial infrastructure that society at large depends 
upon in its daily life. It is impossible to imagine modern day society functioning without it. 
This is something that most likely should be more fully recognised in the banks’ system of 
corporate governance. This research will lead to a set of basic guidelines on banks’ 
behaviour and their social responsibilities. 
Understandably, governments have already commissioned various reports in order to 
analyse the crisis and to suggest improvements. In the UK, the FSA published reports on the 
failure of Northern Rock4 as well as the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland.5 The Labour 
government commissioned the Walker review.6 This review examines corporate 
governance at financial institutions, including board composition, the role of institutional 
shareholders and the governance of risk. The subsequent Conservative and Liberal 
Democrats government commissioned follow-up reports, in particular the report by the 
ICB.7 The ICB focussed on two areas: the first is the improvement of financial stability 
through structural reforms of the banks, including retail ring-fencing and increasing capital. 
The second area is how to encourage competition in the banking sector, in particular in the 
retail sector. Finally, there is the report on the banking crisis by the Treasury Select 
Committee,8 which examines the government’s responses to the banking crisis, in 
particular the bail-out of several institutions, the introduction of the Banking Act 2009 and 
                                                          
4 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learned Review’ (2008) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/nr_report.pdf> accessed 14 Nov 2015 
5 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Failure of Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial Services Authority 
Board Report’ (2011) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf> accessed 14 Nov 2015 
6 Sir David Walker, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK banks and other financial industry 
entities – Final Recommendations’ (26 November 2009) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> accessed 14 Nov 2015 
7 Independent Commission on Banking, ‘Final Report – Recommendations’ (September 2011) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/documents/icb_final_report_12sep2011.pdf> accessed 14 Nov 2015 
8 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure of UK Banks’ 
(2009) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/416/416.pdf> 
accessed 14 Nov 2015 
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the creation of UKFI. This research project will draw from these three major pieces of work 
and build upon them. It will seek to provide a solid theoretical base from which to examine 
the corporate governance at UK financial institutions and how it has changed during and 
after the crisis. Where the three aforementioned reports serve a purpose of informing the 
government on how to respond immediately after the crisis, this research provides the 
opportunity for a deeper examination of the situation in the UK. 
2. Outline of the Thesis 
a. The Hypothesis and the Research Questions 
The hypothesis of this thesis is: corporate governance at UK banks prior to the financial 
crisis was weak and post-crisis reforms did not address these weaknesses. The research 
questions are based on this hypothesis. They allow a careful analysis of corporate 
governance at banks. Based on its answers, improvements may be suggested and basic 
guidelines for banks’ social responsibilities may be formulated. The three main research 
questions are: 
1 What weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks contributed to 
their failure? 
2 What is the effect of new legislation and other initiatives on corporate 
governance at UK banks? 
3 What is the effect of (part-) state ownership of UK banks on their 
corporate governance? 
These questions are inevitably linked as they all relate to corporate governance at banks. 
The first two are especially interlinked: firstly, what went wrong and secondly, what has 
been done about it? Identifying these issues and their proposed solutions, which need to 
be evaluated to see whether or not they are appropriate, allows for a set of 
recommendations on banks’ social responsibility and behaviour based on the experience of 
the crisis. The third question adds to that by taking into account that a large proportion of 
UK banks are or have been at least partially controlled by the government. This in itself 
introduces a different set of dynamics that need to be considered. 
It is important to establish what this project does not cover and thereby set limitations. In 
the wake of the crisis, much research had been conducted into the reduction of systemic 
risk in the financial markets through, for example, the creation of clearing houses and other 
measures. The aim was to introduce transparency in the complex derivatives markets. 
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Many such measures have been introduced to improve the way financial markets work. 
Although they have received much attention,9 they are not directly linked to the research 
questions on corporate governance and they will not be covered here. Likewise, there is 
much discussion on macro-economic aspects and other causes of the crisis, such as the 
failure of the US housing market (and hence the issues with the derivatives based on it10) 
and a long period of low interest rates. Although it is important to recognise that there are 
many other aspects and causes of the crisis, these will not be covered here. The main focus, 
driven by the hypothesis and the research questions, is on corporate governance at UK 
banks. It will ask why it was in such a weak state that these institutions could be so severely 
hit during the crisis and how it can be improved. Finally, because this is a fast moving area 
with many developments at both national and international level, there is a limitation on 
the research period: the material used is up to 1 December 2015. 
b. Outline of Answering the Research Question 
This first chapter provides the background to and importance of the research, the research 
hypothesis and the research questions. It also analyses the research methods that are 
needed to answer the research questions. It lays out the issues of methodology that are 
expected to arise during this research. This starts with the general methodological 
questions, examining how to conduct legal research. Reports and legislation introduced 
after the crisis will be important primary sources. Archives, for example of newspapers, 
provide a valuable source for historical information. After the general discussion, the focus 
is on the narrower field of comparative methodology. This study is required because this 
project, by nature, involves a large amount of comparative methodology. It is therefore 
desirable to describe upfront what the expected issues will be so they can be addressed. 
Some of the issues include the harmonisation at a global level in reports produced by the 
Basel Committee11 and by the Senior Supervisors Group12 and their transplantation into 
national regulatory frameworks. Another issue is the comparative analysis between 
                                                          
9 Christopher L. Culp, ‘The Treasury Department’s Proposed Regulation of OTC Derivatives Clearing 
and Settlement’ (2009) Working Paper No 09-30, CRSP Working Paper 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430576> accessed 14 Nov 2015 
10 William Poole, ‘Causes and Consequence of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009’ (2010) 33 Harv J L & 
Pub Pol’y 421 
11 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘The Basel Committee’s Response to the Financial Crisis: 
Report to the G20’ (October 2010) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf> accessed 14 Nov 2015 
12 Senior Supervisors Group, ‘Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008’ (21 
October 2009) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0910a.pdf> accessed 14 Nov 
2015 
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different countries: corporate governance, board structure and even what exactly a 
company is, will vary.  
After this analysis of the research methodology, the theoretical foundations need to be 
built. These will provide the necessary background for the remainder of the thesis and form 
the answers to the research question. The second chapter will start with a discussion of the 
difference between the company as a legal entity and a real world entity. This includes 
different theories about the existence of the company. It is necessary to understand what a 
company actually is as it will inform the analysis of control of the company, and thus of 
corporate governance. With this difference between a real world company and the legal 
entity in mind, various theories of existence of the company are introduced. This is 
followed by a discussion of the main theories of corporate governance. An understanding 
of these fundamental theories is required to analyse what went wrong with corporate 
governance specifically at banks and to find ways to improve it. This includes an analysis of 
internal and external corporate governance, as this distinction will be particularly 
important for corporate governance at banks. Not only the main theories are examined, 
but also the leading report including the Cadbury report13 and subsequent reports. These 
reports are used to derive other working concepts of a system of good corporate 
governance and will inform the analysis of corporate social responsibility. Corporate 
governance is in essence concerned with the control of the company. Corporate social 
responsibility is concerned with the role of the company in its wider community and thus 
its behaviour towards its stakeholders. It is important to analyse this as stakeholders at 
banks, for example depositors, should play a significant role. 
These concepts of the company, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, 
need to be discussed in general terms before a specific analysis can be done for banks. 
Corporate governance at banks is essentially the same as that of any other company but 
with added extras. In particular, the roles of depositors, the regulators, credit rating 
agencies and other gatekeepers, as well as the specific capital requirements and the 
greater role for risk management make corporate governance at banks a special case 
compared to companies. As a consequence, the distinction between internal and external 
corporate governance becomes more important when analysing corporate governance at 
banks. 
                                                          
13 Sir Adrian Cadbury, Report on the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(London, Gee&Co, 1992) 
19 
 
Having set out the necessary tools of the research methodology and the theoretical 
background, it is possible to analyse the failures of UK banks and the consequences in the 
third chapter. In particular, the failures of Northern Rock and RBS are examined in detail. 
This study is needed to answer the first research question: what weaknesses in corporate 
governance contributed to their failure. Furthermore, this detailed analysis and the 
identified weaknesses will inform the debate on whether new measures and legislation 
address these weaknesses and improve corporate governance. It must be clear from the 
outset that it is unrealistic to assume that it is possible to prevent such a failure from ever 
happening again. In fact, the objective of the regulator is not to prevent defaults from 
happening, but to ensure that when they do they occur in an orderly fashion and without 
costs to the general public.14 
Building on the analysis of the failures and weaknesses of corporate governance at UK 
banks, the following two chapters analyse the various responses. Of these two chapters, 
the first contains a discussion of the immediate responses, including the emergency 
measures. The second chapter contains the analysis of longer term solutions. In the first of 
the two chapters, there is a discussion of the important emergency tools including the 
revised protection of depositors and the newly introduced Banking Act 2008 and 2009. 
These were used to resolve the failures of the Icelandic banks, of Northern Rock and RBS, 
which are examined in more details. Aspects covered include the protests of existing 
shareholders and the intervention of the EU on competition. Once failing institutions were 
being nationalised, UKFI was created to manage the government’s investments at arm’s 
length. The role of UKFI and government ownership on corporate governance as well as on 
the performance of the nationalised banks is examined. The rights of minority shareholders 
are discussed as well as the conflicts between government policy, company objectives and 
regulatory requirements. 
The next chapter discusses the regulatory measures introduced, the major reports 
commissioned and their impact on corporate governance of UK banks following the crisis. 
The question is whether this new regulation addresses the failures identified. Starting from 
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a global level with the international responses, such as those by the G20,15 the Financial 
Stability Board,16 the Basel Committee17 and the Senior Supervisors Group,18 it leads on to 
the reports, national responses and implementation of international recommendations. 
This includes implementation of the various EU directives as well as an examination of 
major reports by the Independent Commission for Banking,19 the Walker Review20 and 
various others. Based on this analysis, an informed answer can be given to the research 
questions. 
c. Case Study: Japan 
To gain further insight into failures of corporate governance at banks, a comparative 
analysis between the current crisis in the UK and Japan’s financial crisis in the nineties21 will 
be undertaken. This period has exposed weaknesses of corporate governance at Japanese 
banks. It has led to gradual reform of corporate governance and the comparative analysis 
will focus on how these reforms and their impact compare to the UK. The period for the 
case study starts at the beginning of the 1990s, when Japan experienced the bursting of an 
asset pricing bubble. It greatly impacted the national financial sector as well as the overall 
economy leading to what is now generally called ‘the lost decade’. After 1991, failures of 
small financial institutions started to occur throughout Japan, but none of them were 
significant enough to pose a threat to the overall financial system. In December 1994, two 
credit cooperatives threatened to go under: Anzen Credit Bank and Tokyo Kyowa Credit 
Association.22 It was the first time that public funds were used by the Bank of Japan to 
prevent the failure of financial institutions. Despite paying high interest to attract funds, 
including that of politicians and political parties, the two institutions were alleged to be 
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mismanaged and state prosecutors stepped in.23 The Bank of Japan was criticised for the 
use of public funds for the bailout. There was a need for a more structured way of dealing 
with bank failures, especially after more banks needed to be rescued in the summer of 
1995. In 1996, Japan introduced its first Deposit Insurance Law, giving the authorities more 
tools to deal with failures of financial institutions.  
However, in October 1997, the financial crisis hit in full force as several of Japan’s financial 
institutions could no longer adequately deal with the non-performing loans on their books. 
Major financial institutions, including Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Yamaichi 
Securities and Tokuyo City Bank, failed. Japan saw at least one major financial institution 
collapsing every week leading to the Bank of Japan providing funds as lender of last resort 
on an unprecedented scale.24 Although new measures were introduced, in 1998 the next 
wave came as two large banks, Long Term Credit Bank of Japan25 and Nippon Credit Bank,26 
failed and were nationalised. This led to new regulatory measures and the establishment of 
the Financial Reconstruction Commission. This regulator assessed the unrealised losses that 
the banks had on their books and calculated the capital injection that would be needed for 
the major banks. In March 1999, the government provided the banks with this capital 
injection to stabilise the financial markets. 
There are clear parallels between the UK case and the Japan case. From some of most 
immediate causes, such as unknown and unrealised losses as well as insufficient capital, to 
some of the measures, such as nationalisation, the similarities between the two banking 
crises justify a thorough comparative analysis. Whilst in the roaring eighties alliance 
capitalism and the keiretsu were placed firmly at the forefront of Japanese business 
practice,27 the slump in the nineties brought doubt that these models were still adequate 
for Japan to be competitive in the global markets. The Main Bank system, large cross-
shareholdings and lifetime employment were characteristics of Japan’s corporate 
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governance,28 but with the major financial reforms in 1997 and the following changes to 
the Commercial Code an attempt was made to bring Japan’s corporate governance more in 
line with US practices.29  
There are significant similarities between the crisis in Japan and the current financial crisis 
that more than justify this comparative analysis. In the chapter on Japan, this comparative 
analysis seeks to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the current proposed 
measures for the UK banking systems including the changes to corporate governance. 
Furthermore, some of the more recent problems of corporate governance for non-financial 
institutions in Japan, such as TEPCO and Olympus, are discussed. The objective is to 
examine how effective the attempts to reform corporate governance have been in Japan 
itself and whether they provide valuable lessons for the UK. Besides the large amount of 
financial regulation that was introduced at the end of the nineties, changes to Commercial 
Code were made as well. These changes, including the choice of board structure, the 
establishment of a Board of Statutory Auditors and the introduction of stock option 
schemes, were aimed at improving corporate governance.30 A comparative analysis 
between corporate governance reforms in the UK and in Japan can assess whether there 
were both different and similar issues of corporate governance and how these were 
addressed. 
3. General Consideration in Methodology 
a. Legal Sources and Methodology 
As part of the response to the financial crisis, lawmakers have issued new legislation and 
asked specialised commissions to write recommendations on the prevention of future 
crises. Both are valuable sources, both for their actual contents as well as for the context 
and purpose for which they have been written. The larger pieces of relevant legislation in 
the UK and EU are clearly identifiable, just as those introduced during the ‘Big Bang’ in 
1997 in Japan. Several reports have been written at a transnational level by various 
influential commissions that set up guidelines for new financial regulation. Likewise, there 
are important national reports. In some situations, case law is available. It is worth 
considering some particular aspects with the use of case law: although judges are deemed 
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to be impartial, it does not mean that they always reach the correct decision.31 It is the 
judicial interpretation of the law that is transmitted. A benefit of common law (and case 
law) is that it has been developed over a long period of time. Statutes, however, can be 
made by parliament in the heat of the moment.32 As such, it is for example a better tool to 
manage a crisis. Case law can also be changed to reflect the changes in society over time.33 
But although it can change, it would require a relevant case to be brought before a 
sufficiently senior court, which can take a long time. 
But how does one use these legal sources, i.e. statutes and case law? One approach is to 
use legal reasoning in the way judiciary might use it. This leads to a form of reasoning 
based on taking the law as axioms, already formed and shaped.34 Such a black-letter-law 
approach may be very useful in answering the questions regarding the direct effects of the 
new regulation and legislation that is being introduced. However, by examining legal 
resources in only such a way, and effectively regarding legal reasoning as something 
special, one disregards a link with the social sciences. Looking beyond the rules, there is 
much relevant information and there are many facts to consider. Without summing up 
potential ways of approaching the problem from a social sciences background,35 it is 
sufficient to say that they can greatly add to a mere rule-based approach. Hence this wider 
approach will be helpful in answering the questions to why certain new statutes and 
regulations have been introduced by lawmakers in this particular form or what their wider, 
perhaps unintended, consequences might be. 
b. Additional Sources: Biographies and Archives 
Getting the historical facts right, with objectivity and without relying on a selective memory 
to what events took place and how they happened exactly, is required for the accuracy and 
credibility of the research. It will therefore be important to consult extensively with 
archives, in particular those of respected newspapers, to establish a clear timeline of the 
historical events. It can also serve to identify the different standpoints of the actors at each 
stage during and after the crisis. For lawmakers, additional archives such as Hansard are 
available, to trace down reasoning and arguments concerning emergency measures taken. 
Using these widely and extensively before reaching one’s own conclusion is generally 
necessary, but especially important for this research. An additional source of information 
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can be the bibliographies of various high-profile figures during the financial crisis. These 
could include Hank Paulson and Alistair Darling, who have published their accounts in 
various bibliographies.36 Although one cannot take these writings at face value, it does 
provide their version of the events. 
c. Methodology for the Japan Case Study 
As mentioned before, with limitations on the use of Japanese language sources, there will 
be a great reliance on secondary sources and translated work such as the handbook of 
Japanese commercial law in German37 and a more general work in English.38 These sources 
must be used with care, as it is not known what may have been lost in translation. Using 
many different sources from different authors on the same topics allows a comparison 
between them, hopefully revealing any mistranslations or other issues. 
One has to consider the comparative problem concerning the different structures of the 
company in Japan. Before the financial crisis in the nineties, Japanese companies were 
structured together in a keiretsu in accordance with the main bank system.39 These 
Japanese companies had specific characteristics, as described by the theory of J-Firm,40 
such as lifetime employment. Cultural differences in society had led to differences in 
capitalism.41 This in turn raises the question whether there really is a ‘Japanese Style of 
Management’.42 It will be very important to take these social and cultural aspects into 
consideration in this case study. Moreover, after carefully tracking the changes from the 
Big Bang Reforms in 1997 and the subsequent Commercial Code Changes, it will be 
important to establish a methodology for measuring change. One can look at individual 
cases, such as the Daiwa trading scandal in New York and hostile take-overs such as 
Livedoor - Fuji TV and UFJ Sumitomo, but is this the right way of measuring change? In this 
case study, previous research has shown that individual but isolated cases can always be 
found to argue that change has occurred, but that any study at national level will show that 
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no change has occurred.43 It has been suggested that the most appropriate way to examine 
changes is by taking a small field and examining changes in that specific area. 
4. Comparative Methodology in Law and Corporate Governance 
a. General Problems of Comparative Analysis 
Because of the comparative nature of this research, it is necessary to establish upfront how 
to approach the problems associated with comparative analysis. Whilst the next sections 
outline the specific comparative elements for each of the chapters, some basic groundwork 
needs to be done first. Comparative law is ‘the comparison of different legal systems in the 
world’.44 A distinction can be made between macro-comparison and micro-comparison: 
where the former looks at the handling of legal materials or the role of those involved in 
law, the latter looks at specific legal institutions and problems.45 But it is perhaps clearest 
to describe comparative law by pointing out what it is not: comparative law is not merely a 
descriptive analysis of foreign law as it requires specific comparative reflections on the 
problem.46 Comparative law touches on many other fields, including sociology. It is 
generally accepted that society, or human behaviour and preferences, and with it social 
changes, whether economic, political or demographic, influence the legal system.47 
The basic methodological principle for comparative law is that of functionality: Zweigert 
and Kötz argue that it is only possible to compare things that have the same functionality.48 
The two things that are compared must have the same purpose or functionality, but that 
does not mean that they can be found in a similar section of a similar statute or other piece 
of legislation. It is necessary to keep an open mind as to how objectives have been 
achieved differently in different jurisdictions. Not everyone believes that such a functional 
approach is satisfactory. A narrow view of ‘the comparative enterprise’, reduced to ‘the dry 
juxtaposition of the rules of one legal culture with those of another’ does not constitute a 
full comparative analysis but a mere ‘contrasting’.49 The point is that there is much outside 
the legal texts and judgments of great relevance for a comparative analysis that needs to 
be considered. 
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For the comparison, it is important to phrase a question in a more general form. This avoids 
limitations and restraints, in particular with regard to sources of law, if one is to find an 
answer in different legal systems. Besides asking the correct question, it is important to 
determine a suitable legal system for comparison.50 Depending on a country’s history, its 
legal system may not be extensively developed in particular areas. However, once the right 
questions have been formulated along a functional line and an appropriate foreign legal 
system has been chosen for comparison, the task remains of building a system for 
comparison.51 Such a system is in essence a loose concept containing words, syntax and 
concepts needed for the analysis. 
The international nature of the financial markets and the fact that banks have become 
large worldwide institutions underlines not only the global dimension of the research 
project but also that globalisation has become an increasingly important factor in legal 
analysis. A national system no longer stands on its own as it did a few hundred years ago: 
international trade and interaction with other nations has a great influence at national 
level. Globalisation, which is in itself a problematic word, especially in legal terms,52 brings 
many challenges of comparative law.53 One of the most important challenges that is 
relevant for this research project is that of ‘legal phenomena’ at different levels, including 
global, regional or national, need to be considered with their own history, interaction and 
transplants.54 Transplants, or ‘the borrowing from another legal system’, are a common 
form of legal change.55 This terminology, ‘transplant’, is sometimes regarded as misleading: 
it seems to suggest that one could surgically cut-and-paste a piece from one country’s 
legislation into that of another without any problems. It is, however, more likely that this 
‘transplanted’ piece of legislation causes friction with existing legislation as well as with 
domestic culture, leading to a ‘legal irritant’ instead.56 The use of one country’s legislation 
by those who make the law in another country should be done with care.57 
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Globalisation brings with it more concepts, such as “legal convergence”, “legal diffusion” 
and “harmonisation”.58 Legal convergence can be defined as the process of attaining the 
same results in different legal systems or more specifically to eliminate differences 
between common law and civil law. Legal diffusion refers to a change of a legal system by 
another outside legal system, either through transplantation, legal borrowing or simply 
inspiration. Finally, harmonisation covers the attempt to bring about a form of legal 
similarity. These are important concepts as both financial regulation and corporate 
governance code is ever more determined at an international or regional level before 
finding its way into national legislation. The next sections outline specific issues of 
comparative analysis for each of the chapters. 
b. Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance 
To lay the groundwork for the actual research, the next chapter establishes what is meant 
by terms such as corporate governance, a system of corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility. Defining these concepts is quite problematic: what is included or 
excluded in the definition already indicates what is regarded as important and hence 
depends on the background and views of who is defining it.59 What is understood precisely 
by corporate governance varies per country. Different corporate laws, codes or rules, as 
well as different economic, social, political or historical paths and developments, have led 
to different notions of corporate governance.60 With corporations expanding across 
national boundaries, whilst attracting money from investors globally, corporate governance 
is being brought outside national boundaries and is caught up in the process of 
globalisation.61 Although various transnational institutions, such as the OECD, produce 
guidelines on corporate governance,62 these reports as well as the emergence of 
transnational corporations and global capital markets do not necessarily mean that there is 
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convergence on corporate governance.63 In any definition and analysis of corporate 
governance national economic, political and other historical events need to be considered.  
A direct comparative analysis between countries’ corporate governance is complicated. 
Consider for example the different legal structure of a company, the different board 
structure (one- or two-tier) in different countries or the difference in representation of 
labour at board level. All these matters need to be taken into account when discussing 
corporate governance: it requires consideration, for example, for the role of directors or 
which stakeholders to consider. One solution is to compare parts of the system that 
perform the same function. This approach searches in the different structures for parts that 
are not necessarily exactly the same in title or mandate in the structure but perform, 
amongst others, the same function that one is after. One of the problems of functional 
analysis is that it assumes that one knows what function to look for. Furthermore, the 
functional approach is insufficient as it still ignores the context of the system.64 Even if by 
using this approach some ‘functional convergence’ between systems of corporate 
governance of different countries can be observed, the path dependency will lead to 
differences.65 
Path dependency implies that many of today’s differences in corporate ownership 
structure can be explained by circumstances and decisions made in the past. In particular, 
structure-driven path dependency and rule-driven path dependency can be distinguished: 
structure-driven means that the initial ownership structure has a great effect on how the 
ownership structure develops thereafter66 whilst rule-driven means that initial ownership 
structures have affected the development of legal rules.67 A wider description of path 
dependency would include the complete social and economic development of a country, as 
these can be helpful in describing the attitude and understanding of concepts as 
transparency and disclosure.68 
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The definition of corporate social responsibility is complicated, as different actors 
emphasise different aspects – depending on their viewpoint.69 It is generally used as an all-
encompassing term for relations between the company and its external stakeholders, 
varying from employees to the environment. The main difficulty is whether good corporate 
social responsibility means adhering to the relevant law, or going above and beyond it. It 
raises the difficult question whether corporate social responsibility is voluntary, driven by 
ethics, or whether it is already enshrined in the companies’ legal obligations. The 
comparative analysis of corporate social responsibility is equally difficult, because it 
extends the problems faced with a comparative analysis of corporate governance.70 In the 
same way the structure of the company, as well as the social, legal and economic 
development of the country, shape the system of corporate governance, it will also define 
what is understood by corporate social responsibility.  
As part of the comparative analysis, it is necessary to consider the influence of 
harmonisation in relevant international reports or the influence of foreign legal systems on 
individual nations. In defining a ‘system of corporate governance’, elements from different 
nations may be compared if possible. The analysis may need to start off with general 
corporations but ultimately needs to focus on financial institutions, which have specific 
elements of corporate governance. Based on this analysis, it will be possible to assess what 
was wrong with banking corporate governance in the period leading up to the financial 
crisis and whether sufficient adjustments are being made.  
c. Comparative Analysis of Financing and Insolvency 
The ability to allow for an orderly default of a financial institution is important: it is after all 
not the objective of the financial regulator to prevent the default of financial institutions. It 
is not regarded as a regulatory failure if such a default occurs with minimal costs to the 
economy, tax-payers and customers. Hence part of the answer to the research questions 
will come from the study of default mechanisms and what had been done if these were not 
sufficient. The relevant areas include some insolvency law to cover default events, law 
relevant to the (temporary) nationalisation of financial institutions and anything that 
follows from that, such as competition laws. It is not surprising that finance, insolvency and 
corporate governance are linked. All of these are connected to the history of the country in 
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which a particular form has emerged, although it is difficult to attribute particular systems 
to particular countries.71 The point is that alternative conditions at different points in time 
have created the different evolutions of governance which exist today. 
Insolvency law inevitably relates closely to the history of finance within each country. The 
influence of the different history in commerce and finance is clear from differences in 
relevant law between countries even as geographically close as England and France.72 The 
different history of finance of countries, although there was influence through early trade 
and commerce, can be found in basic elements such as different financial terminology or 
different coinages.73 From the loan sharks and banks of Northern Italy in the thirteenth 
century and from innovations such as the establishment of the first foreign exchange bank 
in Amsterdam in 1609 and the Bank of England in London in 1694, to today’s world of 
finance,74 it is clear that each country has its own rich traditions and attitudes towards 
finance. This also means that each country has different insolvency laws. These insolvency 
laws in effect do little more than prescribe the priority given to creditors of a failing 
company. This is very much determined by the financial history of that country. 
One of the problems with insolvency is that in the UK it does not travel through the system. 
This is due to the limited liability structure adopted by companies. The history of limited 
liability can be closely linked to the ideas at various times and its creation was certainly far 
from obvious.75 It can even be argued that it causes corporate irresponsibility because it 
poses no obligations, responsibilities or liabilities on the owners of the shares despite the 
fact that they enjoy income from the company.76 Note that for debtors, the only assets 
available to them in case of failure would be those of the company, not of its owners. The 
strict separation between ownership and the company itself grew further by the creation 
of corporate groups, extending the concept to subsidiary companies. One can now 
understand how limited liability prevents insolvency to travel through an organisation and 
how this may further complicate the failure of a large bank. 
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There are other solutions besides insolvency laws that countries have adopted to reduce 
the social and economic impact of a banking failure: consider the stabilising impact of the 
Asset Protection Scheme or the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Different 
measures have been taken to achieve the same goal of financial stability in the face of a 
banking failure and it is necessary to compare the complete set of these measures. Lifting 
out one measure ignores the context of this measure in the whole package of measures 
available. The history is important.77 The comparative law aspect is therefore similar to that 
discussed above in the context of company law or financial regulation in general. 
Another consequence of bank insolvency has been the nationalisation of failed banks. The 
swift capital injection into the failing financial institutions by governments has led to the 
unexpected return of state-owned enterprises. Again, this has worked out differently in 
various countries: in the US almost all recipients have repaid this capital whilst the UK looks 
set for a much longer time period with state-run banks. Comparative aspects include not 
merely how different governments have legally structured their investments in these 
banks, but also how they deal with issues such as competition law and conflicts between 
their policy and the commercial objects of the banks. Issues that will arise are similar to 
that of company law or regulatory law as discussed above. Competition rules should be 
examined at both national level and international level, within the EU or globally. 
Competition rules should also be examined considering any form of state-aid, whether this 
is a direct capital injection or the insurance of impaired assets. The potential conflict of 
government policy, social pressures and the commercial objectives of a (temporarily) 
nationalised financial institution are interesting from a corporate governance point of view. 
The comparative law issues concerning corporate governance have already been discussed 
previously. 
d. Comparative Analysis of Financial Regulation 
There are two immediate issues of comparative law with regard to these newly introduced 
measures: 1) harmonisation and transplants and 2) direct comparative analysis. The first 
issue is based on the observation that many regulatory measures or reports produced are 
done at a global level.78 As capital markets operate globally, the need for uniformity79 in 
regulation globally has increased; something that is underlined by the creation of 
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organisations such as the Basel Committee, IOSCO and the SSG. An absence of uniformity 
can easily lead to regulatory arbitrage or competitive (dis-) advantages for financial centres. 
These global agreements and reports are, however, compromises between national 
interests and ideas as they seek to harmonise regulation. This raises the question of 
whether the measures remain effective and whether they can achieve what is intended. 
The next phase is to implement these harmonised measures at a national level, at which 
stage it becomes a legal transplant. As with harmonisation, legal transplants raise questions 
about effectiveness and, more generally, how they will work within the host nation.80 
An example of this first issue of comparative law is the agreed capital ratio in Basel III.81 The 
agreed number represents the amount of capital a bank is required to hold, yet as it is 
agreed on a global level, it is an average of what all individual nations have agreed to. Their 
decision to agree with this can be based upon many different reasons, both economic and 
political. In turn, this ratio is implemented into each nation’s regulatory laws. The effects of 
this will differ greatly between different nations: some may be in recession and the figure 
may constrain banks in lending more, restricting the economy further. For other nations, 
the agreed ratio may actually be lower than what is currently held by banks anyway, having 
little effect. The capital ratio is a good example of harmonising the ideas of many nations 
into a single number. However different the transplant may work out between these 
nations, for transnational financial institutions such a global agreement is far preferable 
over having many different local regimes without harmonisation.82 
To deal with the first issue of comparative law, the first part of this chapter will contain the 
international harmonised responses. Thereafter the implementation at group- and national 
level are discussed, i.e. at EU level and at UK level. The discussion at UK level also includes 
national initiatives and reports, which do not necessarily contain the same 
recommendations as the international reports. These global and national reports, as well as 
national legislation and, where available, case law, will give a picture of how the responses 
have first been formulated at G20 level and are ultimately being implemented in national 
legislation. 
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The second issue of comparative law is that of direct comparative analysis. This means the 
comparison of one aspect within one system with another.83 A direct comparison can be 
hindered by a variety of things, such as different language used or slightly different legal 
concepts. For purposes of comparison, it is important to derive the underlying assumptions 
and the background to each legal system to come to a meaningful comparison. In other 
words, a simplistic and narrow contrasting of the rules in two legal and regulatory systems 
via black-letter-law would be inadequate if only because legal terms from different systems 
(and in different languages) will be difficult to compare.84 For the purpose of comparison, 
the analysis must go beyond these sets of rules, beyond the surface, to examine the 
history, the politics and the social economic context.85 As an example, some aspects of 
financial regulation may be harmonised, such as capital requirements and depositor 
protection. But there are national institutes other than governments and financial 
regulators that influence financial regulation, such as stock exchanges regulating their 
members and consumer watchdogs representing depositors’ interest. Hence comparing 
regulatory measures on their own with the closest apparent equivalent in a different 
country can be misleading if a more complete picture is not considered.86 
To deal with the second issue of comparative law, the following are discussed: the problem 
of direct comparative analysis, the specific UK context of the national implementation and 
initiatives, as well as the events in other countries driving the international initiatives. 
These different events have resulted in different approaches: the international initiatives 
perhaps have a greater emphasis on reducing global systemic risk, while national initiatives 
may be in part motivated by problems surrounding the rescue of what once were the 
national financial champions. For an accurate historical picture, archives of respectable 
newspapers can be consulted. Additionally, interviews, speeches and biographies of major 
political players can be used to provide a background to historical decisions made at the 
time. 
e. Comparative Analysis in the Case Study of Japan 
Japan, which during the nineties faced a financial crisis followed by more than a decade of 
reforms, is an important case study. Part of Japan’s responses to the crisis amount to a 
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gradual legal transplantation of selected Delaware laws to change its corporate 
governance.87 There are many problems of comparative law. First and foremost, there is 
the language barrier in accessing Japanese (legal) sources. Some of the relevant legislation 
and codes are available in English: the Ministry of Justice publishes the most important new 
laws in both English and Japanese on their website.88 The difficulty is that not all laws are 
published and that, unlike for example in Westlaw, it is difficult to see which parts of the 
laws are repealed or in force. Another example is the Japanese Corporate Auditors 
Association, which publishes codes, rules and parts of relevant law in Japanese but with an 
English translation on their website.89 There is also a fair amount of German90 and a 
growing amount of English91 secondary source material available. As with the official 
English versions of Japanese laws, one is relying on their accuracy and on the fact that 
nothing has been lost in translation. Especially when going from Japanese via German to 
English, this is a substantial risk.  
The methodology of studying Japanese law in the English speaking world has shifted over 
the last years to consider seriously the relevant cultural aspects in the analysis.92 Where 
early research did often take very limited statistical data into consideration and then 
generalised, in the eighties a shift towards econometrically sound analysis accompanied 
English studies of Japanese law. The analysis was accompanied by a realisation that merely 
understanding the rules was insufficient. In particular with reference to Japan, which is in 
many ways so different from European nations, it is important to understand how and why 
rules were made. This full analysis has more explanatory value than merely studying the 
impact of legislation in Japan.93 This increased use of socio-economic analysis when 
studying Japanese law enriches the analysis by understanding why laws are made and how 
they interact with rules in society. It draws away from conclusions as to whether Japan is 
now converging to similar legal systems as seen in the West. Instead, Japan is still 
recognised as a nation on its own with its own political, economic and social factors and it 
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is regarded as having a complex and gradually shifting legal system of its own right.94 It 
underlines the fact that, despite the legal transplants, Japan is a nation with its own rules 
and socio-economic history and context. 
When studying Japanese law one has to consider the problem of legal transplants because 
parts of Japanese laws are taken from German and US legislation. But a rule that is being 
transplanted has a meaning and interpretation in its original system; it has a context and 
comes from legal tradition or legal culture.95 Hence any comparative legal analysis needs to 
examine the ‘original context’ as well as the ‘receiving context’. For a legal transplant to be 
successful and work as in the original context, this original context would need to be 
transferred along with the transplanted rule. In practice this cannot be the case. This re-
emphasises the importance of the study of Japanese law within its social- and economic 
context and why it is what it is as outlined above. It becomes necessary to think about 
Japan’s legal culture, especially, because of the legal transplants, it is necessary to go 
beyond current national context.96 One could go as far as by looking at Japanese 
anthropology. Anthropology is the field of studying foreign cultures and therefore very 
helpful in the comparative analysis.97 By including the anthropological analysis, it allows the 
inclusion of an examination of a set of unwritten rules within Japanese society98 that may 
explain certain phenomena that black-letter law cannot.99 These sorts of codes, values and 
rules must be included in this research, for example to explain the role of directors as 
‘company elders’.  
5. Conclusions 
This research is based on the hypothesis that corporate governance at UK banks was weak 
and that improvements are needed. This has led to the formulation of three separate 
research questions, which look at these weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks. 
To answer the questions, this thesis contains an investigation into the failures of UK banks 
during the recent financial crisis, and the short- and long-term responses. Additionally, it 
contains a comparative analysis with Japan’s corporate governance reforms. One of the 
main difficulties of this research project is that it will involve a significant amount of 
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comparative analysis. When investigating the failures of banks, with the objective to 
identify risks and weaknesses of corporate governance, it needs to be done with the 
understanding that corporate governance itself is not uniquely defined. In different 
countries, or in fact within a single country, different systems of corporate governance can 
exist. Published reports and recommendations are often written from a specific 
background or, when done at international level, form a compromise of different views. 
Thus, when analysing the failures of UK banks and their corporate governance, one needs 
to be aware of the comparative analysis that is being made. 
Similar problems surround the analysis of the responses to the financial crisis. The 
international reports, as well as their implementation at EU and UK level, must be 
approached with the right methodology for comparative analysis in the forefront of our 
minds. The global response, unified as it might have appeared at the height of the crisis, is 
inevitably a merger of problems, ideas and experiences at various national levels. Likewise, 
the important Basel Committee and its reports are international compromises that will find 
their way into national legislation. In the case of the UK, these will go through the extra 
legislative layer that is the EU. Whilst investigating the effectiveness of these measures in 
addressing the shortcomings of corporate governance at UK banks this must be kept firmly 
in mind. 
The case study of Japan’s changes to corporate governance is by definition a comparative 
analysis. Likewise, any comparison and conclusions must be reached within the right 
framework with the right methodology. This thesis sets out to answer questions on 
corporate governance at UK banks. The research plan starts at theories of the company and 
corporate governance, leading to an analysis of the bank failures and measures taken in 
response. It is imperative that, whilst following the outlined plan, the comparative element 
receives the attention it needs at each stage. 
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Chapter 2 – Theory on the Corporate Governance of Banks 
1. Introduction 
This chapter lays the groundwork of the theory of corporate governance as required to 
construe an answer to the research questions. This theoretical framework will form the 
basis for the analysis in the following chapters. In order to analyse the weaknesses and 
failures of corporate governance at banks, one must have a full understanding of this 
theoretical framework. It will aid in identifying these weaknesses and, furthermore, it will 
inform the debate on the appropriateness of the responses and legislative measures that 
have been following the financial crisis. 
The concept of corporate governance is generally about the control of companies. A 
discussion about what is really meant by the word company is required to undertake even 
more preliminary groundwork. Without a clear understanding of what makes a company, 
the discussion about the control of it is meaningless. This basic groundwork consists of 
analysing the main theories of existence of the company, which is discussed in the first 
section. These different theories seek to address the question what a company actually is. 
Particular distinction is drawn to the legal concept of a company and the real world 
concept.  
This first section informs the second one on theories of corporate governance. Without 
understanding what a company is, it not meaningful to talk about its systems of control and 
governance. This second section describes the main theories of corporate governance as 
well as the historical development through important reports on corporate governance. 
This discussion includes the distinction between internal and external corporate 
governance. It is necessary to analyse these concepts in the general setting before looking 
at the specific and narrower case of banks. 
This analysis of corporate governance is extended in the third section to include risk 
management and corporate social responsibility before the fourth section narrows the 
focus of all these concepts to banks. This fourth section contains bank specific aspects of 
corporate governance, including those highlighted by the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision. The concepts of risk management, corporate social responsibility as well as 
internal and external corporate governance each take on a special meaning in the case of 
banks. Hence the general theory is here complemented by bank specific elements.  
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In the analysis as outlined above comparative methodology plays a central role. The 
discussion on what a company is will differ greatly per country, where different historical 
developments have led to different types and forms of companies. Likewise, the 
governance of these companies varies greatly per country, consider for example the 
different board styles in Germany and the US. Even within countries themselves there 
exists a variety of different governance structures. The debate about the role of the 
company towards its employees or its role within the society and environment in which it 
operates will be informed by each country’s historical development. These notions must be 
firmly kept in mind when discussing any of the theories presented in this chapter.  
2. Defining the Company 
a. What is a Company? 
Before considering the governance of a company, it is necessary to consider the 
philosophical question of what a company actually is. Sometimes, the company is not 
clearly defined at all. In early literature, it is sometimes defined merely implicitly as 
activities that take place under an entrepreneur, which is less costly than relying on outside 
markets.1 This person has the control to direct the employees what to do and it is this 
existence of control which creates the company. This approach was criticised because it 
may not be the authority of this single person but the contractual relations that bring 
people together.2 This criticism led to the development of the contractual theory, which 
will be discussed in more detail later.3 In this approach, the company is arguably seen 
implicitly as the real world entity. 
There are, however, two different companies that must be distinguished. On one side, 
there is the real world entity, whilst on the other side there is the legal entity, which is 
merely an abstract thing.4 The real world entity consists of the physical assets, such as 
buildings, machinery, inventory and workers. Whether the law describes them or not, 
whether the law declares that they are a company or not, these physical aspects will be 
there: the machinery and workers would carry on. On the other side, consider a group of 
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people that decide to go through the application process to form a company. Once done, 
the legal entity is created, but in the real world very little has changed. This fundamental 
observation impacts the following sections, which describe different theories of the 
existence of companies. All of these theories are in some way problematic once the 
question is asked what a company really is and these theories must therefore be 
approached with care.5  
The study of corporate governance should be seen in the context of the theories of the 
existence of companies. Each theory has its own implications for corporate governance. 
There are various different theories of existence of the company, including contractual, 
communitarian and concessionary theories.6 Different authors use slightly different 
categories, if only in name, but these three as outlined by Professor Dine will be particularly 
helpful for this research. It appears that the different theories can be matched with the 
different circumstances and behaviour by the UK banks before and after the financial crisis. 
RBS, for example, behaved much along the lines of contractual theory before the crisis. 
After the crisis, with a large part in government ownership, the communitarian theory is 
more appropriate to describe the situation. Before the crisis, investment bankers at RBS 
behaved individualistically, focussing on their own performance for which they would be 
rewarded. The performance contracts the driving force behind the high performing 
investment banks. The combined good performance of individuals would lead to a good 
performance of RBS as a whole. After the part nationalisation, the objectives of RBS 
became blurred. On one hand, the government asked it to stimulate the economy by 
lending more to small business, on the other hand RBS needed to reduce its bloated 
balance sheet both for regulatory purposes and to free up capital allocated to non-
profitable activities. RBS was faced with conflicting regulatory, commercial and political 
objectives. Although these theories may originally not have been drawn up for the purpose 
of examining individual companies, its application in this manner helps in answering the 
research questions concerning the changes in corporate governance of UK banks. 
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b. Contractual Theory 
The contractual theory7 describes the company as a nexus of contracts. It can be argued 
that it forms the basis of corporate law. If one takes the company as a complex set of 
explicit and implicit contracts, then corporate law can arguably enable the participants to 
select an optimal arrangement of risks and opportunities that are available.8 Corporate law, 
due to the freedom of contract, would thus play a more important role than for example 
regulation. There have been many critics of the contractual theory. One line of criticism is 
that these contracts do not always exist, or sometimes only partially.9 In such a case, 
assumptions would have to be made to fill in the gap. For example, one could assume that 
both parties would fill in the gaps in such a way that maximises both their wealth position. 
It is clear that in reality this would not necessarily be the case. 
A possible solution is to split contractual theory into legal contractual theory and economic 
contractual theory. In legal contractual theory, the company is regarded as an association 
or aggregation of individuals, brought together through contractual relations between its 
members.10 The contractual conception can be useful to examine the relationship between 
the board and directors or other internal relationships. It does, however, limit the model to 
company internal relationships as external parties or regulators are not directly part of the 
contracts that make up the company. The company is placed in the sphere of private law 
and it is purely regarded as a legal entity.11 It is further limited as it does not describe a 
company for what it really is, either in a physical form or as a legal entity. 
In economic contractual theory, the firm remains a nexus of contracts. The view is that the 
individuals inside the company seek to operate with maximum efficiency and to minimise 
any transaction costs. The key concepts are that an individual in the company acts 
rationally, based on full information available, to gain efficiency.12 The concept of 
individualism is linked with liberal thought13 making the working of the company rely on 
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self-correction (or market correction) instead of any regulatory interference. As a result, 
the company remains internally focussed, satisfying internal contracts between the 
individuals, without any regard for moral obligations or social responsibilities. The risk of 
following contractual theory is thus that it has the potential to create “very bad 
companies”, i.e. by creating companies without morals or social responsibility, with a 
preference for as little regulation as possible – or as they can get away with.14 
This was not always the commonly held view. Thirty years ago, the contract theory was far 
more positively regarded, probably aided by the dominant views of the Chicago School of 
Economics. Viewing the company as a nexus of contracts allows for different groups to 
contribute what they are good at whilst reducing overall costs. Likewise, shareholders 
provide capital whilst leaving the management to professional managers and 
entrepreneurs, providing managers with the objective of maximizing shareholder value to 
align interests; to manage divergence of interests, fiduciary duties should approximate the 
bargain investors and managers would reach if there were zero transaction costs.15 The 
criticism that this omits any accountability to society raises the question what is public 
interest and when should profit maximisation be sacrificed for this. Taking a step back, one 
could ask the question: do companies behave in a socially responsible manner?16 Efficient 
profit making companies provide many jobs and products or services that consumers want 
to buy whilst companies in difficulty are more likely to cut corners and provide unsafe 
working conditions or cause pollution.17 Taking the example of decisions on pollution of a 
nearby river, it is not a question of corporate governance, in the sense of the structure of 
governance of the company, but a matter of agreement or contract that can be reached 
between the company, local authorities and the local population.18 Furthermore, corporate 
social responsibility defined as accountability of management to not only shareholders but 
also society is problematic, for the company, defined as a nexus of contracts, cannot have 
social or moral obligations.19 Managers do not have a contract with society, but with 
shareholders, hence their objectives are defined accordingly. This means that recognition 
of the interests of stakeholders outside the company cannot take place because they are 
                                                          
14 Joel Bakan, The Corporation: A Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (2003 Random House) 
15 Daniel R Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’ (1982) 35 Vand L Rev 1259, 1264 
16 ibid 1269 
17 ibid 1269 
18 ibid 1270 
19 Ibid 1273 
42 
 
not part of the nexus of contracts, and that taking these interests into account can mean 
not fully fulfilling shareholder interests.20 
As stated before, this view from thirty years ago, although useful for this research, is 
becoming more difficult to defend today. The contractual theory, together with the 
dominance of shareholder value to which it is linked, resulted in the “asocial corporation” 
and, by influencing legislation, promoted what can be termed “deregulatory 
globalisation”.21 In the post-crisis UK financial sector there is a shift in the debate: 
regulation is becoming more intrusive and defining social functions of the banks is 
becoming more important. The categorisation of theories of existence of the firm by 
Professor Dine22 can be used: in an ante-crisis world, the behaviour of financial institutes 
and the environment in which they operated can be brought back to the contractual 
theory. In banks, individuals were driven by their own performance-related contracts, 
which in the short-term improved the performance of the company. In a post-crisis world, 
there is not merely a search for an alternative, such as the concession theory, but there is 
the emergence of state-owned financial institutions, which can be linked to the 
communitarian theory. The government would seek to achieve some its goals by 
instructing the part nationalised banks, for example to lend more to businesses in an 
attempt to stimulate the economy. 
c. Concession and Communitarian Theory 
The communitarian theory and the concession theory take a different starting point as both 
have a role for the state in the creation of the company. The concession theory, as its name 
indicates, views the existence of a company as a concession by the state.23 The term 
concession hints at a very long history and comes from the time of the rise of the national 
state when it was at conflict with religious congregations and organisations of feudal 
origin.24 At that time, any organisation would draw its legitimacy from an express grant of 
supreme power, in this case the state. The company can thus exist as a legal entity itself 
once granted power by the state. A more recent point of departure is found in Dartmouth 
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College v Woodward,25 in which it was said that a company is an artificial being, possessing 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers on it. This can be extended 
to the view that the state grants special advantages, including limited liability and 
favourable treatment in the accumulation of assets.26 As such, it could even be said that 
this approach forms the bases for the Companies Act 2006 in the UK. 
A straightforward criticism of the concession theory is that the state may actually have the 
opposite objective. It sometimes seeks to curtail the company and to thwart rather than 
facilitate organisational development.27 Another fundamental shortcoming of this approach 
is that it only covers the company as a legal entity, because that legal entity is granted a 
status by the state. Nothing is said about the physical aspects of the company, something 
the state has no say in. The state allows companies to operate with minimal interference 
except that it seeks to ensure that governance structures are “good”. It does so without 
imposing its own goals upon the company as it does in communitarian theory.  
Bottomley introduces “Constitutionalism” which also allows the state to regulate corporate 
governance.28 With the claim that legal regulation of corporate governance should reflect 
the values of public political life, he arrives at three core elements of constitutionalism: first 
dual decision making, outlining the differences between the board of directors and the 
meeting of shareholders in the life of the company; second, deliberate decision making 
which implies an open process of decision making that takes all relevant aspects into 
account; third, the idea of separation of powers to create accountability throughout the 
company. By putting these together, Bottomley tries to create a framework in which the 
quality of decision making is improved and moves beyond creating profits for the 
shareholders. 
The communitarian theory goes further than the concession theory in that it views the 
creation of the company as the creation of an instrument that the state can utilise. A 
problem with this approach is that it defines a company in terms of social aspects instead 
of any legal basis or even physical assets. An extreme example of communitarian theory is 
the German Corporation Law 1937. Besides its changes to the influence of the 
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management board and the board of directors, it prescribes an objective for companies: 
they must operate to improve the general welfare.29 If a company was found in breach of 
this objective then the state could dissolve it. This was driven by the ideas of the National 
Socialist movement, which wanted to see the state in control of economic activity in order 
to produce a socially acceptable outcome. The communitarian model is also adopted in 
former communist countries,30 standing directly opposed to the contractual model based 
on individualism and liberalism. The company no longer has commercial objectives but it 
will have political objectives. These objectives can serve the society in which the company 
operates, leading to an extreme form of corporate social responsibility. It is more likely, 
however, that, as a political tool, the company will be faced with conflicting commercial 
and political targets. 
3. Corporate Governance 
a. The Main Theories 
The different theories of existence of the company can now inform the discussion on to 
control these companies. This section will provide different theories of corporate 
governance, which are ultimately about the control of the company. As least several of 
these existential theories appear to have been developed separately from those on 
corporate governance. As such, there is not always a clear relationship between the two 
fields. It is thus not necessarily possible to match a theory of corporate governance with 
one of existence of the company. However, the understanding of why companies exists will 
inform discussion of the main theories of corporate governance: the agency theory, the 
resource dependence and stewardship theory and the stakeholder theory.  
Consider the control of the company and separation of ownership and control.31 In the 
agency theory, the problem is how the dispersed shareholders, in effect the owners, can 
control the board, their agents, to look after their property, the company.32 The 
assumption is that the agent will try to act in his self-interest rather than in that of the 
company. Thus the shareholders need to create incentives, coined the agency costs, that 
align the interests of the agent with that of the shareholders. Agency theory was developed 
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in a wider context of corporate governance.33 It could be extended to cover employer and 
employees or company and creditors. This theory is closely related to the contractual 
theory as the agents are controlled by contractual agreements. However, these contracts 
need to be monitored and enforced, creating agency costs. 
Closely related to the agency theory is the transaction cost economics.34 The difference is 
that it does not regard the firm as a nexus of contracts but as a governance structure. The 
firm seeks to minimize transactions costs by undertaking transactions internally rather than 
externally, thus growing in size. The choice of governance structure reduces the costs of 
misaligned transactions. Other researchers have stated that, as contracts will always be 
incomplete and never cover for every situation, where agency problems are present the 
form of governance structure will be important.35 
Rejecting the negative assumption of the agency theory is the stewardship theory.36 The 
assumption is made that people join the board with the best interests of the company at 
heart and look after it in the long term as stewards.  The question is whether the 
organisation has the right structure that enable the steward to do this. The stewardship 
theory is thus concerned with empowered management issues, a typical example of which 
might be whether the role of chief executive officer and chairman should be combined or 
separate. 
The last main theory discussed here is the stakeholder theory. This theory has been 
promoted by various international organisations, such as the OECD. The main difference 
with the previous theories at that it no longer assumes shareholder supremacy. One might 
thus simplify the situation and say that it introduces elements from other countries, such as 
Germany or Japan, into US corporate governance. Although it recognises that shareholders 
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are the owners, the theory argues that everyone with an interest in the company should be 
looked after. The most direct stakeholders include employees, customers and suppliers, 
but this can easily be extended to the community and environment in which the firm 
operates. Note that it shares this broader view of the company sitting within the company’s 
wider environment with the resource dependence theory.37 This theory starts with the 
same assumption as the stewardship theory: that the board, when hired, will act in the best 
interest of the company. The problem for the resource dependency theory becomes one of 
managing the dependence on outside groups for resources. This can include sourcing its 
board’s members, seen as a source of management skills, knowledge and connections. 
b. Internal and External Corporate Governance 
Another way to look at corporate governance is to split it into internal and external 
corporate governance or controls.38 Internal controls are internal to the company. One 
could regard the board as the highest control in the firm, exercising control over the 
decisions made by senior management.39 The idea of such internal control mechanisms 
closely aligns with agency theory, as the issue of control of the agents by the shareholders 
could be done by way of performance contracts. Consequently, the performance and the 
skills of the board as well as how they influence and steer the company play a central role 
in internal corporate governance.  
On the other side stands external corporate governance.40 This can be summarised as the 
control exerted by the markets over the company. It could be seen as a method of last 
resort, which becomes active when all the internal control mechanisms have failed.41 
Assuming current management is inefficient, the potential fight for management with 
other company’s management can be a way to improve performance. A potential hostile 
take-over would thus be an external mechanism to control management. It ties into 
contractual theory if one regards the implementation of the contracts with minimal 
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transaction as the objective of this external mechanism. Large investors as well as large 
creditors can thus exercise significant control over the company.42 
c. The Cadbury Report and Its Successors 
Having set the theoretical background regarding the existence of companies, the next step 
is to define what is understood by a system of corporate governance. Although 
internationally harmonised principles do exist, what is implemented as a system of 
corporate governance is country specific. This research is focused primarily on the UK,43 
although where possible arguments from international reports, such as OECD’s report on 
corporate governance,44 can inform the debate through comparative analysis. Using both 
UK and international reports of various time periods, this section outlines what is meant by 
a system of corporate governance. Note that the OECD published an updated version of its 
principles45 in September 2015; the theory in this chapter largely relies on the previous 
version that was in place during the crisis. 
In 1992, the Cadbury committee defined corporate governance as ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’.46 Although the Cadbury report has now been 
replaced by the UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined Code) this 
definition still stands.47  The definition is rather compact and not necessarily helpful; it 
quickly gives rise to the questions: who directs and controls it? And what system is used? 
To the first question Cadbury answers that the ‘Boards of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their companies’,48 whilst the system is completed by adding the remaining 
actors: ‘the shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint directors and the auditors and to 
satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place’.49  
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The Cadbury report was followed by various reports, some of which have already been 
mentioned. The Financial Reporting Council is responsible for maintaining high standards of 
corporate governance in the UK and does so by, inter alia, publishing the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. The Cadbury report had been folded in to the Combined Code, together 
with the Greenbury report on remuneration and the Hampel report on the implementation 
of Cadbury and Greenbury. After several updates, this Combined Code has now been 
renamed as the UK Corporate Governance Code.50 Although it describes the purpose of 
corporate governance as ‘to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management 
that can deliver the long-term success of the company’,51 it does not extend the actors in a 
system of corporate governance beyond the board and the shareholders. In this case, ‘long-
term success’ does not imply that different stakeholders should be considered. 
d. International Reports 
Looking at the international reports which have harmonized the practices of different 
countries, the system of corporate governance can be extended to include more actors. 
Ten years after Cadbury, the OECD, for example, states that 
‘employees and stakeholders play an important role in contributing to the 
long-term success and performance of the corporation’.52 
Although the OECD remains neutral towards the different approaches of corporate 
governance, in this statement, the contribution of stakeholders to the ‘long-term success’ 
of the company is recognised. The OECD provides examples of some important 
stakeholders. 
‘The competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of 
teamwork that embodies contributions from a range of different resource 
providers including investors, employees, creditors and suppliers’.53 
Other international reports, which are the result of harmonising different practices across 
countries, such as Basel II54 and the Winter Report,55 also use this enlarged definition. The 
main national differences brought together in these international reports concern labour 
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co-determination and whether shareholders should extend their concern from profit 
maximisation to wider social and environmental issues outside the company.56 However, 
these national differences are gradually declining as elements of the harmonised reports 
are implemented in national statutes. In the UK, the directors have a fiduciary duty towards 
the shareholders as well as, per the Companies Act 2006, s172, to promote the success of 
the company whilst having regard for employees, suppliers, customers and others as well 
as impact on the community and environment. Alistair Darling, then Secretary for Trade 
and Industry, commented that 
‘directors will be required to promote the success of the company in the 
collective best interest of their shareholders, but in doing so they will have 
to have regard to a wide range of factors, including the interests of the 
employees and the environment’.57 
This progresses from the view held in the Companies Act 1985, s309, which merely 
specified that directors should have regard for ‘the interests of the company’s employees 
in general, as well as the interest of its members’. It has remained entrenched in the 
concept of shareholder value as the directors are merely to have regard for these wider 
issues whilst promoting the success of the company. These sections of the Company Act 
2006 have therefore been branded ‘enlightened shareholder value’ as it goes somewhat 
further than merely shareholder value.58 Moving even further away from shareholders 
towards stakeholders allows for corporate social responsibility, defined as ‘the 
responsibility towards the company’s stakeholders’ where the term ‘stakeholders’ is quite 
widely defined.59  
Identifying the actors is not necessarily sufficient to determine the entire system: consider 
the difference between the UK’s single board and the dual board as is adopted in 
Germany.60 It is not obvious which of the two is better, if that is possible to say at all given 
the difficulties in directly comparing the two. It is, however, clear that in both cases the 
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directors are important actors in a system of good corporate governance. As discussed, the 
Companies Act 2006 outlines the responsibilities of directors. These include their fiduciary 
duties towards the company; although the company can enforce these duties, the 
shareholders will be able to enforce them as well through derivatives action.61 The 
directors will therefore have to act in the best interests of the company, otherwise they can 
be held to account. 
e. Elements of a Good System of Corporate Governance 
With the concept of a system of corporate governance comes the question: what principles 
constitute a good system of corporate governance? Here the distinction is made between 
the processes and the principles. There is more international agreement on these general 
principles than there is on the system itself as, taken on their own, the principles do not 
prescribe a specific implementation. There is a distinction between the accepted principles 
and the actual processes that are implemented: a general principle such as transparency is 
easily committed to, but to ensure there is full transparency in risk management processes 
is something different. Another problem is that what is regarded as a good level of 
transparency varies greatly per country, leading to comparative problems. What 
constitutes an accepted or expected level of transparency varies greatly between for 
example UK companies and Japanese companies. What is regarded as transparent in Japan 
is often not regarded as transparent at all in the UK. Consider as an example the years of 
absence of transparency in the non-performing loans in Japan during the nineties. The 
uncertainty about the extent of the problematic loans on banks’ books, compared with an 
unwillingness to deal with it, resulted in what was effectively a very long credit crunch. A 
more recent example is the lack of transparency provided by TEPCO at the time of the 
nuclear disaster at Fukushima. The most accurate and up-to-date information appeared to 
be coming from US sources instead of Japanese. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter six. 
Returning to Cadbury, the important principles are ‘those of openness, integrity and 
accountability’.62 Openness or transparency allows stakeholders to scrutinise actions and 
decisions taken within the company. A good code on transparency is set out by the IMF,63 
which despite being written for transparency on fiscal policy is highly relevant for 
                                                          
61 Patrick Beale, ‘Directors Beware?’ (2007) 157 NLJ 1033 
62 Sir Adrian Cadbury (n 46) 3.2 
63 International Monetary Fund, ‘Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency’ (2007) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507c.pdf> accessed 14 November 2015  
51 
 
companies as well. It defines four pillars for good practice on openness and transparency: 
clarity of roles and responsibilities, open budget process, public availability of information 
and assurances of integrity. In a company, there should also be clarity on the roles and 
responsibilities as well as integrity. The openness required to the outside world is different 
for a public body but should perhaps be increased for a private company as well. A high 
level of transparency allows employees or other stakeholders to participate.  The 
participation of stakeholders can correct bad decisions taken before the situation escalates: 
consider the example of Hazell v Hammersmith and Fullham LBC, where the council had 
exceeded their mandate by investing in risky assets.64 Due to the council’s openness in its 
investments, members of the general public had adequate information to participate and, 
in this case, conclude that legal action was required. The difference here is that the council 
is a public body and therefore has more requirements towards openness and transparency 
than private companies, as was the case with IMF recommendations, but perhaps this 
suggests that private companies should be subject to similar requirements of transparency.  
The other principles, i.e. integrity and accountability, can refer to internal information 
systems but also to integrity or fairness in remuneration and taking action in the case of 
failure. Cadbury defines integrity as ‘straightforward dealing or completeness’.65 The 
integrity of internal information systems and internal control has been described by the 
Turnbull Guidance and subsequent updates; it places clear responsibility for designing such 
a system of control with the directors.66 International reports, such as those by the IMF67 
and by the OECD68, refer to integrity as ‘the quality of the information that is supplied’. The 
final point is accountability, which Cadbury claims is made effective ‘through the quality of 
information [the board of directors] provide to the shareholders, and shareholders through 
their willingness to exercise their responsibility as owners’.69 Hence accountability works in 
two directions: the directors need to provide good information and the shareholders need 
to act on it, especially in the case of failure. The three principles of transparency, integrity 
and accountability are closely linked; it is difficult to take any of them away as the 
remaining principles will not be sufficient on their own. 
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4. Risk Management and Social Responsibility 
a. Risk Management 
Risk is inherent in any business operation that is undertaken. A definition of risk is provided 
by the Basel II report as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events’.70 Risk management is aimed at 
identifying, measuring and managing risks. Unfortunately, not all risks can be measured 
and a distinction can be made between quantifiable and unquantifiable risks.71 There is a 
clear link between corporate governance and risk management and social responsibility. It 
is clear that without elements such as transparency, integrity and accountability there 
cannot be a system of good risk management within the company. This comes back to the 
duties of directors, who are universally identified as important actors in the system of 
corporate governance. The duties of the director, as per Companies Act 2006 s172, relate 
directly to risk management of the company. Likewise, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
states that ‘the board … should maintain sound risk management systems and internal 
control’.72 This is further supported by the recent paper by the Financial Reporting Council 
concerning the board and risk, stating that  
‘Transparency and clear lines of accountability through the organisation 
were essential for effective risk management’.73 
The link between corporate governance and risk management translates directly into 
corporate social responsibility. This becomes the link between internal and external 
corporate governance. Good external corporate governance becomes corporate social 
responsibility and describes what can be expected from a company’s behaviour within 
society. Consider for example the Deepwater Horizon disaster, an environmental disaster in 
the Gulf of Mexico and the US coast due to an explosion on board an oil drilling rig.74 The 
commission that investigated concluded that 
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‘In years [...] neither industry nor government adequately addressed these 
risks. Investments in safety, containment, and response equipment and 
practices failed to keep pace with the rapid move into deepwater drilling. 
... given the financial returns [...] the business succumbed to a false sense 
of security. The Deepwater Horizon disaster exhibits the costs of a culture 
of complacency’.75 
This highlights two aspects of corporate governance: firstly, the focus on ‘financial returns’ 
signifies that returns for shareholders have been sought above all else. Secondly, the ‘false 
sense of security’ and ‘culture of complacency’ indicates that there was insufficient internal 
control, transparency and accountability as risks at the production level have been ignored 
or not communicated upwards in the organisation. Good internal corporate governance 
and thereby risk management could have helped to prevent this disaster which so 
dramatically affected the society and community it operated in.  
b. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility is difficult to define; different people define it differently 
depending on their own position and viewpoint, but it always appears to involve, to some 
extent, an obligation of the company to exercise some concern towards the environment in 
which they operate. It has largely been a voluntary affair in the UK, but, through the 
Companies Act 2006 and case law, there is a legal basis emerging to support it.76 As 
discussed previously, the acknowledgement of any moral or social obligations of the 
company moves away from the contractual theory, in which a company as nexus of 
contracts cannot have a social or moral conscience. Milton Friedman, in a now classic 
newspaper article, makes in this context the distinction between the companies and those 
who manage it.77 First, he argues that managers come with their own background and 
beliefs and in their personal capacity they may fulfil any social responsibility they see fit. 
However, as an agent of the owners of the company, in their time and with their money, 
Milton Friedman asks the question: what it would mean to be socially responsible? His 
examples show that all decisions that would fulfil some social goal would automatically be 
at the expense of the shareholders’ profits, effectively taxing the company, meaning that 
he does not work well as their agent. Furthermore, Milton Friedman argues that it is 
impossible for the management to determine which social goals it should chose to fulfil – 
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something that is normally done, as is the case for taxes, through a democratic process. He 
does point out, that, besides the objective of making money, there is the obligation to 
operate within the bounds of the law and that by doing so there is social responsibility. 
Can Milton Friedman’s exposition be married to the earlier argument that a system of good 
corporate governance, containing the necessary elements, gives rise to good risk 
management and corporate social responsibility? There are two observations to be made. 
Firstly, the owners of the company themselves may consider objectives other than profit 
making.78 This may take the form of a moral or social conscience of the investors, from 
divestment in countries where human rights are violated to simple charitable giving. The 
impact of reputational considerations next to these moral considerations should not be 
forgotten. In practice, the investors may not be inclined to do so, considering that not only 
are they very dispersed, leaving decisions to the board, they are also under pressure 
themselves to obtain good returns on their investments. Secondly, there is a difference 
between Milton Friedman’s social objectives and the prevention of disasters in the 
community the company operates through sound risk management. In other words, what 
is exactly meant by corporate social responsibility is not the same amongst researchers and 
may in fact be very difficult to define.79 
The problem with Corporate Social Responsibility is then that it has become a wide term 
under which anything ranging from saving the planet to merely honesty and fairness in 
business transactions can be placed.80 Many of the large companies are producing a report 
on their social responsibilities in some form or other. Whether this reflects a commitment 
as a result from genuine beliefs or a reputational and public relation concern is the 
question.81 The pressure piled on companies by various NGOs, including Greenpeace in the 
case of environmental disasters or Amnesty International in case of human rights abuses, 
aided by an increase in global media and communication, is tremendous, influencing 
consumers but also employees. For this research, all these considerations will be 
important. Firstly, corporate social responsibility for banks needs to be defined: is it limited 
to dealing fairly with account holders? Does it include wider concerns regarding the 
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stability of global financial markets and the world economy or is that merely an effect of 
good risk management? Should finance be provided to polluting oil companies or should it 
be provided to small businesses in the UK to simulate the economy? Both these questions 
go back as far as the theory of existence of the company and, although banks may be 
considered a special case, these general theories remain valid and should be applied. It 
would appear that, in the case of banks, one should perhaps not so much consider 
Friedman’s social causes that are chosen seemingly at random, but instead the social 
causes covered here should include the responsibility to society at large to provide a sound 
financial infrastructure. This would include financial stability and a minimal disturbance to 
the economy if a bank failure ever were to happen. 
5. Corporate Governance at Banks 
a. Why Banks are Different 
Corporate governance for banks adds an extra dimension to the analysis of corporate 
governance due to a few specific elements that banks have over other companies. 
Corporate governance for banks has several very specific issues including extensive 
regulation and supervision, ‘debt-governance’ and a much greater emphasis on risk 
management.82  
Because of several bank failures, international groups such as the Basel Committee have 
set out global standards for risk management and capital requirements, such as Basel I83 
and Basel II.84 These initiatives have been widely adopted in national regulatory law. In the 
EU, they have been implemented through the Capital Requirement Directives, which in the 
UK is looked after by the Financial Services Authority. As with related EU directives, such as 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, this has been added to the FSA’s Handbook 
of Rules and Guidance. Minimum capital is only the first of the three pillars of Basel II; 
supervisory review and market discipline are the other two. The argument is that all three 
pillars are required to make the whole system work. Underlying these pillars are general 
principles as transparency which was earlier identified as an element of a system of good 
corporate governance. The impact of the Basel accords on the banking industry has been 
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enormous, especially in the context of this research project, hence the next paragraphs 
examine the main two accords preceding the financial crisis. 
b. Internal and External Corporate Governance at Banks 
When discussing the general theory of corporate governance, the distinction was made 
between internal and external corporate governance. This distinction still applies for 
corporate governance at banks. It is, however, more complicated because there are 
additional components to each of these two areas.85 The internal corporate governance 
may include aspects such as a good corporate culture and good ethics and behaviour. The 
risk management function will also play a more prominent role and the role of the Chief 
Risk Officer is even more important. This also has implications for the function of the board 
and how it controls the bank. Related to these topics is also the reward structure for 
employees. 
External corporate governance at banks still has the important control by the markets, as is 
the case with any large company. There are a few important additions. One of the most 
important external players for the bank are the regulators, who play an important role in 
the running of a bank. The traditional model, which describes the management of a 
company as agents of the shareholders, does not allow for financial regulation to play the 
role of representing the general public as stakeholders. Instead, the principal agent 
problem could be extended to include for example depositors, borrowers and other 
customers; the regulators could play the role of ensuring that the objectives of each of the 
participants with regards to risk preferences and corresponding incentives are aligned.86 
Hence the regulator needs to balance the interests of the various stakeholders in the 
economy that can be affected by the risks banks take and the potential social costs that 
arise from it.87 The regulator may also be concerned with the moral hazard arising from 
information asymmetry between the bank and stakeholder: for example, a depositor may 
not have the same insight in the bank’s risk profile as the bank does for the depositor. This 
particular issue is solved by regulation on protection or guarantee of deposits.88 The point 
is that regulators should be considered a stakeholder and can play an active role in the 
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agency problem: in the UK, the FSA is playing an active role in designing internal systems at 
the banks to achieve protection for all stakeholders, including the broader economy.89 
The Bank of England Act 1998 takes power away from the Bank of England and establishes 
the Monetary Policy Committee. The FSA was created through the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, or FSMA. This act superseded the Financial Services Act 1986, which had 
created the Securities and Investment Board. This regulator replaced various smaller 
regulating bodies and ended self-regulation. It consolidated the financial regulation into 
one main body. The name was changed to FSA following the passing of the FSMA. It later 
got additional regulatory responsibility for mortgage businesses in 2004 and for insurance 
intermediaries in 2005. The FSA’s objectives are, pursuant the FSMA s2(2), market 
confidence, public awareness, the protection of consumers and the reduction of financial 
crime. Market confidence is further defined as maintaining confidence in the UK financial 
system, including financial markets and exchanges and regulated activities. The public 
awareness implies improving public understanding of the financial system, including 
awareness of the risks and benefits associated with investments and financial dealing. 
Protection of consumers means that there is an appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers; the level of this degree being determined by the types of investment and the 
knowledge of different consumers as well as consumers’ need for accurate advice and 
information. The reduction of financial crime includes reducing crime such as fraud, 
misconduct and misuse of information in financial markets and handling the proceeds of 
crime. 
Besides the financial regulator, banks are subject to the standard gatekeepers like any 
company is, such as external accountants. These bring the same concerns for banks as they 
do for other companies, as ineffective gatekeepers can contribute to failures such as 
Enron.90 A special category of gatekeepers are the rating agencies. Although these agencies 
come with many flaws, the ratings they provide hold (or, perhaps, held) enormous cloud in 
the financial markets. These many flaws have contributed to the failure of rating agencies 
to do their job properly. Hence they are regarded as at least a contributing factor to the 
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financial crisis and in need of reform.91 They are, however, an independent entity92 that can 
provide information concerning credit worthiness to all market participants including 
banks, shareholders and regulators. 
c. Basel I: A First Step 
The first guidelines by the Basel Committee, now referred to as Basel I, were contained in 
what is only a thirty-page document, half of which are annexes. Agreement on these 
guidelines was reached between the G-10 countries and endorsed by their respective 
central bank supervisors. It contained a basic framework for measuring capital adequacy 
and the minimum standards that were to be achieved. Although agreed by only ten 
countries, the document was circulated to the relevant institutions worldwide. Its 
framework had two objectives: firstly, to ‘strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system’ and, secondly, to ‘be fair and have a high degree of 
consistency in its application to banks in different countries with a view to diminishing an 
existing source of competitive inequality among international banks’.93 A level playing field 
was created by applying such standards uniformly, however, the Committee emphasises 
that it is merely setting the minimum standards.94 National authorities could set the bar 
higher. 
The basic type of capital identified was equity in combination with disclosed reserves. It 
was common in all countries and visible in published accounts. This constituted the Tier 1 
capital. Any other amount of capital that could be legitimately considered, including 
undisclosed reserves and revaluation reserves, was referred to as Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 
capital must make up at least fifty percent of the total capital base. Other elements would 
be deducted from the capital base, such as goodwill and investment in banking subsidiaries 
that were not consolidated in national systems. One important issue that the Committee 
raised was that of double-leveraging, where banks cross-hold their capital rather than 
drawing capital from non-financial investors.  
Besides defining capital, Basel I took the first step in defining risk weights for different 
categories of assets. It was a crude framework that weighs the assets in accordance with 
their riskiness. Six aspects of the weighting framework were highlighted. The first was the 
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risk that was taken into account by the weightings. This risk was restricted to the risk of 
default of the counterparty. Consequently, many other risks, most notably market risks 
such as interest rate risk and exchange rate risk, were not considered. The second point 
was that risk attributed to countries and their public institutions was determined by 
whether or not they are an OECD member and, if it was not an OECD member, whether the 
asset was denominated in the local currency.95 The third aspect was that similar types of 
public sector entities could be assigned different weights if they were in different countries. 
The fourth aspect was that the recognition of collateral in reducing the risk weighting was 
limited to the case where collateral was either cash or OECD government bonds. The fifth 
aspect concerned loans or mortgages backed by residential property: this special category 
attracted a risk weighting of fifty percent. Finally, the sixth aspect concerned the off-
balance-sheet activities. Recognising the diversity and increasing complexity of these 
activities, the approach was to multiply the principal nominal amount by a credit 
conversion factor and weighing the result by considering the credit risk of the counterparty.  
The credit conversion factor depended on the nature of the activity: interest rate swaps 
attracted a very low factor whilst direct credit substitutes attracted a very high factor. 
Finally, Basel I set the target standard ratio for the amount of capital a bank should hold: 
the ratio of capital to risk weighted assets should be at least eight percent, of which at least 
four percent must be Tier 1 capital. Giving banks a transition period of just over four years, 
this target standard ratio had become the international norm for banks to hold. Despite its 
flaws arising from its obvious simplistic approach, it was a major step because it forced 
banks to maintain higher capital levels in line with a uniformly adopted standard. On the 
downside, it is very likely that the simplicity stimulated widespread capital arbitrage and 
encouraged the growth of the securitisation.96 
d. Basel II: The First Pillar – Minimum Capital Requirement 
Improving on the first standard set by Basel I, the Basel II report97 covers two hundred and 
thirty-nine pages, or roughly eight times the size of its predecessor. Basel II is widely 
implemented into financial regulation and, until Basel III is phased in, this is what is 
followed in current practice. The fundamental objective has been to:  
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‘… develop a framework that would further strengthen the soundness and 
stability of the international banking system while maintaining sufficient 
consistency that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant source 
of competitive inequality among internationally active banks’.98 
The main benefit, in the view of the Committee, is that Basel II will ‘promote the adoption 
of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry’.99 It has done so by trying 
to introduce more risk-sensitive capital requirements, where those in Basel I were very 
much static and determined upfront. It further allows a much greater use of the 
assessment of risk provided by the banks’ internal systems as input for the capital 
calculations, subject to some minimum requirements. Basel II is build around three pillars. 
The first pillar is the minimum capital requirement, which in itself can be split into credit 
risk, operational risk and trading book issues including market risk. The second pillar is the 
supervisory review process and the third pillar is market discipline.  
The first pillar, which describes the calculation of the minimum capital requirements, offers 
two approaches for credit risk. The first is the standardised approach, which gives a revision 
and extension of the standard risk weightings set by Basel I. The risk weightings depend 
both on the type of obligor, for example a sovereign, a bank or a corporate, and on the 
rating given to the obligor by a rating agency, such as Standard & Poor’s. The second 
approach to measuring credit risk is the banks’ internal rating-based approach. Banks can 
be given approval by their regulators, subject to disclosure requirements and other 
minimum conditions, to use their own internal estimates of risk components in 
determining the capital requirement for their exposures. This means that these banks have 
to measure for each exposure the probability of default, the loss given default, the 
exposure at default and the effective maturity. Note that the internal rating-based 
approach needs to cover the unexpected losses and not the expected losses: minimum 
capital requirements are after all set purely for the unexpected losses.  
The other two elements of the first pillar are operational risk and trading book issues. 
Operational risk is defined as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events’.100 It includes legal risk but it 
excludes strategic risk and reputational risk. As with credit risk, there are several 
approaches banks can take, varying in their level of sophistication and risk sensitivity. The 
simplest is the basic indicator approach, followed by the standardised approach. The third 
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approach, the advanced measurement approach, is based upon the bank’s internal 
operational risk measurement system but satisfying a set of specified criteria. It is up to the 
bank’s supervisor to determine whether a bank is allowed to use a more advanced method 
for part or all of its operations. The final part of the first pillar, trading book issues, 
encapsulates and updates the Market Risk Amendment.101 A trading book consists of 
‘positions in financial instruments and commodities held either with trading intent or in 
order to hedge other elements of the trading book’.102 They are subject to trading book 
capital treatment provided that the instruments are either free of any covenants on their 
tradability or could be hedged completely. Naturally, the instruments need to be accurately 
and frequently valued, at least daily, depending on market changes, either by marking-to-
market or by marking-to-model. It is important to point out that the minimum capital 
requirements for the trading books are far lower than that for the banking book discussed 
earlier. As will be discussed in the next chapters, it is this difference that becomes 
problematic during the height of the crisis when mortgage-backed securities, whilst 
becoming more illiquid and ever riskier, need to be transferred from trading book 
treatment to banking book treatment, creating a surge in the minimum capital 
requirements for the banks. 
e. Basel II: The Second Pillar – Supervisory Review Process 
The second pillar of Basel II describes the supervisory review process. The purpose is to 
‘encourage banks to develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring 
and managing their risks’.103 The supervisor must challenge the bank on the strength and 
effectiveness of its risk management systems. It should do so by not merely imposing 
higher capital requirements, but through other means as well, including improving internal 
controls and strengthening risk management. Four key principles are identified; the first 
principle is 
‘Principle 1: Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their 
capital levels’.104 
Such a process should have several key elements. The Committee is very clear in that the 
bank’s management is responsible for ‘understanding the nature and level of risk being 
taken by the bank’ and for ‘ensuring that the formality and sophistication of the risk 
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management processes are appropriate in light of the risk profile and business plan’.105 As 
such, capital requirements and planning are an essential part of the strategic objectives. 
The Committee is also very clear on the role of the directors as they are responsible for 
‘setting the bank’s tolerance for risks’.106 Furthermore, the directors need to ensure that 
management creates a framework to assess the various risks and how they impact the 
bank’s capital. Finally, directors also need to ensure that appropriate internal policies are 
designed, communicated, monitored and adhered to. All of this should lead to sound 
capital and risk assessment based on good internal systems of monitoring, reporting and 
internal control. 
‘Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate bank’s internal capital 
adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor 
and ensure their compliance with regulatory ratios. Supervisors should take 
appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of 
this process’.107 
The second principle gives supervisors the task to review the adequacy of risk assessment 
within the bank. The supervisor should also review the assessment of capital adequacy and 
of the control environment.  The banks need to be held to operate above the minimum 
level required. 
‘Principle 3: Supervisors expect banks to operate above the minimum 
regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to 
hold capital in excess of the minimum’.108 
Although the capital requirements from the first pillar will prescribe a minimum amount of 
capital to be held, it is based upon the fact that the bank will operate with a good risk 
management and internal control system as well as a diversified risk profile. In short, a 
supervisor may judge that in particular circumstances assumptions underlying the first 
pillar are not met and that more capital may need to be held. 
‘Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to 
prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required to support 
the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid 
remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored’.109 
A supervisor should have a range of options to intervene when capital threatens to drop 
below the required minimum, varying from merely more intrusive supervision to forcing 
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the bank to raise its capital. The Committee points out that additional capital is not always 
the solution to a bank’s problem: it may instead, for example, need to improve its internal 
systems and controls. 
f. Basel II: The Third Pillar – Market Discipline 
The third pillar introduces additional disclosure requirements for banks. The underlying 
thought is that, through disclosure, the market will enforce a discipline upon the banks that 
complements the first two pillars. It ensures that other market participants have access to 
key information about the soundness of the bank, including its capital and risk exposures 
and assessment processes. The Committee recognises that its disclosure requirements 
must not clash with other disclosure requirements arising from, for example, accounting 
standards. The scope is therefore limited to only those matters that concern the bank 
capital adequacy. It should only disclose that what is considered to be material: meaning 
that an omission or a misstatement could influence the assessment or decision of the user. 
g. Critique on the Basel Reports 
It is obvious that Basel I had its shortcomings, if only because it has already been 
superseded by Basel II. It is however worth highlighting some of its major deficiencies so 
that the preogress and changes of Basel II can be better understood. It may even be argued 
that Basel I had made the financial system less stable, not more.110 That conclusion is 
reached on the basis of several shortcomings. Firstly, there is the arbitrary categorisation 
and weighting of risk which is often a far cry from the real world. Secondly, the risk of a 
portfolio is assumed to be the sum of the individual assets, without any regard for the 
correlation or overlap between them. The assumption may hold for a very well diversified 
portfolio, but not for one where the risk is concentrated. Thirdly, the risk weights assigned 
to OECD governments are zero, implying that no capital needs to be held against them; 
even for non-OECD governments the capital requirements are less than those for safer 
corporate borrowers. Sovereign defaults after the introduction of Basel I, including 
Argentina and Russia, have proven how disastrous this assumption is. Fourthly, and 
perhaps most telling of the attitude of the banking sector towards regulation, is the fact 
that the divergence between real world economic risk and the measures of required capital 
has led to universal practices of capital arbitrage. In order to gain higher returns on their 
capital, banks started to take ever larger risks without having to increase their capital. 
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It is often claimed that Basel I led to an increase in lending to Asian banks as the capital 
required for interbank loans with a maturity less than a year is far less than that required 
for lending to non-banks.111 At the end of 1997 over sixty percent of all international bank 
lending to Asia had a maturity of less than a year; this has contributed to the Asian crisis, 
surely the opposite of what Basel I had set out to achieve. Others are more positive about 
Basel I, claiming that it has achieved its principle objectives of improving stability whilst 
providing a level playing field amongst banks, despite its simplicity.112 But even those that 
are positive acknowledge that banks are “gaming” the regulatory framework by taking 
excessive risk with those assets that require relatively low capital.113 
Basel II sought to address some of the issues of Basel I by allowing the banks to use their 
more sophisticated internal methodologies to measure the risk of their assets and 
portfolios. Since the development of Basel I, large and internationally operating banks have 
invested resources into developing better ways of assessing their risk. Their in-house 
systems were often vastly more sophisticated than the crude methods of Basel I and Basel 
II sought to use these improved techniques. It would allow a far better link between risks, 
capital required and hence reward as return on capital.114 This in turn raises two questions. 
Firstly, what will stop banks from “gaming” this system by designing their internal 
methodology in way favourable to them and, secondly, will this give an unfair disadvantage 
to smaller banks that do not have the capability or resources to invest in their own 
methodology?115 In the US, to address this second issue, the scope of application of Basel II 
has been reduced to only the large and internationally operating banks. They have a 
greater need for a sophisticated way to measure their risks due to the complexity and scale 
of their operations. The smaller US banks, which are the vast majority of the US banks, are 
already considered to be well capitalised according to Basel I standards.116 
The coming into force of Basel II had significant consequences for specific areas of banking, 
including project finance.  Unless the bank would qualify to use the internal rating-based 
approach, the loans would likely attract a weight beyond the 100% set by Basel I. Apart 
from qualifying for using an internal methodology, banks had several other major options: 
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to use securitisation, to use monoline insurance, or even to merge with competitors.117 The 
first way to reduce capital requirements is to securitize a large part of the repayment 
obligations of a loan portfolio. Investors would buy these CDOs, basing their selection on 
the underlying portfolio and the ratings. In the next chapters it will become clear that the 
increase in securitisation has played a large role in the current financial crisis and specific 
bank failures. The second way to reduce the required level of capital is to use monoline 
insurance. In this case, the loan would be wrapped with the guarantee of timely repayment 
by a monoline insurer. The capital that needs to be held against this wrapped loan is that 
which would need to be held against the monoline insurer and is typically much lower than 
the loan on itself. Again, in the next chapters, it will become apparent that monoline 
insurers were not the riskless institutions that everyone thought, thereby contributing to 
the financial crisis. The third way that is suggested, especially for smaller institutions, is that 
of a merger to create efficiencies. This also creates more systemically important 
institutions. 
h. The Financial Crisis 
The next chapters will seek to answer the main questions set for this research projects 
concerning corporate governance of banks and the financial crisis. This paragraph 
introduces some of the main concepts that will come up frequently in answering these 
questions. The prevention or reduction of systemic risk has become a major focus since the 
financial crisis. Systemic risk can be defined as  
‘the risk that the failure of one significant financial institution can cause or 
significantly contribute to the failure of other significant financial 
institutions as a result of their linkage to each other. Systemic risk can also 
be defined as to include the possibility that one exogenous shock may 
simultaneously cause or contribute to the failure of multiple significant 
financial institutions’. 118 
But what is the connection, if any, between systemic risk and banks’ corporate 
governance? There are many (firm-level) risks specific to banking that can be addressed by 
corporate governance and regulation, however, systemic risk is far more difficult to 
address.119 The answer may not be to merely impose higher capital requirements and to 
reduce risk appetite of the banks, but, in the case of failure, prevent a wide-spread crisis of 
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confidence by planning for potential large external events. Such an argument goes back to 
Cadbury and other early reports on corporate governance highlighting the importance of 
internal communication, risk management and education of senior management and 
directors.120 Klaus Hopt discusses a range of such improvements to banking corporate 
governance in great detail.121 In particular, he describes that stakeholder governance and 
goals should not be introduced for banks, instead promoting changes such as a less opaque 
structure and group-wide governance to improve the overall risk assessment. 
As a result of state aid to failing financial institutions, the Western world has seen a return 
of the state-owned enterprise. Financial giants in the US, such as Citigroup and AIG, have 
used temporary state aid provided under the “troubled asset relief program” (TARP); in the 
UK several financial institutions such as Lloyds and the Royal Bank of Scotland have 
received capital injections from the government. This makes governments shareholders, in 
some cases even majority shareholders, in global banks. To have controlling power over 
financial institutions can trigger various clauses in company and security laws, as is the case 
in the US, bringing with it many additional complications.122 The government becomes a 
controlling shareholder under TARP which implies that it has significant liability to other 
shareholders. However, the political objectives that the government has forced several 
banks to implement, such as being more lenient in repossessing homes when mortgage 
payments are not made, are not in the commercial interest of the company and potentially 
damaging to the other shareholders. Unfortunately, the US is immune from suit unless it 
has waived this immunity, which it has not under TARP. From a theoretical standpoint, 
contract theory can no longer be applied in government controlled banks and the sole 
objective for managers is no longer the generation of profit for shareholders.123 These 
conflicts are further explored in the chapter on state-ownership of financial institutions. 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter has built the theory from the ground up, starting with the theories about the 
existence of companies, leading to a broad analysis of corporate governance, to the top 
with the framework of corporate governance at banks. By taking these steps in this logical 
order, it has set a clear foundation for the remainder of this research. It has proven 
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necessary to provide much detail on corporate governance at banks, simply because of the 
additional complexity that this type of company brings. Armed with this foundation, it is 
possible in the following chapters to analyse the weakness and failures of corporate 
governance at banks during the crisis as well as the impact and effectiveness of the 
responses and measures that follow. This informed analysis will provide the answers to the 
research questions.  
The next chapter contains the analysis of UK banks which failed during the financial crisis. 
The broad discussion in this chapter will allow an equally broad analysis of these failures. In 
other words, the analysis of the failures should in no way be restricted to bank specific 
elements of corporate governance. Although these may certainly form an important part of 
the analysis, the failures can also be analysed against basic concepts of the general 
corporate governance. It is very well possible that there were weaknesses in these general 
elements and these must not be forgotten simply because the study focusses on banks. A 
similar warning holds for the chapter thereafter, which is concerned with the short and 
long term responses to the bank failures. To be effective, the measures must address the 
shortcomings identified. These shortcomings can reside anywhere within the corporate 
governance framework. The measure taken should seek to address these without 
limitations on bank specific elements only. 
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Chapter 3 – UK Bank Failures 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the way that the global financial crisis hit the UK 
banks. The aim of this chapter is to seek an answer to the question what weakness in 
corporate governance at UK banks contributed to their failure during or following the crisis. 
Through careful examination of the case studies, it is expected that several shortcomings 
can be identified. The selected case studies that played out during the crisis are Northern 
Rock, the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. These three are chosen 
because of their differences and thus potentially cover a variety of reasons. As is discussed 
in detail in this chapter, Northern Rock was a retail bank with a customer base mainly in the 
North of England. The Royal Bank of Scotland was an aggressively expanding global 
wholesale bank, which had acquired NatWest at the turn of the Millennium and was 
involved in the audacious takeover of ABN Amro, a Dutch lender. Lloyds, with the image of 
a solid or even conservative UK bank, was faring relatively well during the financial crisis 
until the disastrous takeover of HBoS.  
Following an analysis of the failures that took place during the crisis, there is a discussion of 
a range of banking scandals that have come to light over recent years. However, as these 
scandals played out or have their roots before the financial crisis, it is expected that they 
can provide insight into the weaknesses of corporate governance at UK banks before and 
during the crisis. The events include several failures of conduct that occurred at several UK 
banks simultaneously. They include the mis-selling of payment protection insurance and 
the rigging of LIBOR and exchange rates. Following these industry-wide scandals, two UK 
banks are examined in more detail: Barclays and the Co-operative Bank. These two banks 
operated a different business model: Barclays is dominated by an aggressive investment 
banking arm, whilst the Co-operative Bank aims to be an ethical bank. Both banks were hit 
by a series of scandals. It is argued that these scandals support the hypothesis that 
corporate governance of UK banks was weak. It is expected that they can assist in 
identifying weaknesses in corporate governance, in particular that the board was 
ineffective, that internal controls were lacking and that there was a disregard for the 
various stakeholders.  
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2. Historical Overview 
a. The Development of the Financial Sectors 
This historical overview starts at the Great Depression in the US in the 1930s. The main 
reason for doing so is because at this point in time some fundamental principles such as 
disclosure were for the first time drafted into statutes. Following the crash of 1929 there 
was a great need to protect investors from fraudsters. In order to provide this protection, 
the Securities Act 1933 was passed. It was the first major act in the US to regulate the offer 
and sale of securities. The Securities Act 1933 was built around the principle of disclosure. 
The issuer is required to make full disclosure towards potential investors. This principle of 
disclosure has remained central to the operation of financial markets. It is a pre-requisite 
for the third pillar of Basel II, namely that of market discipline, which requires transparency 
and disclosure. The Securities Act 1933 regulates the initial offering of securities. The 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 regulates the secondary trading of securities. It also 
establishes the Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, the Banking Act 1933 
established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This is the US institution that 
safeguards the deposits in the banks. The Banking Act 1933 is often called the Glass-
Steagall Act, usually referring to merely a few sections of this act, which limited the 
affiliation between commercial banks and securities firms. It effectively forces a separation 
between commercial and investment banking. This concept of separation between the two 
types of banking is revisited in more detail in the chapter on long term solutions. 
In contrast to the US, the UK financial services sector was largely self-regulating. The only 
exception was the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1956, which was the only 
statutory form of regulation at the time. It worked, mainly because the City was a domestic 
affair.1 The financial industry in the UK experienced a ‘Big Bang’ in 1986 when the financial 
markets were opened to foreign entrants. The then prime minister, Margareth Tatcher, 
introduced these reforms, together with a more formal system of financial regulation, to 
allow the city of London to compete with the world’s other financial centres such as New 
York. It sought to introduce more free market principles whilst replacing the unofficial 
regulation of “old boy networks”.  Regulation was introduced in the form of the Financial 
Services Act 1986, based upon Professor Gower’s first report,2 a government white paper3 
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and later the second part of the Gower Report.4 The Securities and Investment Board was 
set up under this act. It established a system of two-tier regulation, with several self-
regulating bodies existing besides the Securities and Investment Board. 
Regulation of deposit-taking activities was a matter for the Bank of England, but was 
changed by the Bank of England Act 1998. This part of the regulation was transferred to the 
Securities and Investment Board, which was combined with the self-regulating bodies into 
the Financial Services Authorities (“FSA”) by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
The Bank of England and the FSA were the two main UK regulators at the time of the 
financial crisis. Their establishment was a further departure from self-regulation in financial 
services in the UK. At that time in the US, the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed, allowing the 
merger between commercial and investment banking into large universal banking groups. 
Although such a merger was formerly not allowed, the Act was largely ignored in the years 
before the repeal. A year before its repeal, for example, Citibank took over the US security 
firm Salomon Smith Barney, effectively merging commercial and investment banking. These 
events paved the way for a further enormous growth of the financial institutions and 
markets. This growth of financial markets, the innovation and increasing complexity in 
financial products and the consolidation of players into large global banks was at its height 
just before the financial crisis. 
b. Banking Failures 
Banking failures have been around as long as banks themselves. In principle, there is 
nothing wrong with a badly run company going bankrupt. It will affect employees, 
suppliers, customers and so on. The problem is that banking failures often carry a much 
wider social and economic impact. Hector Sants, the former head of the FSA and then 
designated head of the Prudential Regulatory Authority (“PRA”), pointed out that 
‘orderly failure with minimal cost to the economy should not be seen as a 
regulatory failure. The PRA should be judged by the avoidance of failures 
which incur a cost to the economy and in particular to individual tax payers 
and customers’.5 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Department of Trade and Industry, Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework for 
Investor Protection (Cmnd 9432, Jan 1985) 
4 Laurence C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection: Report Part 2 (1985)  
5 Hector Sants, ‘Reforming Supervisory Practices: Progress to Date’ (Speech Reuters Newsmakers 
Event 13 December 2010) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2010/1213_hs.shtml> accessed 
14 November 2015 
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It is this potential wider impact that makes the failure of a bank problematic. There have 
been many examples of bank failures over the past decades.6 The following short and by no 
means complete overview7 illustrates that banking failures are quite common even in 
mature economies and that banks have been allowed to fail in the recent history. In 1974 
there was the failure of the Herstatt Bank, which failed due to large open currency 
positions of DM 2 billion at the moment that the Bretton Wood system collapsed. It was 
this failure that led to the establishment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
which later published the Basel Accords.  
The Financial Crisis in Japan, during which many Japanese banks got into difficulties, started 
with a stock market collapse in 1991. The property bubble, fuelled by cheap loans, burst. 
Chapter six contains a detailed case study of Japan’s financial crisis, the reforms that 
followed and the nationalisation of some of Japan’s largest banks such as Long Term Credit 
Bank. In Europe, countries such as Norway8 and Sweden9 also experienced a banking crisis. 
The UK suffered failure of banks, including the scandal at the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (“BCCI”).10 BCCI had been involved in large scale money laundering operations 
and was forced to close down in 1991. A few years later, in 1995, Barings, the oldest 
merchant bank in London, collapsed after unauthorised trades resulted in enormous losses. 
The collapse of Barings resulted in some of its directors being disqualified.11 These banking 
failures usually stood in isolation, often triggered by individual actions. 
c. Systemic Risk 
If banking failures are nothing out of the ordinary, then what made the global financial 
crisis different? The main differences are, firstly, that several banks had become so large 
that they were deemed to be too-big-to-fail and, secondly, that the interconnectedness in 
the financial system had increased dramatically. Systemic risk, which was defined in more 
detail in section 2.4.7, was high. Years of financial innovation had led to securitisation of 
loans and mortgages. It had further developed into synthetic products, where the 
                                                          
6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Banking Failures in Mature Economies’ (April 2004) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp13.pdf> accessed 14 November 2015 
7 For an overview of banking failures in the UK: Patricia Jackson, ‘Deposit Protection and Bank 
Failures in the United Kingdom’ (1996) 
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10 Richard Dale, ‘Reflections on the BCCI Affair: A United Kingdom Perspective’ (1992) 26 Int’l L 949, 
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underlying of the CDOs where no longer real world mortgages. Instead the underlying 
financial instruments would be credit default swaps, which pay on the credit event at a 
reference legal entity. This further accelerated the growth of financial markets and 
increased the interconnectedness in the financial system. Additionally, these developments 
marked a shift in the banks business models: it moved from originate-to-hold to originate-
to-distribute.12 In other words, rather than holding a loan on its own books, banks would 
now actively seek to move it to a third party. 
Unfortunately, not all of the underlying mortgages were of high quality, thus reducing the 
quality and increasing the risks of the packaged product. With a collapse of the US 
mortgage markets, many of these products produced losses.13 Further problems arose 
when the funding mismatch played up. Short term commercial paper was no longer 
available to fund the long term securitised products as investors wanted cash instead.14 
This amounted to a run on the shadow banking system, effectively a run on the banks but 
one without the queues in front of the branches. Banks did not want to let the special 
purpose vehicles that contained the securitised products default, so they took the 
obligations onto their banking book instead. The fact that these off-balance sheet 
instruments were being brought back onto the banking book meant that extra capital 
needed to be held for it. 
The effects were disastrous.15 The next section deals with the bank failures in the UK, but 
there were many other high profile casualties. A detailed analysis of the failures in the US 
and the underlying causes was conducted by the US Financial Crisis Committee, which 
published its report in January 2011.16 The first big US name to fall was Bear Stearns in 
March 2008, which was taken over by JP Morgan. In the autumn of 2008, disaster struck 
home with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the rescue of Merrill Lynch by Bank of 
America. It is in particular the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 that 
                                                          
12 Richard J Rosen, ‘The impact of the originate-to-distribute model on banks before and during the 
financial crisis’ (2010) <http://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/working-
papers/2010/wp2010-20-pdf.pdf> accessed 4 July 2016 
13 Thomas Zimmerman, ‘The Great Subprime Meltdown of 2007’ (Fall 2007) J Struc Fin 7; Kurt 
Eggert, ‘The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown’ (2009) 41 Conn L 
Rev 1257 
14 William Poole, ‘Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009’ (2010) 33 Harv J L & 
Pub Pol’y 421, 425 
15 David Wessel, In FED We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic (Reprint, Crown Business 
2010); Hank Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial 
System (Headline Publishing Group, 2010) 
16 US Financial Crisis Commission, ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report’ (Jan 2011) <http://fcic-
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accelerated the crisis.17 It had held on to riskier lower rated tranches of mortgage backed 
securities, which it subsequently overvalued. It became therefore very difficult to 
determine whether the firm was solvent in the run-up to its failure. This was combined 
with reliance on short-term funding. In the weekend before its failure, several deals to 
rescue it fell through and the US government decided not to bail it out.18 Other well-known 
casualties of that period include American International Group, Washington Mutual, 
Wachovia and above all the mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In Europe it 
was much the same story. Financial conglomerates such as Dexia, Fortis, several Irish banks 
and many others required rescuing. It is clear from even this short list that the scale of this 
crisis was without precedent. 
The fear of contagion between the financial institutions quickly took over from the initial 
causes of the crisis and drove the responses.19 It resulted in a credit crunch: banks were no 
longer prepared to loan to each other because they feared that other parties were close to 
defaulting. The interconnectedness between the financial institutions had increased, like 
the interconnectedness between much of the rest of the world had. Progress in 
telecommunication and IT systems had created a dependence on a global scale. Whereas 
Barings or BCCI were contained or localised defaults, there now existed financial giants, 
such as Citigroup, UBS or the Royal Bank of Scotland, which were simply too-big-to-fail. A 
great amount of systemic risk had been introduced into the financial system. 
In the following chapters, when discussing the policies implemented after the crisis, the 
reduction of systemic risk in the system is a major consideration.20 Part of the 
connectedness was created through the explosion in over-the-counter derivatives. 
Although it is certain that many of the new policies and legislation are being designed 
specifically to regulate the derivatives market, for example through the use of centralised 
counterparties, they are not necessarily relevant for this research. This research focuses 
only on those policies and legislation that have a direct impact on the corporate 
governance of banks. 
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3. The Global Financial Crisis hits the UK 
a. A Timeline of the Crisis 
This section provides a more detailed time line of the main events immediately before and 
during the financial crisis. The purpose of this timeline is to provide an historical overview 
in which the cases studies of Northern Rock, Lloyds Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
can be placed. Although deeper underlying causes for the financial crisis may well have 
started earlier, the immediate catalyst to the crisis was the halt in the booming US housing 
market when prices dropped from the last quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2006. The 
warning signs continued through 2006 and at the end of that year, large US banks such as 
JP Morgan, started to reduce their own exposure to subprime mortgages whilst others, 
such as Goldman Sachs, started betting against the housing market.21 In the first months of 
2007 the US subprime mortgage market collapsed and several subprime lenders went 
bankrupt. In the summer of 2007, there was a worldwide credit crunch as many financial 
institutions worldwide revealed that they had exposure to US subprime mortgages. 
In August 2007 Countrywide Financial, the largest mortgage lender in the US, avoided 
bankruptcy as it received an $11 billion loan from a consortium of banks. Bear Stearns had 
to disclose on 17 July 2007 that two of its hedge funds had lost all their value due to the 
subprime mortgage crisis. This led to large losses for Bear Sterns and ultimately a bailout by 
the Federal Reserve in March 2008 and the sale to JP Morgan a few days later. Other banks 
announced losses, including Merrill Lynch announcing a $8.4 billion loss in October 2007. 
At the same time in the UK, Northern Rock found it increasingly difficult to attract funding 
from the wholesale markets. As a result, Northern Rock sought emergency funding from 
the Bank of England as lender of last resort, which is examined in the next section. This was 
leaked and resulted in a run on the bank on 13 September 2007. On 17 February 2008 
Northern Rock was nationalised. In spring 2007, the battle between Barclays and RBS 
commenced over the Dutch bank ABN Amro. In April 2007 Barclays announced a deal to 
buy ABN Amro, followed the month after by a rival, hostile take-over bid for ABN Amro by 
RBS, Santander and Fortis. As these three offered mainly cash instead of shares, they won 
the battle in October 2007. 
After Northern Rock was nationalised in February 2008 and Bear Stearns failed in March 
2008, RBS, after announcing a £6 billion write-down due to credit exposure, raised £12 
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billion from a rights issue in April 2008. In the summer the mortgage crisis intensified 
further as several US lenders go bankrupt. It reached its peak in the early days of 
September. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were nationalised and a week later Merrill Lynch 
was forced to accept a take-over by Bank of America and Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy protection. A few days later the Federal Reserve provided a $85 billion loan to 
prevent AIG from going bankrupt. In October 2008, the Troubled Assets Relief Program was 
approved. 
In the UK, Lloyds took over the troubled lender HBoS in a £12 billion deal in September 
2008. In that same month, Fortis, a member of the consortium taking over ABN Amro, was 
part nationalised, Bradford and Bingley’s branches were sold to Santander whilst the UK 
government took ownership of the mortgage- and loan books. The Icelandic government 
took control of Glitnir and the Irish government guaranteed deposits in the Irish banks for 
two years. The crisis continued the next month when trading was suspended in several 
Icelandic banks including Kaupthing and Landsbanki. The Icelandic government took 
complete control of Landsbanki and a major rescue plan was drawn up in the UK by the 
Bank of England and the Treasury to protect UK financial institutions and markets. This 
rescue plan included a £50 billion capital injection that would part-nationalise the banks, as 
well as extended liquidity schemes. Later that month, UK officials travelled to Icelands as 
UK councils and charities were hit for about £1 billion due to the failing of the Icelandic 
banks. The Treasury later announced a £37 billion rescue package for RBS, Lloyds and HBoS. 
b. Northern Rock 
Northern Rock was an important financial player in the North East of England.22 It was 
formerly a building society, demutualised in October 1997. At the end of 2006, it had a 
consolidated balance sheet of just over £100 billion, largely composed of secured lending 
on residential properties. Northern Rock described itself as a ‘specialised lender, whose 
core business is the provision of UK residential mortgages funded in both the retail and the 
wholesale markets’. Although there was no underlying problem with the mortgages itself, 
the change in funding was problematic. To fund the growth in balance sheet, Northern 
Rock started to borrow more and more money from the wholesale market. This is referred 
to as shifting from an ‘originate to hold’ approach to an ‘originate to distribute’ approach. 
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Under the ‘originate to distribute’ model, Northern Rock parcelled up mortgages and used 
them as collateral for further funds, i.e. securitisation. To grow even further, Northern Rock 
started to use so called ‘covered bonds’, a form of securitisation where the banks continue 
to hold the assets themselves but issue the covered bonds secured against them. Although 
these techniques allowed for a rapid growth in wholesale funding, retail funding was 
stagnant. In the first half of 2007, Northern Rock continued to grow at a rapid pace, 
increasing its loans to customers by £10 billion. However, after signs of trouble in the US 
subprime mortgage markets, the growth ambitions were adjusted downwards halfway 
through 2007 and the funding strategy was reviewed. The outcome was an objective to 
diversify the funding sources geographically. 
In August 2007, the US subprime crisis started to gather pace as described previously. The 
funding markets froze, causing a worldwide liquidity squeeze. Management at Northern 
Rock was surprised, firstly, because they wrongly believed that their high quality assets and 
transparency would allow them to maintain liquidity and, secondly, because they had not 
foreseen that all funding markets would close simultaneously. Northern Rock had 
conversations with the Bank of England to put a backstop, a support facility, in place if it 
ever needed it. Ironically, details of these discussions leaked and this caused the run on the 
bank. This retail run reduced the liquidity even further, making state support a necessity 
rather than the intended back stop. 
The funding risk had been discussed and evaluated by the board and its Risk Committee, 
chaired by a non-executive director, before these events. On the other hand, the governor 
of the Bank of England pointed out that the funding strategy was fatally flawed and 
professor Buiter described it as reckless. The Treasury Select Committee concluded that the 
directors of Northern Rock were the principal authors of the difficulties that the company 
faced and that it is right that they had been replaced. It places the blame for devising a 
risky high-growth strategy, reliant solely on wholesale market for funding without any 
backup plan, with the board. The Committee also concluded that the board had provided 
clear information about its strategy, including that of funding, to its shareholders. Although 
many employees were shareholders, the Committee did not want to make a distinction 
between institutional investors and employee shareholders and concluded that they all 
sought a high reward from a risky investment. 
On Monday 17 September 2007, the UK government announced its guarantee for all 
depositors to halt the run on the bank. On Thursday 20 September, this was further 
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specified to cover all deposits in existence with the bank on Wednesday 19 September. 
Although the government tried to find a private sector solution, this failed and in the end 
Northern Rock was fully nationalised on 11 January 2008. 
c. Lloyds Banking Group and HBoS 
The findings into the failure of HBoS, published by the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards in March 2013, highlighted major some failings.23 Note that on 19 
November 2015, the PRA and the FCA jointly published to further reports into the failure of 
HBoS: one that examines the failure itself,24 and one that examines the enforcement 
actions taken by the regulator.25 The reasons for the failure identified in the former are in 
line with those identified by the earlier report. First, there is the failing of internal control. 
Senior management of the bank had given a large amount of independence to the divisions 
Corporate, Institutional and Treasury. It was these three divisions that would go on to 
amass the enormous losses as individuals leading these divisions would, unchallenged, 
grossly underestimate the risk they were running. The bank’s risk function was not 
adequately designed to put a proper check on these activities. The second major failing was 
on the part of the regulators. Although the FSA had noted a lack of internal control and an 
overreliance on funding through the wholesale markets, it did not follow through on this. 
Additionally, the FSA was, understandably, more concerned with the implementation of 
Basel II. It shifted focus of top management further away from credit and liquidity to the 
internal calculation of risk weighting for assets. Thus several opportunities were missed by 
the FSA to prevent the eventual outcome. 
The report further highlights the horrible failure of corporate governance at HBoS. 
Amazingly, some of the former board members view the board as a beacon of good 
corporate governance. This complacency was part of the problem as it indicates that there 
was little room for challenging decisions, rather simply chest beating. The composition of 
the board also lacked in experience on banking and finance matters. It was simply not 
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within their capacity to fully understand and challenge some of the decisions and risks 
taken by the bank.  
HBoS was rescued by Lloyds and this rescue is put forward as the main reason as to why 
Lloyds later required government assistance.26 There are three perspectives to consider in 
the rescue.27 The first is that of HBoS, which clearly benefitted. It rescued the firm in the 
short-term, providing security for customers, funding and employment for most of its staff. 
From Lloyds’ perspective, the question is whether it would generate sufficient additional 
benefit especially when weighted against a potential negative impact on its financial 
position. Of particular relevance is the limited due diligence carried out on behalf of Lloyds, 
which caused the board to make the decision based on insufficient information. Given how 
events unfolded, the board had possibly reached the wrong conclusions. Finally, there is 
the perspective from the government. Although the merger is often presented as a shotgun 
marriage, the then Chancellor and Governor of the Bank of England maintained that their 
only contribution was to place competition concerns to one side and nothing more. 
Instead, they put forward the view that it was purely a commercial decision.28  In any event, 
their support was clear and, together with the haste required at that point in time, the 
poor due diligence by Lloyds can be explained. Nonetheless, it does constitute a failure of 
corporate governance at Lloyds to have pursued the deal, despite the circumstances under 
which it took place. 
d. The Royal Bank of Scotland 
i.  Timeline 
The Royal Bank of Scotland is a Scottish bank with its headquarters in Edinburgh. It was 
founded in 1727 and since then continued to grow to become a large national bank. With 
the acquisition of NatWest, an English bank, in 2000, it became the second largest banking 
group in the UK with subsidiaries including Coutts and Ulster Bank. It was the successful 
integration of NatWest during which Fred Goodwin made a name for himself, resulting in 
his promotion to CEO in 2001. The acquisition of NatWest included the NatWest Markets 
division, its investment banking arm. Together with the US banks Citizen Financial Group 
and Charter One Bank, as well as the Stamford based Greenwich Capital Markets, it leads 
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the expansion of the US operations and the investment banking arm of RBS. Through 
organic growth, RBS set up overseas subsidiaries in many European and Asia-Pacific 
countries. In the UK, RBS acquired Churchill Insurance and Direct Line. Finally, in 2005, it 
acquired a ten percent stake in the Bank of China. 
By 2007, RBS had become one of the truly global financial conglomerates. But when ABN 
Amro, a Dutch lender, under pressure from hedge fund TCI, sought to merge with Barclays 
Bank, RBS launched a hostile bid. It did so in May 2007 together with Santander and Fortis. 
The plan was to break ABN Amro into three parts: RBS would acquire its wholesale 
operations, including the Chicago based LaSalle Bank, whilst Santander would acquire the 
Latin-America based operations and Fortis its Netherlands based operations. Whereas the 
merger with Barclays was proposed to investors as an exchange in shares, the offer by the 
consortium was mainly cash based. ABN Amro unsuccessfully sought to defend itself by 
selling the crown jewels, in this case LaSalle Bank, to Bank of America for $21 billion. This 
should have made the deal far less attractive for RBS, who sought to expand their US 
operation by adding LaSalle to its existing US arm. However, by October 2007, with the 
global financial crisis commencing and Northern Rock receiving government support, the 
Barclays share-based bid lost in value to €61 billion whilst the consortium’s cash bid 
remained steady at €71 billion. The consortium had won the battle. 
The freezing of the wholesale markets hit RBS hard. Additionally, RBS, as leader of the 
consortium, had to take the whole of ABN Amro’s balance sheet with its own until it was 
split between the consortium members. Furthermore, it turned out that ABN Amro was 
heavily exposed to the US mortgage crisis. RBS was exposed to severe combined losses 
from both the mortgage positions of ABN Amro and RBS, whilst it was already low on cash 
following the takeover. As a result, RBS had to ask investors for £12 billion in capital in April 
2008. This was followed by a reporting of major losses in August 2008. 
Finally, the UK government had to come to the rescue of RBS. On 29 November 2008 the 
government took a 58% stake in RBS worth £15 billion. As part of this process, Fred 
Goodwin was forced out. On 19 January 2009, sometimes called the Blue Monday Crash, 
the next important events happened at once. RBS released a trading statement in which it 
announced that it expected to report trading losses of around £7 billion and write downs, 
mainly in relation to the takeover, of around £20 billion. Simultaneously, the UK 
government announced that it would inject funds into the UK banking system to guarantee 
bank loans to stimulate the UK economy. The government also announced that it would 
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increase its stake in RBS to 70%. On that day, the RBS share price collapsed by 67%, 
dragging other UK banks with it. On 16 Feb 2009, RBS reported a loss of £24.1 billion for 
2008, the biggest ever in UK corporate history. 
ii. The Immediate Reasons for the Failure 
The failure of RBS was one of the most dramatic failures of a UK bank during the financial 
crisis. It was led by the well-known Sir Fred Goodwin, 29 nicknamed “Fred the Shred” in the 
media due to his reputation gained after the successful takeover and integration of 
NatWest. At the height of the crisis, RBS was involved in the takeover of ABN Amro, 
together with the Belgian bank Fortis and the Spanish bank Santander. It was in 
competition with old rival Barclays bank which had tabled an offer to merge with ABN 
Amro. As a result, RBS and Fred Goodwin had not only featured prominently in the media 
in the period leading up to the crisis, its financial position and balance sheet were severely 
compromised. In early October 2008, it survived only through the financial support of the 
UK government. The support was provided in the forms of both liquidity and solvency 
support. RBS’ and Fred Goodwin’s reputation were in tatters, becoming national symbols of 
what went wrong with the City. 
The FSA has conducted an extensive analysis, which forms the basis for this case study.30 
The report can be split into three parts: the reasons for RBS’s failure, lessons for regulators, 
supervisors and management, and finally FSA enforcement. The most valuable parts in this 
report, for the purpose of this research, are the reasons given for the failure as well as the 
recommendations made, especially those recommendations that relate to the governance 
of the bank. 
The report finds six key factors that caused RBS to fail. The first factor was that RBS’s 
capital position was in fact far weaker than its published total regulatory capital suggested 
due to poor definitions of regulatory capital.31 At the end of 2007, RBS had a capital 
position of £68 billion which meant that it had a capital ratio of 11.2% against the required 
8% by Basel I and Basel II Pillar 1; likewise, its published Tier 1 capital ratio stood at 7.3% 
against a required 4%. These ratios were relatively low compared to its UK peers:  RBS 
pursued, in the words of Sir Fred Goodwin, a policy of “capital efficiency”. Despite these 
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good ratios, RBS did not have enough capital to convince the markets that it could manage 
its uncertain future losses. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, in addition to the 
aggressive capital policy, RBS had worsened its capital position by a large debt-finance of 
the ABN Amro takeover, reducing its Tier 1 capital ratio to below its own target of 5.25%. 
Secondly, the capital regime as prescribed by Basel II proved to be severely inadequate. 
This is being addressed by the introduction of Basel III, which is discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter. One of the improvements is that the Tier 1 capital ratio for systemically 
important banks, such as RBS, is increased to 9.5%. The FSA calculated that, applying the 
new risk weightings and methodology of Basel III, RBS would have held a Tier 1 capital ratio 
of only 1.97% at the end of 2007. The third reason of its weak capital position was due to 
the very deficient way in which the required capital for trading books was calculated. 
Following the Value-at-Risk based approach combined with the low risk weighting attached 
to the trading book, as prescribed by the regulators, RBS had only £2.3 billion of core Tier 1 
capital available to cover all the losses from its £430 billion assets on the combined RBS and 
ABN Amro trading books. The Credit Trading area alone lost over £12 billion in 2008. 
The second factor was that RBS was dependent upon short-term wholesale funding.32 This 
was not uncommon for banks at the time, but the situation at RBS was excessive. In 
general, UK banks’ loan books were growing much faster than their deposits: the combined 
funding gap for UK banks stood at £500 billion at the end of 2006.  Although RBS had a 
capital problem as outlined, it was the liquidity problems that were the immediate driver 
behind the failure. Other banks, financial institutions and other wholesale money market 
providers were unwilling to meet RBS’s funding requirements. This left RBS relying on 
emergency liquidity provided by the Bank of England through the ELA. This situation was 
allowed to exist due to poor regulation of the liquidity regimes; as a result, the proposed 
regulation in Basel III introduces several liquidity measures and ratios which are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
The third factor was great uncertainty and concern about potential future losses especially 
in view of the aggressive growth strategy that RBS had pursued.33 This was not restricted to 
the losses from their credit trading operation, which is discussed next, but also from the 
losses from loan impairments. In contrast to trading losses, which are recognised 
immediately, loan impairments are only taken into consideration when borrowers default. 
The fact that a large economic recession was due to follow on from the immediate crisis 
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gave rise to great uncertainty about future loan loss provisions at all banks. The market 
anticipated that RBS’s loan portfolio was of particularly low quality due to its aggressive 
growth strategy and its willingness to take on risk, all of which was confirmed when RBS 
had to create large provisions for loan losses. From 2008 to 2010, RBS had to make total 
impairment losses of around £30 billion. 
The fourth factor was the large losses in credit trading of around £12 billion, which directly 
eroded the capital position and caused great uncertainty about the ultimate losses.34 
Around 2006, RBS had decided to grow its structured credit business aggressively. This 
included increasing its exposure to monoline bond insurers and leverage finance. It was this 
area that was driven by the boom in structured credit products based upon US mortgages 
and created a flurry of complex financial instruments and derivatives relating to credit. 
When, by early 2007, it was becoming clear that the underlying credits for these complex 
products were turning bad, RBS, like many others, was slow to react, believing in the high 
ratings of the trades on their books. Once RBS tried to offload their toxic positions, it found 
that its “distribution capability” to sell positions that were turning sour to uninformed and 
uneducated clients was far less than that of other banks. Hence it was stuck with its 
positions, leaving only the questions whether it was better to close the positions and take a 
loss, whether hedges would be actually be available and what the best estimate of the 
losses at any date would be. In 2008, RBS realised trading book losses of £8.5 billion. 
The fifth factor was the take-over of ABN Amro, which exposed RBS to an even greater 
number of risky assets, increased liquidity risk and effectively eroded its capital base.35 
Although the takeover by the consortium of ABN Amro cost €71 billion, only €27 billion was 
to be paid by RBS for the parts that it wanted. These parts included LaSalle, which had been 
sold to Bank of America just before the takeover, reducing the amount that RBS had to pay 
to only €16 billion: a number far smaller than the headline figures suggested and also much 
smaller than its £23 billion acquisition of NatWest in 2000. However, the credit trading 
losses made by ABN Amro contributed greatly to RBS’s total losses, increasing also the 
market uncertainty about RBS’s position. The acquisition was financed largely by short term 
debt: over €12 billion was financed by debt of a maturity of less than a year. Further 
funding restraints arose as the cash from the LaSalle transaction remained stuck in the 
Netherlands whilst RBS needed to quadruple its funding commitments as it was committed 
to funding ABN Amro’s inherited ABCP conduits totalling around £8 billion at the end of 
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2008. Additionally, RBS had not foreseen that ABN Amro would not receive approval for its 
Basel II internally developed credit risk models, meaning that it would need to hold much 
additional capital. Finally, as RBS was the consortium leader, it needed to consolidate the 
whole of ABN Amro on its 2007 accounts, before distributing it amongst the other 
consortium members. This created much uncertainty and a lack of transparency on where 
the losses would ultimately go, especially as Fortis, another consortium member, failed in 
October 2008. 
Finally, the sixth factor was the increased fear in the financial markets for systemic risk, 
which hit banks with vulnerable liquidity, low asset quality and low capital ratios, such as 
RBS.36 Regulators and policy makers had, at the start of the crisis, failed to appreciate the 
new element of systemic risk in the banking system. It caused a deterioration of market 
confidence which culminated with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In 
the weeks after the collapse of this household name, there were further banking failures 
and the markets were so nervous that nobody was prepared to meet RBS’s funding needs. 
It had to rely almost completely on the emergency liquidity assistance provided by the 
Bank of England. The report recognises that it is difficult to determine what factors 
distinguished RBS from its competitors in such a way that it could not attract any more 
funding. It mentions as a potential explanation the low capital ratios and problems with 
asset quality signalled by earlier losses.  
iii. The Deeper Underlying Reasons 
Next to these six immediate reasons that led to the failure of RBS, the FSA report examines 
the impact of the management, governance and culture at RBS on its failure. It is clear that, 
although RBS had to deal with the same bad market conditions as other banks, there had 
been key decisions made by its management that had left it in a more vulnerable position 
than other banks. They include the six immediate reasons previously discussed. The context 
in which the FSA has reviewed RBS’s management is ‘to satisfy a legitimate public interest 
in understanding the causes of RBS’s failure.’37 After all, the taxpayers footed the bill to bail 
it out. The second purpose is to learn from the uncovered management failures in order to 
avoid similar behaviour in future.  
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The FSA identifies five major areas of management, governance and culture for closer 
scrutiny. The first area is the overall effectiveness of board oversight and challenge.38 
Although the FSA did not find that there was a basis to successfully bring an enforcement 
case, the FSA is by no means positive about the quality of corporate governance at RBS in 
the period before the crisis. The examination is unfortunately hindered by practicalities. 
Although it is not difficult to check that the formal process was appropriate by reviewing 
minutes of board meetings, it is difficult to assess whether there was sufficient critical 
discussion between the board members. This is not necessarily captured in the minutes 
and inquiring to this after the facts can lead to, not necessarily intentionally, tainted views. 
In order to conduct effective oversight and to hold effective board level discussions, the 
members need to have extensive relevant experience, understand the firm-wide risks and 
be able to challenge the policies and decisions. The FSA concluded that RBS’s board and 
formal processes were all of an acceptable standard.39 The FSA also concluded that there 
were substantive failures of RBS’s board effectiveness that ultimately led to the failure of 
the bank.40 These failures of effectiveness include the failure to challenge the focus on 
increasing revenue and assets, rather than capital and liquidity, failure to identify the 
aggregate risk across the businesses and failure to challenge assumption behind the 
business model, including those behind the US subprime market and behind the funding 
market. 
The second aspect is the board’s role in relation to the ABN Amro take-over. 41 The most 
telling conclusion was drawn by the new chairman, who stated that: 
‘I don’t think there can be any doubt that the key decision that led RBS to 
its difficulties was the acquisition of ABN Amro. That is the painful reality 
that we can now do nothing to change. With the benefit of hindsight, it can 
now be seen as the wrong price, the wrong way to pay, at the wrong time 
and the wrong deal’.42 
Such a major take-over is the responsibility of the board and this was a particularly risky 
take-over. It was a very large and complex transaction, financed almost completely by debt 
on the short-term funding market and with only extremely limited due diligence available. 
Furthermore, as RBS was the leader of the take-over consortium, ABN Amro would be 
consolidated completely on its balance sheets before assets were transferred to the 
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consortium partners. Records show that there was a significant amount of meetings 
between board members leading up to the take-over, suggesting that the formal process 
has been adequate. However, it is undeniable that the decision making had been 
exceptionally poor: again, despite adequate formal processes, the effectiveness of the 
board has to be questioned. The FSA identifies several reasons for such poor decision 
making, including an over-reliance on the past success from the NatWest take-over, the 
acceptance of poor due diligence in case of a hostile take-over, and, above all else, the 
failure to appreciate the importance of customer and counterparty confidence in the 
bank.43 In conclusion, the board’s decision did not show ‘the degree of moderation and 
sensitivity to strategic risk appropriate to a bank’.44 
The third aspect concerns the board’s role of oversight of strategy and whether its 
associated risk profile is deemed acceptable.45 The strategy was opportunistic with a clear 
ambition for growth, relying on both organic growth and on acquisitions. Although this is 
not necessarily an issue in itself, the FSA argues that the board did not pay enough 
attention to the risk profile associated with this strategy. In 2005 and 2006 there was 
already growing concern amongst directors that the board needed to better articulate its 
risk appetite. As an example supporting this view, the investment banking arm did not 
provide any risk analysis of the markets in which it sought to aggressively grow. A further 
example is provided by quotes from the Internal Audit Committee, charged at the time 
with the risk function, which regularly stated that discussions on strategy were not 
accompanied by discussions on associated risks. 
The fourth aspect is the leadership capability and management style of Sir Fred Goodwin.46 
The FSA did not see sufficient proof for an enforcement case, but does raise several 
questions about his style and impact on RBS. Firstly, there is the question whether his 
management style has deterred robust challenges from the board or other senior 
managers.  Furthermore, the pay at RBS for executive directors was amongst the highest 
for UK banks, which may have further deterred any of them from challenging him. The 
second line of questions concerns whether or not his focus was not too much on growth 
instead of risk and whether or not his attitude towards the crisis was far too optimistic. 
Lastly, there is the question whether or not, in his delegation of responsibilities to the 
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management of the investment bank, he had maintained sufficient overview and 
understanding of the actual business. It should in this context be noted that the head of the 
investment banking arm, Johny Cameron, settled with the FSA after an investigation and 
agreed that he would not take up any regulated function or fulltime employment in the 
financial services industry in future.47 In return, the FSA would not take any disciplinary 
action.48 To illustrate the lack of understanding with Johny Cameron of the transactions his 
department was involved in, the FSA notes that he explained his knowledge of around May 
2007 regarding CDOs to be as 
‘I don’t think, even at that point, I fully, I had enough information. Brian49 
may have thought I understood more than I did … And it is around this time 
that I became clearer on what CDOs were, but it’s probably later’.50 
It is obvious that senior management at the investment banking arm had little knowledge 
of at least some of the areas that they were active in, let alone had a thorough grasp of the 
risks associated with it. The board and the CEO in particular should have held the 
investment bank on a much tighter leash. 
The fifth and final aspect is the quality of risk controls and management information.51 As 
with the previous aspects, there were not sufficient shortcomings to bring an enforcement 
case. However, the FSA notes several severe deficiencies. For example, there was no 
process for proposing and agreeing a risk appetite. The board received a monthly risk 
report that was purely backward looking instead of forward looking. The Group Risk Officer 
was not invited to attend important meetings, including the regular morning meetings held 
by the CEO and his team. The list goes on. To summarise, the point of these deeper 
underlying reasons reviewed in this section expose significant problems with management, 
culture and governance at RBS at the time of the crisis. These reasons should inform the 
improvements proposed. 
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4. Failures Revealed Post-Crisis 
a. Failures of Bankers’ Conduct 
Over the last few years, since the height of the financial crisis passed, many cases have 
been reported in the media with regard to the behaviour or conduct of bankers. Several of 
the UK banks were implicated. Examples include mis-selling of payment protection 
insurance, anti-money laundering violations and rigging of the LIBOR rates and exchange 
rates. The vast majority of these cases of bankers’ misconduct either predate or happened 
during the financial crisis. In itself, none of these cases would directly cause an actual 
failure of a bank. Arguably, it may not even have contributed to an actual failure. In that 
sense, a close examination may not assist in answering the research question. However, 
what does deserve a more detailed discussion is how it demonstrates a breakdown of 
corporate governance by a disregard from UK banks’ employees towards its customers, 
regulators and other stakeholders and, in return, a complete breakdown in trust from the 
stakeholders towards the bank itself. This is an argument that closely follows the thread set 
out previously. It affirms the findings of the previous case studies that there was a lack of 
understanding and a lack of information flow, that controls were lacking and that 
challenges between senior management and other employees were absent. It also affirms 
a lack of appreciation at all levels of the role of the bank in society at large and potential 
impact of risks taken. It is a topic that has received growing attention in the UK, in 
particular by the Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards. The conclusions for 
corporate governance are discussed in more detail after a brief examination of individual 
cases of misconduct. 
i. Mis-sold Products 
The first major case of mis-sold products to come to light since the financial crisis was that 
of mis-sold payment protection insurance (“PPI”).52 PPI is an insurance for the borrower 
that insures repayment of their loan in case the borrower is no longer able to make 
repayments due to illness, loss of job, death and so on. Due to the way that PPI works, the 
banks would get the premium of the insurance for the running of the loan as well as the 
benefit of the pay-out in case of repayment problems. Furthermore, banks would in many 
cases make little to no profit on the actual underlying loan, but only on the insurance 
premium paid to them.  
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It transpired that UK banks sold PPI to customers as part of their loans or credit card deals. 
However, many customers where either completely unaware of the fact that they had 
bought protection or that they were not aware of eligibility criteria for potential insurance 
pay-outs. Consequently, UK banks are still paying compensation for mis-selling. As recent 
as October 2014, RBS set aside another £100 million53, Barclays another £170 million54 and 
Lloyds another £900 million.55 In total, the PPI costs for Lloyds reached £11.3 billion, 
including £2.5 billion in administration costs.56 There is no doubt that PPI can be a useful 
tool for those who actually need it. It is also clear that the banks mis-sold them on a 
massive scale and are paying a hefty price for it. 
Another product that was mis-sold on a large scale were interest rate swaps.57 These 
products exchange a fixed swap rate for a floating interest rate. By entering into such a 
product, a client may for example hedge its uncertain future floating interest rate 
payments for fixed ones. Depending on whether rates actually move up or down, the client 
may make a profit or loss by the transaction, but the main point is that he has taken away 
his uncertainty about the level of future payments. These products have allegedly been 
sold to small businesses on a large scale as part of fixed rate loans. Unfortunately, with 
floating rates remaining as low as 0.5% and many of the swaps sold around 2007 having a 
fixed rate of 6%, they were highly loss making for the clients. The fact that they were sold 
as protection against rate rises gives little comfort, especially considering that these were 
sold in an aggressive way, often without telling the customer they were included in the 
package, and made large profits for the bank. The Treasury Select Committee described the 
situation as 
‘There is nothing wrong with selling a business a fixed rate loan, however 
where the bank adds a hedge and fails to tell the customer I regard that, at 
best as mis-selling and at worst, immoral’.58 
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This hits the nail on the head. The conduct and behaviour of banks towards customers, 
their stakeholders, has been exceptionally poor. It affirms the observation that regard for 
all stakeholders is a very weak element of corporate governance at UK banks. 
As a consequence of the increase in complexity in financial markets and products, mis-
selling does not only happen to consumers but also to professional counterparties. The fact 
that increased complexity in financial products has led to these type of problems is nothing 
new.59 It is well illustrated in recent litigation between Ceylon Petroleum Corporation 
(“CPC”) and its banks, brought both in arbitration and before the courts in England. CPC, 
the national oil and gas company of Sri Lank, a set up as a state enterprise and a body 
corporate, argued that it did not have the capacity to enter into a certain combination of 
options on oil on which it made substantial losses. Both Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”) 
and Citigroup had sold protection to CPC against raising oil prices in the form of simple call 
options. The dispute with Citigroup resulted in arbitration, whilst that with SCB was fought 
in the English courts. The trust of CPC’s argument, which was accepted in arbitration but 
rejected by the Court of Appeal,60 was that it was a transaction of speculative nature, 
rather than one of insurance, and that CPC as a state enterprise did not have the capacity 
to enter into such a transaction. Whether one agrees with the arbitration panel or the 
Court of Appeal, the derivative products sold were relatively straight forward. However, 
two different groups of legal professionals of high standing reached opposite conclusions. 
Thus, for any bank, even when it engages with what appears to be a very knowledgeable 
counterparty, and even when the products are pretty straight forward, it becomes very 
important, in line with the trust of CPC’s argument, to understand and explain the nature of 
the transaction to the client and, through thorough due diligence, understand whether or 
not the client actually has the capacity to enter the trades. A bank should do this with any 
client, with both the large multinationals and with the customer on the high street. 
ii. Money Laundering and Violating International Sanctions 
Banks are, by nature, involved in large financial transactions and large international flows 
of money. Consequently, criminal organisations and others seek to abuse the international 
financial system and thereby banks to launder money or for other illegal financial activities. 
Banks therefore have strict compliance and anti-money laundering checks and procedures 
in place. Several UK banks have recently been accused of violating anti-money laundering 
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regulations.61 In December 2012, HSBC settled with the US regulators for a total fine of £1.2 
billion for allegedly, amongst others, circumventing restrictions on dealing with Iran and 
North Korea. A similar settlement of $300 million had been reached between US 
authorities and UK bank Standard Chartered.  
There are two points to be made. Firstly, it involves two UK banks that so far had not 
required a bail- out and had escaped much of the publicity in other scandals. The second is 
that even in these cases, there appears to have been weak internal controls, reporting and 
oversight. It suggests that even at those UK banks that did not fail, there were substantial 
weaknesses in corporate governance.  
iii. Market Manipulation 
The LIBOR rate, or the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate, is a benchmark interest rate that is 
determined daily by averaging a number of submissions, the LIBOR submissions, by traders 
at various large international banks. The LIBOR rate determines the value of many financial 
products, ranging from saving accounts and mortgages to complex derivative products. 
There are international equivalents, such as US LIBOR in the US and EURIBOR for the 
Eurozone. There is evidence that as early as 2005, traders at Barclays, a UK based bank, 
sought to influence various LIBOR rates from their regional hubs.62 When it came to light, it 
was investigated by the FSA, which concluded that there had been 257 requests to fix 
LIBOR rates between January 2005 and June 2009.63 Investigating reports include many 
conversations held between traders, which have been widely reported in the media. Due to 
the sheer unprofessionalism and apparent lack of morals, these quotes in the media helped 
to further damage any confidence that society may have had left in banks after the 
enormous reported losses and bail-out packages.  
For Barclays, the first UK bank to be punished, the total combined fines by various 
regulators amounted to £290 million. It’s CEO, Bob Diamond, who had become the centre 
of media attention as the stereo-typical American style investment banker and the best 
paid CEO at a UK bank, refused to go. Three days later he was forced out by the Bank of 
England, who demanded a cultural change. Barclays’ chairman and COO left at the same 
time. Other banks involved include the Swiss bank UBS, which was fined £940 million in 
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total. RBS was fined a total of £390 million and the head of its investment bank, John 
Hourican, resigned.64 
The LIBOR scandal was not the only case of large scale market manipulation by a handful of 
traders. More recently, regulators have fined several banks over their traders’ attempts to 
manipulate foreign exchange trades between January 2008 and October 2013.65 These 
include the UK banks HSBC and RBS as well as UBS and US banks JP Morgan, City Bank and 
Bank of America. The collective fine amounts to £2.6 billion dollars, which was reached 
through a general settlement. Investigations at other banks, including Barclays, continues. 
It should be noted that, as for the LIBOR scandal, individual traders were prosecuted and 
lost their jobs. It also appears that it was confined to a handful of traders and several banks 
who attempted to manipulate the markets for their own personal benefit. It is, however, 
incredible that they could have done this for such a prolonged period of time. As noted by 
the Treasury Select Committee, it ‘does not look good’ that it was not spotted by either the 
Bank of England or the FSA.66 But, as they also noted, it also indicates 
‘a prolonged period of extremely weak internal compliance and board 
governance at Barclays, as well as a failure of regulatory supervision’.67 
The same observation can be made for the other UK banks involved, in particular RBS. As 
stated before, none of these scandals may have resulted in the failure of a UK bank, but 
they do confirm what exactly was wrong with corporate governance at UK banks at the 
time before and during the global financial crisis. 
b. Barclays 
Over the past twenty years, Barclays has grown rapidly from a domestic retail bank to a 
global universal bank. Its investment banking arm had grown particularly fast, acquiring 
parts of Lehman Brothers after it had collapsed. The bank has survived the financial crisis 
without requiring direct government support, raising capital on its own instead. In the 
years after the crisis, the bank was nonetheless engulfed by negative publicity relating to 
conduct failures as described previously. It reached its pinnacle when on 2 July 2012 the 
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CEO, Bob Diamond, resigned.68  Mr Diamond, the stereo-typical, high-earning, flamboyant 
and outspoken American investment banker who had led Barclays Capital before becoming 
CEO, had become the focal point of what had gone wrong in the City. Under immense 
pressure from both politicians and the regulators following the LIBOR scandal, his position 
had become untenable. The bank announced in July 2012 a review of its business practices, 
to be led by Antony Salz. This has become known as the Salz Review.69 In the summary of 
the report, the rapid growth is regarded as containing the seeds to the problems as they 
led to a change in focus and culture within the bank both before and after the crisis. 
‘The result of this growth was that Barclays became complex to 
manage, tending to develop silos with different values and cultures. 
Despite some attempts to establish Group-wide values, the culture that 
emerged tended to favour transactions over relationships, the short 
term over sustainability, and financial over other business purposes. To 
some extent these characteristics were reflected in the broader 
business environment. But the overriding purpose at Barclays in the 
lead up to the crisis and beyond was expressed in terms of increases in 
revenues and profits, return on equity and competitive position’.70 
Some of the specific failures that are listed cover those discussed previously. They include 
under-investment in monitoring compliance, risk and other control processes leading to 
breaches of international sanctions.71 Related operational failures include a failure to 
segregate its own money from that of the customers. This occurred in 2009, for which the 
bank received a fine from the FSA.72 The importance of segregation was clearly 
demonstrated during the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which had not kept a clear 
segregation. This made it extremely difficult for customers to get any of their money back. 
Another operational failure was the failing in 2009 relating to submitting data of reportable 
transactions to the FSA, which it collects to detect and investigate market abuse such as 
insider trading and market manipulation.73 The bank simply did not have adequate systems 
and controls in place for this reporting requirement. These failures collectively paint the 
picture that the overall systems and controls in place at Barclays were inadequate, which in 
turn is detrimental for good corporate governance. 
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It also includes the mis-selling of PPI. It is reported that gross premium from Barclays PPI 
sales exceeded £400 million per year between 2003 and 2008, dropping slowly thereafter 
to less than £200 million after 2010, whilst the reported cost of meeting claims was under 
25% of gross premiums for every year since 2002.74 In summary, Barclays made a profit 
from PPI between 2002 and 2012 of an estimated £940 million.75 As a highly profitable 
product, it was discussed and reviewed frequently at board level. Schemes were designed 
to encourage staff to sell PPI, including a two and a half times higher commission for loans 
sold with PPI instead of without.76 When the FSA expressed concerns about PPI in 2009, 
Barclays was one of the banks that brought a legal challenge against the FSA and the 
Financial Ombudsman Service. The courts decided in favour of the regulators77 forcing 
banks, including Barclays, to review their PPI sales. The report concludes that Barclays was 
too slow in controlling the failures relating to PPI, e.g. in controlling the selling process and 
setting appropriate incentive schemes; in reacting to customer complaints; and in 
considering whether the very high profitability was indicative of underlying potential 
problems.78 
Barclays was further involved in the mis-selling of interest rate swaps to small businesses, a 
practice started as early as 2001. This led to large number of complaints, especially since 
2008 when interest rates reached a historical low. Following reviews by the FSA, Barclays 
launched a compensation scheme in 2012. The report concludes that, had Barclays placed 
greater emphasis on understanding their clients and their needs rather than on profit, this 
would not have happened.79 A similar storyline developed in relation to two complex and 
risky investment funds sold to risk-averse investors.80 Other customer related problems 
highlighted in the report include the charges for credit cards and overdraft81 and 
unmanaged conflicts of interests within the investment banking arm, Barclays Capital, 
when advising on transactions.82 The point of the issues listed in this paragraph and in the 
previous is that throughout Barclays profitability was the sole driving factor. It was 
throughout the whole of Barclays, not just within the investment bank, but also in the retail 
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arm. Profit was placed above any needs that the customer may or may not have had. In 
fact, understanding the customer was not important. Customers are a key stakeholder in 
good corporate governance and Barclays’ behaviour clearly fell below any reasonable 
standard. 
Traders at Barclays Capital were involved in the previously discussed LIBOR manipulation. 
The report concludes that this was due to cultural deficiencies on the trading floor and a 
failure to embed ethical values.83 It was made worse by an ineffective control and 
supervision of traders and a lack of separation between those trading and those submitting 
the rates. Not only were the controls ineffective, they were also deemed flawed so that 
breaches were not discovered. These findings echo those discussed previously. There is one 
further important point to be made: all these issues, and in particular the LIBOR 
manipulation, including the publication of communication between traders, have severely 
dented any trust and confidence that the general public may have had in Barclays. This 
takes the analysis back to the vital role that banks play within the economy and why the 
stakeholders of the bank must include the general public. To further emphasize this point, 
consider the Structured Capital Markets team within Barclays Capital, which was a tax-led 
transaction structuring business. Put differently, this was a highly profitable business that 
assisted clients as well as Barclays itself in avoiding to pay taxes. Although Barclays 
operated in an open way with HMRC, and although there is no evidence to suggest that it 
aided in tax evasion, this team was operating on the edge of highly abusive and aggressive 
tax avoidance schemes.84 When it reached the media, the team was closed down, but not 
without causing significant reputational damage and a further erosion of public trust in 
Barclays. The main point is that it is impossible to marry the wider economic importance of 
a bank and its obligation to the general public, its stakeholder, with assisting others to 
avoid paying taxes by which public services benefiting these same stakeholders are funded. 
The solutions proposed in the report are not to create additional regulation alone. Instead, 
the report summarises that 
‘… regulation alone cannot address the fundamental underlying causes 
that led to the business practices which are in the spotlight – the 
cultural shortcomings we found. Barclays and all its stakeholders need 
to recognise that restoring its reputation requires transformational 
change to create a bank that must feel very different from when we 
started our Review: an organisation that feels different – to staff, 
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customers, regulators, shareholders and the public at large, with a 
positive resilient culture that will sustain it as a modern, open and 
globally influential financial institution’.85 
There are 34 separate recommendations86 made on how this can be achieved within 
Barclays. Although a closer examination of the responses to the failures at banks is the 
subject of the next chapter, a short summary of the recommendations is insightful into the 
deeper reasons behind the issues noted above. Some of these recommendations are more 
abstract than others but overall they point in the same direction. The main ones include 
the second and fourth recommendations, which state that high values and standards must 
be set and that, crucially, the board and senior management must be demonstrating these 
as well as carrying responsibility for implementing these. In other words, responsibility for 
this lies with the top of the organisation, who also perform an exemplary role. If the focus 
of the CEO is purely on meeting financial targets, then this will cascade all the way down 
through the organisation. The third recommendation states that Barclays must develop an 
understanding of its customers and their needs. The customers’ needs and objectives 
should be met whilst meeting the commercial objectives within the organisation. This is 
closely connected with the recommendations discussed previously, but also with the sixth 
recommendation that a Code of Conduct must be published. This gives guidance to 
employees on how to behave in their daily work. The implication of these 
recommendations is that one of the deeper underlying problems at Barclays was the 
importance of profit over customers, a principle emanating from the board and senior 
management all the way down the organisation. 
There is a set of recommendations that fall under the category of board effectiveness. To 
list but a few, it is recommended that a sufficient number of non-executive directors have 
substantial banking experience. The non-executive directors must invest sufficient time to 
adequately discharge their obligations. The board information should be comprehensive. 
This points to a deeper underlying problem with the capability and commitment of the 
board members in overseeing senior management at Barclays and the independent 
challenge that they provided. Finally, there is a set of recommendations that relate to the 
human resource function, performance targets, pay and incentives. In short, the human 
resource function was not sufficiently empowered to provide any direction on who was 
hired and on what staff were paid. A substantial part of pay itself was linked directly to 
performance targets. These in turn were almost exclusively linked to financial and sales 
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targets. This provided a clear message to staff, namely that the main objective was to make 
money, regardless of any ethical considerations or understanding the costumers’ needs. All 
these underlying failures are failures of corporate governance. It is clear that they are the 
direct cause of all the problems, from PPI mis-selling to the existence of tax avoidance 
teams, listed above. 
c. The Co-operative Bank 
The most recent spectacular failure of a bank due to a shortfall in capital is that of the Co-
operative Bank. Although linking this failure directly to the financial crisis might be 
considered somewhat of a stretch, perhaps by way of adverse economic conditions or 
increased capital requirements, it simply must be included in this research because it is a 
prime example of the failure of a UK bank with a different model of operation and a 
substantially different model of corporate governance. In fact, if the failure of the Co-
operative Bank was not examined as part of this research, the conclusion might as well 
have been reached that its approach was a superior model of corporate governance that 
should be adopted without properly assessing its downsides. The bank has an indirect co-
operative model: its customers could become members of its parent, the Co-operative 
Group, and thus become indirect owners. The bank has a strong ethical policy, which sets 
out many laudable policy objectives.87 These include acting with honesty and transparency, 
being a responsible bank that treat customers fairly and promoting economic and social 
development in Britain. Some go even further than one might expect from a bank’s core 
objectives, such as promoting human rights, protecting animal welfare and supporting 
international development. These, combined with its co-operative model, would make a 
strong case for the bank operating on a superior model than its competitors, if it wasn’t for 
the capital shortfall and other scandals that engulfed it.  
i. Timeline 
Before examining the underlying problems in detail, it is necessary to highlight some of the 
key events in the bank’s history because they contributed directly to its fall from grace. In 
2009, the Co-operative Bank merged with Britannia Building Society. 88 This merger 
contained several problems. For example, Britannia had a very different risk appetite, 
                                                          
87 The Co-operative Bank, ‘Our ethical policy’ (20 January 2015) <https://www.co-
operativebank.co.uk/assets/pdf/bank/aboutus/ethicalpolicy/ethical-policy.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2015 
88 Sir Christopher Kelly, ‘Failings in Management and Governance: Report of the independent review 
into the events leading to the Co-operative Bank’s capital shortfall’ (30 April 2014) <http://www.co-
operative.coop/PageFiles/989442031/kelly-review.pdf> accessed 14 November 2015, 12-30 
97 
 
which included highly concentrated commercial real estate lending. Due diligence was 
insufficient and provisions had to be made later. Britannia’s financial position was in fact 
deteriorating whilst merger discussions took place. Furthermore, it was unclear how senior 
management positions would be filled in after the merger and how already complicated IT 
systems would be integrated. In 2011, two years after the merger, the FSA concluded that 
Britannia would have failed if there had been no take-over.89 
In 2011, the Co-operative Bank started its attempt to take over the part of Lloyds Banking 
Group which it was forced to split off to comply with EU rules on state-aid.90 This became 
known as Project Verde, including 632 branches in the UK and around 5 million retail 
customers. However, the Co-operative at that time was still struggling with the integration 
of Britannia, in particular the integration of IT systems was proving highly problematic. It 
would also further stretch its capital resources. Amid these concerns, which were also 
voiced by the FSA, the bank decided to bring in a new CEO to lead the transaction, which 
now became its sole focus. It never considered that the transaction might not go through. 
Despite an independent and highly critical report by KPMG at the end of 2012, and 
warnings from the FSA that it would increase capital requirements, nobody at the bank 
considered pulling out of the deal. Finally, after further critical reports and an actual 
increase in capital requirements, the Co-operative pulled out of the deal in March 2013. It 
left the bank without any strategy or plan as it never contemplated that this might happen. 
The Co-operative Bank was hit by the PPI mis-selling scandal.91 All of the mis-selling 
emerged from the Co-operative side, as Britannia had not been involved in this practice 
prior to the merger. As was the case with other banks, the income generated by PPI 
premiums vastly outweighed the claims that were actually paid out. The bank had to make 
provisions of up to £347 million by the end of 2013, but it is especially concerning that the 
mis-selling practice was also present at this bank despite its ethical commitments. The 
costs of the PPI scandal, combined with the losses from Britannia’s loans, Project Verde and 
from integrating the IT platform were eroding the bank’s capital. After the increase in 
capital requirements by the FSA, the bank had to announce a £1.5 billion capital shortfall 
following an industry-wide exercise performed by the regulator. The bank was forced to 
negotiate a rescue packet with several US hedge funds, who would provide capital in return 
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for 70% control in the bank.92 It would also result in the closure of around 50 branches. The 
final part of the bank’s fall from grace was the arrest of its former chairman, Reverend Paul 
Flowers, in connection with an investigation into the supply of drugs.93 
ii. The Kelly Review 
The obvious question is whether one could still run a bank with the Co-operative ideals and 
principles, or whether this case has proven conclusively that it is not possible. Before 
looking at the details, it is instructive to examine the headline conclusion of the Kelly 
report, written by Sir Christopher Kelly as an independent review into the events leading to 
the bank’s capital shortfall. 
‘This report tells a sorry story of failings on a number of levels. The Bank 
Executive failed to exercise sufficiently prudent and effective management 
of capital and risk. The Banking Group Board failed in its oversight of the 
Executive. The Group Board failed in its duties as shareholder to provide 
effective stewardship of an important member asset. Collectively, they 
failed to ensure that the Co-operative Bank consistently lived up to its 
ethical principles. In all these things they badly let down the Group's 
members. … The lessons set out in Chapter 14 are far from novel. It does 
no credit to those involved that they should need to be learnt again’.94 
The main conclusion from this must be that these are basic failures of corporate 
governance in general. Although the problems are at a bank, the failures are not specific to 
corporate governance at banks. The problem is that the general elements of good 
corporate governance, such as effective management of risks, effective board oversight 
and effective stewardship, were absent. As the report rightly points out, this sadly is 
nothing novel. 
Before analysing the problems with corporate governance at the Co-operative, it is 
necessary to describe how the group is structured.95 With over 7 million members, the 
group is divided into different areas which each have their own committee. There are 45 of 
these Area Committees, each consisting of 10 to 12 members. In practice, only a small 
number of the members actively participate in the election of the Area Committees. The 
Area Committees elect 100 of its members to sit on the Regional Boards. The Area 
Committees further elect 15 of these 100 members, which sit on the Regional Boards, to sit 
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on the Group Board. Note that those sitting on the Group Board still have to sit on the 
Regional Boards and in the Area Committees, which adds to an enormous time 
commitment. Furthermore, they need to ensure continuous re-election for all three of 
these posts. Apart from these 15 elected members, the board has 5 representatives chosen 
by the 80 independent societies that trade with the Co-operative. Votes are weighted by 
the share of business done and the persons put forward are typically their CEOs 
themselves.  The board thus comprises 20 persons, which although large, is a reduction 
from the 33 persons it comprised of in 2009. 
The bank itself was held at arm’s length from the group. Although it is understandable that 
there was some form of separation, if only due to regulatory regimes applicable to the 
bank but not to the group, this should not have meant that the group’s board should 
provide only minimal oversight. There are other retail groups that have a separate bank, for 
example Sainsbury’s Bank and Tesco Bank, which are successful. However, at the Co-
operative, the group’s board would only review a written statement provided by the bank 
without much challenge. In fact, the only challenge would arise on values and principles, 
rather than on core banking matters.96 The report highlights two reasons for the lack of 
challenge.97 The first is ineffectiveness which arose from its size. But the second and most 
important reason is the board’s complete lack of experience in banking and finance. The 
board, consisting mostly of elected members who had to spend most of their time on their 
re-election, did not contain any business experience in general. The time commitments 
required with the job simply would not allow for or attract anyone with substantial 
business experience. The report states that it was so bad, that several members needed 
basic financial terminology and concepts to be explained.98 The 5 representatives from 
independent societies typically had worked within the co-operative movement and equally 
lacked the required skills and knowledge. The consequences are clear: 
‘Sustained success requires effective governance. Effective governance 
requires a high performing board. The composition of the Co-operative 
Group Board, and the limited pool from which its members were drawn, 
made a serious governance failure almost inevitable … The current 
approach to the election of non-executive directors has conclusively shown 
itself incapable of producing a Group Board with the necessary governance 
competences or the business and technical skills required for successful 
stewardship of the Group’s assets. It promotes activists with concerns 
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about issues important to those who elect them, not individuals with skill 
sets relevant to overseeing the business’.99 
It is Sir Christopher Kelly’s damning assessment that these problems were simply bound to 
happen given the poor corporate governance. It is thus a proven essential element of good 
corporate governance that the board has the required skills and expertise to oversee the 
group’s complex portfolio of businesses. It is further added that the board must have good 
management information to challenge the board.100 Finally, as a bank specific element of 
corporate governance, it is an important conclusion of the report that the bank should 
develop and implement a robust risk governance and oversight and an appropriate control 
framework.101 It is clear that this did not happen and that the board was not capable of 
addressing this shortcoming. 
iii. The Myners Report 
The views expressed in the Kelly review are confirmed independently by Lord Myners, who 
was appointed as Senior Independent Director to the Co-operative Group in December 
2013, and who wrote an independent report on its governance.102 He resigned 4 months 
later, noting a resistance to change, a denial of responsibility, deliberate delays and a 
hiding behind values within the group, amongst his reasons for leaving.103 In summarising 
his findings, Lord Myners notes that 
‘… the present governance architecture and allocation of responsibilities is 
not fit for purpose. It places individuals who do not possess the requisite 
skills and experience into positions where their lack of understanding 
prevents them from exercising the necessary oversight of the Executive … 
This deeply flawed system of elected member representation has 
consistently produced governors without the necessary qualifications and 
experience to provide effective board leadership and to monitor, challenge 
and provide direction to management … The result has been an inability to 
hold the Executive to account or to provide the guidance, motivation and 
counsel that any management team competing in this demanding 
competitive environment might reasonably deserve and expect’.104 
This is in complete agreement with the conclusions reached independently by Sir 
Christopher Kelly, as discussed previously. The recommendations made by Lord Myner are 
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therefore no surprise. The main recommendation is to create a new Group Board, with an 
independent chair, 6 to 7 independent non-executive directors and two executive 
directors.105 This would ensure knowledge and skills are present on the board to provide 
the necessary challenge. It would also remove the convoluted way in which the board is 
selected. It would not stand in the way of putting additional demands on the board 
members to demonstrate exceptional commitment to ethical values. 
Lord Myners further outlines several proposals to re-organise the Areas and Regions into a 
different Membership Council and other committees. The point is his proposals seek to 
maintain the unique characteristics of a co-operative and they do not seek to convert it 
into a standard exchange listed company. However, the conclusion is that in order to 
achieve the social goals and objectives, the Co-operative Group must be a commercially 
successful business.106  It needs to survive over the long term and generate healthy profits 
to build its capital base. This is all the more important for this type of organisation because, 
unlike its competitors, it is not able to raise additional capital by issuing shares. In other 
words, value creation is necessary for value distribution amongst its members and to 
achieve any other social goals it might have. 
5. Conclusions 
The first research question that was posed is what weakness in corporate governance at UK 
banks contributed to their failure during or following the crisis? The case studies examined 
in this chapter provide some clear answers to this research question. First and foremost, 
the case studies demonstrate that there can be no doubt that corporate governance at UK 
banks was in fact weak. There were four main themes that emerged which contributed to 
this weakness. These are the growth in complexity in financial markets, in products and in 
institutions leading to a higher minimum standard; the lack of effectiveness at board level; 
ineffective systems and controls; and the problems associated with a lack of moral values 
and ethics. A far wider ranging and detailed analysis of the underlying crisis, which goes 
beyond the scope of this research, can be found in the report by the US Financial Crisis 
Commission.107 
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a. The Growth in Complexity and Required Minimum Standard 
Consider again the growth and increasing complexity of both financial institutions and 
financial instruments in the decade before the crisis. As described in the previous chapter, 
Basel 1 was introduced as an international standard, to create a level playing field aimed at 
making banks safer. It is clear that the rules were too simplistic; in particular, the risk 
weighting of assets left much to be desired. On one side, regulators can be blamed for 
designing such a flawed system. But, equally, on the other side, banks can be accused of 
abusing this system. Banks sought to gain maximum returns on their capital for the 
shareholders and in doing so allocated capital into assets that would attract a low 
regulatory risk weighting despite the high real world risk they carried. The question is 
whether or not the banks stayed within their agreed boundaries of acceptable risk whilst 
seeking higher returns. 
Turning now to complex financial instruments, such as securitized loans and mortgages, the 
Basel Committee reports that there were several reasons for an explosive growth in this 
area. Firstly, there was a high demand for these products as they were generally perceived 
to be safe, often confirmed by their rating, whilst they provided a high yield.108 Common 
sense would already dictate that something is amiss here: there is a positive correlation 
between risk and return; why would that not be the case here? Another reason for the 
popularity of securitisation is that the originator could transfer risk, often in the form of 
illiquid assets such as mortgages and car loans, off the bank’s balance sheet and into 
marketable securities.109 Furthermore, it generates a reduction in capital requirements for 
the issuers: although the issuers suggest that regulatory arbitrage is not one of the main 
considerations, supervisors are not convinced.110 In the years before the crisis, there was 
weakening of due diligence in securitisation. Issuers weakened their asset screening and 
monitoring whilst investors often did not understand the risk that they were taking on.111 
This became especially obvious once the US mortgage markets started to collapse. 
There are several points to be made in relation to the research question. Firstly, there is 
again the element of working around legislation and reducing regulatory capital rather than 
the adherence to what regulation is in fact trying to achieve. Secondly, there is the creation 
of instruments so complex and non-transparent, that investors really should not have been 
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offered, although arguably it was their own problem that they bought it. Both of these 
points raise ethical issues, which are discussed in a later paragraph. The main point to draw 
on here, however, is of a different nature. It is the observation that the complexity in 
financial innovation and financial instruments increased at an incredible pace over the 
decade proceeding the global financial crisis. What is more, it was not restrained by the 
financial regulation that sought to make banks safer, instead, it was stimulated by it. 
Combined with the rise of financial behemoths that are now coined too-big-to-fail, the 
financial industry in its entirety had become much more complicated and interconnected. 
The inevitable consequence, and the main conclusion put forward in this paragraph in 
answer to the first research question, is that the standard of what constitutes good 
corporate governance at UK banks was raised considerably in the decade pre-crisis. 
This is fully supported by the evidence presented in the various case studies. Northern Rock 
was mainly a domestic lender, but its aggressive growth plan was based on financial 
innovation. It sought to take many of its mortgages off its balance sheet via securitisation, 
thereby relying increasingly on short-term funding. In doing so, it raised the standard of 
what would constitute good corporate governance. Its systems and controls would have to 
be raised to a sufficiently high standard to match the complexity of its business model. The 
skills and knowledge at board level would have to increase to understand the risks flowing 
from the business model and to understand the effects of reliance on international 
wholesale markets for funding. The problems demonstrate that the standard of corporate 
governance at Northern Rock was not raised accordingly, which in turn led to its failure. A 
similar analysis can be applied to RBS. During a period of aggressive expansion, including 
the growth of its CDO business and the take-over attempt of ABN Amro, the standard of 
what constituted good corporate governance kept being raised. In practice, the systems 
and controls at RBS were sorely lacking. The understanding at senior management level of 
the new business and products they were entering into was mostly absent. The case 
studies of Barclays and the Co-operative Bank demonstrate the same or similar 
shortcomings arising of the increased complexity of its business, products and 
environment. 
It is the conclusion of this research that the standard of what constitutes good corporate 
governance is not uniquely defined. Elements of what must be present can certainly be 
identified. However, the standard and minimum requirements differ for each of the UK 
banks. It is the further conclusion of this research that, in the decade before the crisis, the 
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standard for each UK bank was raised substantially and all the UK banks covered in the case 
studies fell below its individually raised standard. 
b. Elements of Corporate Governance 
i. Ineffective Board 
Where the previous conclusion related to the increased overall minimum required standard 
of corporate governance, this paragraph and those that follow contain conclusions on 
specific elements of corporate governance. In the examination of the case studies, it was a 
recurring theme that these specific elements where entirely absent or, in any event, fell 
below the minimum required standard. The case study of Northern Rock, as already 
discussed under the previous conclusion, was ineffective in challenging its aggressive 
expansion. At HBoS, the board did not only lack experience in banking and finance, it was 
beating itself on the chest as a beacon of good corporate governance moments before its 
collapse. At both RBS and at Barclays, there was a dominant CEO, Sir Fred Goodwin and 
Bob Diamond respectively. Neither the board at RBS nor at Barclays could provide sufficient 
challenge. It resulted in the disastrous take-over at RBS and the spread of a profit-focused 
culture at Barclays. 
The case study making the strongest case of all for a strong and effective board is that of 
the Co-operative Bank. First, it must be noted that, with the take-over of Britannia and 
Project Verde, the standard of what constituted good corporate governance kept rising 
without any changes being made to its governance. It was the conclusion of two 
independent reports, written at about the same time, that the board at the Co-operate 
Group was completely ineffective and required a substantial overhaul. It was an accident 
waiting to happen and, as it transpired, it happened in a spectacular way with a large 
capital shortfall and a former chairman arrested on drugs related charges. The board was 
not effective because it was too large and it did not contain any business experience, let 
alone banking experience. It was unable to provide any challenge to or oversight of the 
banking unit. It did not understand the financial risks or the capital requirements that 
underpinned the bank. It provides the strongest evidence of the necessity of an effective 
board, with the knowledge and skills to challenge senior management and to provide 
effective oversight. 
ii. Ineffective Risk Management and Controls 
The second element of corporate governance that was missing in the case studies is that of 
effective risk management and controls. In the case of RBS, there was no defined risk 
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appetite. This means that it is impossible to decide whether new transactions or business 
plans fall within the risk appetite that senior management want the firm overall to adhere 
to. The risk reports that were written at RBS were always backward looking instead of 
forward looking. This meant that there was no clear vision of how the various business 
units or its complex transaction would react to any future adverse conditions. Finally, when 
these risk reports would be discussed at board level, the CRO would not be in attendance. 
All these factors combined led to an ineffective risk management and control at RBS. This 
led to the situation that there was no understanding of the risks that the firm was running 
and what the consequences would be in adverse conditions. In other words, the firm was 
hopelessly ill-prepared when the global financial crisis started. 
The other case studies provide a similar analysis. At Barclays, with the focus on profit, the 
risks associated with how the profit was made were not sufficiently considered. At the Co-
operative Bank, there was no understanding with the board of what good risk management 
would look like. The conclusion here is that the risk management, systems and controls 
must be proportionate to the risks that the bank is taking. As with overall minimum 
required standard of corporate governance, it is dependent on the specific bank. Simply 
put, if the bank is an international investment bank engaged in trading complex derivatives 
structures, then its risk management, systems and controls need to be of a proportionately 
higher and more advanced standard than that of a local lender. Nonetheless, there is no 
doubt that at both ends of the spectrum appropriate risk management and controls must 
exist. It is the conclusion of this research that it did not exist. 
iii. Culture, Values and Ethics 
The final element of good corporate governance that was missing throughout the case 
studies is a less tangible concept of culture, values and ethics. The various scandals, such as 
PPI-mis-selling, interest rate swap mis-selling, money laundering, violation of international 
sanctions and market manipulation in LIBOR and foreign exchange markets, paint a picture 
of an industry sector that has completely lost its moral compass. The case study of Barclays 
revealed the existence of a highly lucrative unit advising on tax avoidance schemes that 
were on the aggressive side of the spectrum. It also revealed a culture where profit was 
clearly placed before customers’ needs. The Co-operative Bank’s image of the only ethical 
bank was severely damaged, not just due to its losses and incompetence, but also following 
the arrest of its former chairman on drugs related charges.  
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There things matter and are of general importance. For this research, it matters especially 
from a corporate governance perspective. The banks fulfil an important economic function 
and it would be difficult to imagine an advanced society without them. They also matter 
because of the potential consequences of a bank failure. But above all, they matter from a 
corporate governance perspective because society at large is an important stakeholder. 
That must be the conclusion that flows from these case studies. And the further conclusion 
must be that banks did not give sufficient consideration to this, leading to weak corporate 
governance.  
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Chapter 4 – Emergency Measures and Short Term Solutions 
1. Introduction 
This chapter covers the emergency measures implemented by the UK government in 
response to the failures of UK banks during the financial crisis. It seeks to partially answer 
the second research question: what is the effect of new legislation and other initiatives on 
corporate governance at UK banks. The UK government responded to the failures by 
passing emergency legislation in the form of the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 and 
by (part) nationalising the failed banks. This chapter contains an analysis of the emergency 
legislation and a discussion of its effects. The emergency legislation was introduced mainly 
to facilitate the nationalisation of failed banks. The Banking Act 2009 is also discussed. It 
replaces the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, which granted emergency powers to the 
government and the regulators for the duration of one year only. The Banking Act 2009 
provides for a Special Resolution Regime and special insolvency rules to handle the failure 
of a bank. It also contains provisions such as a deposit guarantee scheme. Although the 
Bank Act 2009 is in itself a long term solution, providing a framework for the handling of a 
bank insolvency, it is relevant to this chapter as it replaces the Banking (Special Provisions) 
Act 2008. It is now the primary tool in dealing with the failure of a bank in the UK. 
These responses by the UK government to the failures have an impact on the corporate 
governance of banks because they change the safety net for banks. If the management of 
the bank and the shareholders know their faith in case of default and if depositors know 
their deposits are safe, then their behaviour will change. Some of the responses affected 
competition within the UK and have been scrutinised by the Office of Fair Trading and the 
European Commission. This has an impact on the banks’ customers and on other banks. 
This chapter also contains an analysis of the effects of government ownership of the failed 
banks. This seeks to answer the third research question, namely what is the effect of state-
ownership on corporate governance at UK banks. The main problems in governing the 
nationalised banks arise from conflicting objectives. The regulatory objectives, the 
commercial objectives and the political objectives are often not aligned. This means the 
board will need to compromise and it makes good governance difficult. An analysis of UK 
Financial Investments (“UKFI”) demonstrates how the UK government intended to manage 
its investments in the banks and how it is working in practice. 
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2. The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 
a. The Powers granted under the Act 
The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was the first piece of legislation passed in the UK 
as an immediate response to the financial crisis. It was at least partially designed to assist 
in the rescue of Northern Rock. The long title of the act states its purpose as 
‘an act to make provision to enable the Treasury in certain circumstances 
to make an order relating to the transfer of securities issued by, or of 
property, rights or liabilities belonging to, an authorised deposit-taker; to 
make further provision in relation to building societies; and for connected 
purposes’. 
It received Royal Ascent on 21 February 2008 and under this act, on that same day, Order 
SI2008/432 was made. This statutory instrument arranged for the transfer of Northern 
Rock into public ownership.  
Although the powers granted under the Act were immediately used for the nationalisation 
of Northern Rock, the act itself was drafted generically. It allowed for the creation of 
statutory instruments to enable the rescue of Northern Rock and potential future bank 
failures. Contrary to that, Alistair Darling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, 
made the comment at the first reading that the Government have no intention at present 
to use the Bill to bring any institution other than Northern Rock into temporary public 
ownership. 
Although this reflected politicians’ opinion at the time, it was soon to be overtaken by the 
events that followed. The powers granted under this Act have been used for subsequent 
government interventions in the banking sector, which, given the crisis that was going on, 
must have been foreseen with at least some degree of certainty. Specifically, the powers 
were used to nationalise the mortgage and loan books of Bradford and Bingley, which was 
part-nationalised and part transferred to Abbey National under SI2008/2546 on the 29th 
September 2009. They were used again to transfer deposits from Heritable Bank, part of 
the Icelandic Landsbanki, and from Kaupthing Edge to ING Direct, part of the Dutch 
financial conglomerate ING Group, under a range of statutory instruments SI2008/2644, 
SI2008/2646 and SI2008/2674 on the 7th and 8th of October 2009.  The Act therefore 
quickly became an important tool for the UK government to handle bank failures. 
Sections 3 and 6 of the Act describe the main powers granted to the Treasury. These are 
powers to transfer securities, property, rights and liability provided certain conditions are 
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satisfied. These conditions and limitations are discussed in the next paragraph. Section 3(1) 
provides: 
‘3 – (1) The Treasury may, in relation to all or any securities of a specified 
description that have been issued by an authorised UK deposit-taker, by 
order make provision for or in connection with, or in consequence of, the 
transfer of the securities to any of the following— 
(a) the Bank of England; 
(b) a nominee of the Treasury; 
(c) a company wholly owned by the Bank of England or the 
Treasury; 
(d) any body corporate not within paragraph (c).’ 
For example, Northern Rock was transferred to a nominee of the Treasury, in this case 
UKFI. In support of the powers granted under section 3, the Treasury is allowed under 
section 4(2) to extinguish the subscription rights associated with the securities.  
Section 3(1) is the core of the rescue operation. In establishing this mechanism, it is 
implicitly recognised that allowing an authorised UK deposit-taker, such as a bank or 
building society, to fail has the potential to create a much larger detriment to the economy 
and society. In establishing section 3(1), one could say that the importance of the general 
public at large as an external stakeholder is recognised in statute. Any invocation of this 
part of the statute will be done for their benefit and to safeguard their interests. 
Of course, the Treasury cannot simply exercise these new powers under sections 3(1) or 
4(2) without providing compensation to the original holders of these securities, who would 
be deprived of their property and associated rights. Section 5 provides that the Treasury 
must pay compensation following the transfer of securities under section 3 and following 
the extinguishing of any of the associated rights under section 4. The compensation that 
should be made must be determined taking into consideration the fact that the bank was 
about to fail. It would be unreasonable to compensate the original holders on the basis 
that the bank was a sound financial institution. Compensation will be determined in 
accordance with section 5(4), which provides: 
‘5 – (4) In determining the amount of any compensation payable by the 
Treasury by virtue of any provision in an order under this section, it must 
be assumed— 
(a) that all financial assistance provided by the Bank of England or 
the Treasury to the deposit-taker in question has been withdrawn 
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(whether by the making of a demand for repayment or otherwise), 
and  
(b) that no financial assistance would in future be provided by the 
Bank of England or the Treasury to the deposit-taker in question 
(apart from ordinary market assistance offered by the Bank of 
England subject to its usual terms).’ 
The value and rights must be assessed based on the strength of the, perhaps hypothetical, 
unsupported bank. In reality, this provision is likely to make the value and rights almost 
worthless because, given that the powers are exercised, the bank would be bankrupt 
without the specified assistance. 
Under section 6 the Treasury is granted power similar to that under section 3 but relating 
to the transfer property, rights and liabilities. 
‘6 – (1) The Treasury may by order make provision for or in connection 
with, or in consequence of, the transfer of property, rights and liabilities of 
an authorised UK deposit-taker to either (or each) of the following— 
(a) a company wholly owned by the Bank of England or the 
Treasury; 
(b) a body corporate not within paragraph (a).’ 
As with the transfer of securities, the Treasury must make arrangements for compensation 
as set out in section 7 of the Act. The amount payable is subject to similar conditions in 
section 7(3) as were defined for securities in section 5(4).  
The powers described above are related to “authorised UK deposit-takers”. These are 
defined in section 1(1) as a ‘UK undertaking that under Part 4 of FSMA 2000 has permission 
to accept deposits’. The Act also makes provisions for building societies. Section 11 makes 
amendments to the Building Societies Act 1986 under which the Treasury may facilitate 
financial assistance for the purpose of maintaining stability in the UK financial system.  
b. Limitations on the Powers granted under the Act 
It will be clear that the provisions discussed above grant the Treasury great power over the 
individuals because they allow the Treasury to take away property and associated rights 
from individuals. These powers cannot be granted without appropriate checks and 
balances in place to protect the individual. Besides the ordinary constitutional checks and 
balances, which are discussed further on, the Act itself provides that the exercise of these 
powers is subject to specific conditions and procedures. Most importantly, the Treasury 
can only make an order to transfer securities, property, rights and liabilities of an 
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authorised deposit-taker if and only if either or both of the section 2(2) purposes are 
satisfied. 
‘2 – (2) The purposes are— 
(a) maintaining the stability of the UK financial system in 
circumstances where the Treasury consider that there would be a 
serious threat to its stability if the order were not made; 
(b) protecting the public interest in circumstances where financial 
assistance has been provided by the Treasury to the deposit-taker 
for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the UK financial 
system.’ 
The power to intervene is thus limited as it may only be exercised in a situation where the 
financial stability of the entire UK financial system is under threat. Naturally, there can be 
no doubt that at the time of the global financial crisis this condition was satisfied. Even if it 
could be argued that a failure of a small deposit taker would in itself not constitute a great 
threat to stability, then the potential panic, uncertainty and contagion that would follow 
such a failure certainly would represent such a threat. 
The powers are further limited because the Treasury can only exercise its power within one 
year of passing the Act, as per section 2(8). This means that a new Banking Act needed to 
be introduced within a year. Its replacement is the Banking Act 2009, discussed later. 
Parliament would need to approve any orders made under the Act, with some variations 
for the specific types of order available. This reflects the exceptional circumstances in 
which such an order is made and the huge consequences: it is not a common occurrence 
for the Treasury to intervene in the normal operation of businesses in the UK. The Act 
would even allow for orders to be made retrospectively, with some constraint on what is 
deemed an appropriate time. 
The exercise of the powers granted by the Act is subject to the ordinary constitutional 
checks and balances. The first check on the power given is that the Treasury Ministers and 
the Chancellor, whilst acting on advice of the FSA and the Bank of England as per the 
Memorandum of Understanding, are accountable to Parliament.1 Thus Parliament as well 
as the relevant parliamentary committees can scrutinise decisions to exercise the powers. 
Second, the exercise of the powers granted can be the subject of a judicial review. In these 
cases, the courts review the lawfulness of the decision made by a public body, in this case 
the Treasury. It is a well-established principle of common law that judicial reviews may 
                                                          
1 HC 19 February 2008, vol 472, col 254 
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only challenge the way in which the decision is made, not whether the decision is the right 
one. 
The Icelandic bank Kaupthing Bank HF applied for judicial review of the Treasury’s decision 
to make the order to transfer deposits held by its subsidiary.2 The Treasury had used the 
powers under section 6 of the Act to make this order after the FSA had judged the 
subsidiary to be in serious financial difficulty. The order was made because of the 
perceived threat to the stability of the UK financial system as per the purpose set out in 
section 2(2)(a). The two grounds of the challenge were, firstly, that the purpose of the 
Treasury was not to maintain the financial stability but to protect the depositors and, 
secondly, that HM Treasury had failed to identify the actual threat to financial stability in 
the UK posed by the financial difficulties of the subsidiary. The application was refused. In 
the first ground it was held that the objective was the financial stability, whilst the second 
ground was deemed artificial and unreal. It is the first ground which is most interesting as 
it demonstrates the difficulties under which the Treasury has to operate.3 On one hand, 
HM Treasury needs to formulate its reasons for exercising its powers in precise terms for 
when it is scrutinised by courts and lawyers. If it does not do so, it risks acting ultra vires. 
On the other hand, there are market forces which in time of a crisis can show a shock 
reaction to anything said by the Treasury. Therefore, the Treasury cannot say outright that 
the financial stability of the UK is at significant risk, choosing instead to lean towards the 
argument of safeguarding depositors. Clearly this is a very difficult balancing act. 
In another example of a challenge by way of judicial review, the applicants, former 
shareholders of Northern Rock, argued that the compensation payable to them following 
nationalisation was unfair and incompatible with their rights under the ECHR Protocol 1 
Article 1.4 In this case, it was held that the assumptions that the independent valuer had to 
make for the Northern Rock shares were not contrary to the shareholders’ right of 
possession pursuant the Human Rights Act 1998. The claims by SRM for a judicial review 
were dismissed. In particular, the court held that three principles, as established by the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, were all in place: the need for a fair 
balance to be struck between public interests and private rights, the principle of 
                                                          
2 R. (on the application of Kaupthing Bank HF) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 2542 (Admin) 
3 Joanna Gray, ‘Case Comment: High Court considers Icelandic bank’s challenge to HM Treasury’s use 
of emergency powers during 2008’ (2010) JFR&C 18(2) 178 
4 R. (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Treasury Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 
788, on appeal from R. (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Treasury Commissioner 
[2009] EWHC 227 (Admin) 
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proportionality and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. Another important 
conclusion was that the compensation scheme only required putting shareholders in the 
same situation as if the intervention had not taken place. In practice, this implies that that 
they would receive very little. It was noted that the regulators did not owe a duty to 
shareholders. On appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, the Court found that the 
applicants’ complaint under Article 1 of Protocol 1 was ‘manifestly ill-founded and 
therefore inadmissible’.5 
c. Compensation under the Act 
The compensation arrangements for the transfer of securities under section 3 are set out 
under section 5. Compensation is to be decided by an independent valuer. The then 
Chancellor, Mr Alistair Darling, said of the compensation, that  
‘the valuer must assume that financial support provided by the Bank of 
England and the Treasury has been withdrawn and that no further public 
financial support will be given, apart from the ordinary market support 
provided by the Bank of England’.6 
The argument for this principle is that the bank would go bankrupt without government 
support. If it would be valued under the assumption that government support would 
continue, it would be valued much higher. This would be an unfair result as it is effectively 
the tax payer who is paying for the compensation arrangements. 
There have been various challenges brought in respect of the compensation measures. An 
application to this extent was brought in relation to Bradford & Bingley before the Upper 
Tribunal (Tax and Chancery). It was refused on the grounds that the tribunal did not have 
the authority to question the manner in which the valuer was appointed nor the rules 
governing his approach to the valuation of the compensation.7 An earlier case before the 
same tribunal was heard, concerning the valuation of Northern Rock on nationalisation and 
in particular the reading of ‘has been withdrawn’ in section 5(4).8 The point the claimants 
made was that financial support never was withdrawn or, in the alternative, it was 
withdrawn over a longer period and in any event not as intended under section 5(4). The 
result would have been that share prices and thus compensation would have been higher. 
This argument was rejected by the court, a decision upheld by a majority in the Court of 
                                                          
5 Grainger v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHHR SE13 
6 HC 19 February 2008, vol 472, col 178 
7 Bradford & Bingley Applicants v Clokey (UKUT (TCC), 19 July 2012) 
8 Northern Rock Applicants v Caldwell [2011] UKUT 408 (TCC) 
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Appeal.9 It was held that section 5(4) must be read in conjunction with section 15(1), which 
describes financial assistance. The main point made is that on valuation date all financial 
assistance must be withdrawn, which was the case here. 
3. The Banking Act 2009 
a. An Overview of the Original Act 
The Banking Act 2009 replaced the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008. This was 
necessary as the 2008 Act contained a provision that limited the power to the Treasury to 
only one year after passing of the Act. It was not introduced with the same urgency as the 
previous Banking Act and went through the normal consultation process. As a result, this 
new Banking Act is much larger and more complex than Banking Act 2008. The main 
objective of the act is to establish a framework for handling the insolvency of a bank in the 
UK through the use of a Special Resolution Regime. The passing of the Act was 
accompanied by two statutory instruments coming into force. The first is the Banking Act 
2009 (Restriction of Partial Transfers) Order. This statutory instrument gives a bank 
protection from interference when it is placed in the Special Resolution Regime. The other 
is the Banking Act 2009 (Third Parties Compensation) Regulations, which makes provisions 
for compensation of third parties left behind in a failing bank. The Bank Insolvency part 
provides for the orderly windup of a failing bank and facilitates rapid payments from the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”) or a transfer of relevant accounts to 
another financial institution. This part of the FSCS largely replaces previous arrangements 
under FSMA (Part 15), which have been in place since 2001. Note that, technically, this is 
not an insolvency provision used to dealing with the actual failing of the bank. Instead, 
they provide an insurance mechanism in case of failure. 
As with the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2009, the new Banking Act 2009 can be said to 
recognise the importance of the public at large as an external stakeholder. As with its 
predecessor, the new Act contains provisions to arrange what is effectively a rescue or an 
orderly wind-down of an authorised deposit holder. The main beneficiary of this, as before, 
is the general public. The extension to the FSCS is a further clear benefit for the general 
public as an external stakeholder. The safety of their money and savings goes a long way to 
ensuring financial stability and avoiding a sudden panic. 
                                                          
9 Harbinger Capital Partners v Caldwell [2013] EWCA Civ 492 
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The Act contains three tools for intervention: private sector purchase, a construction with 
a bridge bank and temporary public ownership. In a private sector purchase, the 
authorities can arrange the transfer of all or parts of the failing bank. Using a bridge bank, 
the authorities can transfer some or the entire failing bank to a temporary vehicle. If there 
is no other option, the Treasury can temporarily take a failing bank into public ownership. 
Whenever the authorities use the powers under the Special Resolution Regime, i.e. the 
stabilisation powers, the bank insolvency procedure or the bank administration procedure, 
then the authorities must have regard to the five Special Resolution Objectives. These 
objectives are (1) to protect and enhance the stability of the financial systems of the UK, 
(2) to protect and enhance public confidence in the stability of the banking systems of the 
UK, (3) to protect depositors, (4) to protect public funds and (5) to avoid interfering with 
property rights in contravention of the Human Rights Act 1998. Note that this list has, 
under new legislation, been expanded and this is discussed in more detail in the next 
section. The Treasury must also issue a Code of Practice, which is discussed in the next 
paragraph, for the use of each of the three powers under the Special Resolution Regime. 
The second part of the Act provides the framework for bank insolvency. The main features 
of bank insolvency are that a bank enters the process by court order. The order appoints a 
liquidator, who aims for the depositor’s accounts to be transferred or for compensation to 
be made from the FSCS. The liquidator will then wind up the bank. An application for bank 
insolvency under the original Act may only be made to the court by the Bank of England, 
the (then) FSA or the Secretary of State. Each of these may only apply on certain grounds 
(section 95, 96): the Bank of England and the FSA may only apply for bank insolvency if the 
bank is unable, or likely to become unable, to pay its debts or if the winding up of the bank 
would be fair. If the FSA applies, then the Bank of England must consent and vice versa. 
The Secretary of State may only apply on the ground that winding up the bank would be in 
the public interest. If an insolvency order is made, then the liquidator has two objectives: 
the first being the safeguarding of deposits and the second to achieve the best result 
possible for the bank’s creditors. The first objective takes precedence over the second 
pursuant section 99. 
The third part of the Act provides the framework for bank administration. Bank 
administration is used when part of the bank is sold to a commercial purchaser or 
transferred to a bridge bank as outlined in sections 11, 12 of Part 1. The court will appoint 
an administrator on application of the Bank of England, who will ensure that the non-sold 
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or non-transferred part of the bank provides services required for the purchaser or bridge 
bank to operate effectively. In other aspects the procedures are the same as for insolvency. 
The administrator has two objectives (section 137): firstly, to support the commercial 
purchaser or the bridge bank, which takes precedence over the second objective of normal 
administration. This first objective ceases only when the Bank of England gives notice that 
the connection is no longer required (section 139). 
The fourth part makes amendments to the FSCS as defined in the FSMA. The fifth part 
places the oversight of the systems of payments between financial institutions with the 
Bank of England. The Treasury can make a recognition order for a payments system to be 
supervised by the Bank of England. The Bank of England in turn may require operators of a 
payment system to establish rules for operation and it can give directions to such 
operators. However, the FSA must be consulted before the Bank of England may take 
action under this part of the Act. Finally, the sixth part of the Act tidies up the legislation 
concerning the permission of issuing bank notes in Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
b. The Special Resolution Regime – Current State 
i. The Objectives and the Code of Practice 
The Banking Act 2009 ss5,6 require HM Treasury to set out a Code of Practice. This Code of 
Practice must contain the guidelines the authorities will use the powers under the Special 
Resolution Regime10 and is regularly updated to include changes to the Banking Act 2009 
and related legislation.11 The Code of Practice covers the three stabilisation options, the 
bank insolvency procedure and the bank administration procedure. The relevant 
authorities are legally obliged to have regard for the Code under section 5(4). Some of its 
main points include how the special resolution regime’s objectives are to be understood 
and achieved, the choice between different resolution options, compensation, and how 
the Bank of England will determine the public interest test for the use of the bridge bank 
and private purchaser stabilisation options is satisfied.12 
                                                          
10 HM Treasury, ‘Banking Act 2009 Special Resolution Regime: Code of Practice’ (November 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209933/banking
act2009_code_of_practice.pdf> accessed 14 November 2015 
11 HM Treasury, ‘Banking Act 2009 Special Resolution Regime: Code of Practice’ (March 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/411563/banking
_act_2009_code_of_practice_web.pdf>  accessed 14 November 2015 
12 ibid 7 
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The regime’s objectives listed under section 4 are phrased in general terms without further 
explanation. Originally, there were 5 objectives but two have been added since. They are, 
in summary, 
(1) To ensure the continuity of banking services in the UK and critical 
functions; 
(2) To protect and enhance stability of the financial system within the UK, 
in particular with regard to preventing contagion and maintaining 
market discipline; 
(3) To protect and enhance public confidence in the stability of the 
financial system in the UK; 
(4) To protect public funds, in particular by minimising the reliance on 
extraordinary public financial support; 
(5) To protect investors and depositors to the extent of the relevant 
schemes; 
(6) To protect clients’ assets (where relevant); and 
(7) To avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of a 
Convention Right. 
Chapter 3 of the Code provides the interpretation and further explanation. For example, 
the ‘stability of the financial systems of the UK’ is very broadly defined to include capital 
raising, risk-transfer, facilitation of domestic and international commerce, as well as the 
general continuity of the banking system and any systemic impact.13 A similarly broad 
definition is given for ‘public confidence in the stability of the banking system’. It includes 
the expectation that deposits will be repaid, that normal banking services will continue to 
be available, that (perceived) problems in one institution will not extend to another, and 
that if an institution fails, a system exists to protect the interests of depositors.14 All other 
objectives of the regime are equally broadly defined. The point is that it is difficult to 
foresee any future circumstances in which these definitions may need to be relied upon, 
hence a broad catch-all approach is used. Finally, the last objective is important as it 
ensures that any interference is proportionate and in the public interest. It is a reflection of 
the legal challenges brought in relation to compensation in earlier nationalisation under 
the Banking Act 2008, as discussed previously. 
                                                          
13 ibid 9 
14 ibid 10 
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ii. The Main Powers 
The Special Resolution Regime, the first part of the Act, is now the UK’s statutory toolkit for 
resolving failing banks and building societies. At the time when the Act came into force, the 
three authorities, namely the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury, could exercise 
the powers granted. First, the FSA determined whether a bank had met the relevant 
conditions to be placed under the Special Resolution Regime. Thereafter, either the Bank 
of England would take over implementing and running the Special Resolution Regime. Only 
in the case of transfer to temporary public ownership would the Special Resolution Regime 
be run by the Treasury. The three authorities were naturally required to cooperate closely 
in all scenarios. 
The current situation is slightly different as, following the Financial Services Act 2012, 
which is discussed in chapter five, the FSA was replaced as the main financial services 
regulator. In its place came the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (“FCA”). The provisions have therefore become more complicated. In 
total, there are four conditions under section 7 that need to be satisfied before a bank is to 
be placed in the Special Resolution Regime. The first condition is that the PRA needs to be 
satisfied that the bank is failing or is likely to fail. Additionally, the Bank of England needs 
to be satisfied of three further conditions. The first is that, having regard to timing and 
other relevant circumstances, it is not reasonably likely action will be taken by or in respect 
of the bank that will result in the PRA’s condition ceasing to be met. The second condition 
is that the exercise of the power is necessary having regard to the public interest in the 
advancement of one or more of the special resolution objectives. Finally, the third 
condition is that one or more of the special resolution objectives would not be met to the 
same extent by the winding up of the bank. There are further provisions under section 7 
which apply to these conditions. For example, although one of the regulators must 
determine whether a condition is met, the others are to be consulted. The Special 
Resolution Objectives are relevant to the Bank of England’s second and third conditions. 
Finally, it is worth noting that provisions are included on the relation between failure and 
financial support. 
When the Banking Act 2009 came into force, there were three options available for 
resolving a failing institution. The Bank of England had the power to sell all or part of a 
failing bank to a commercial purchaser. This was the private sector purchase option and 
could be executed by share or property transfer instruments. In the second option, the 
Bank of England can transfer all or part of the failing bank to a bridge bank. The third 
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option is a transfer by the Treasury of the institution into public ownership. This has 
changed substantially since January 1, 2015, when the Bank Recovery and Resolution Order 
2014/3329 came into force. This was one of several Statutory Instruments that form the 
transposition of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive15 (“BRRD”) into UK law. 
Although this Statutory Instrument should be categorised as a longer term solution, 
therefore might also be discussed in the next chapter, it is discussed here instead because 
relates directly to the emergency measures available to the Treasury and the regulators. 
There are now five options available instead of three. These options are: 
(1) ‘Transfer by the Bank of England of some or all of the business of the 
failed firm to a private sector purchaser; 
(2) Transfer by the Bank of England of some or all of its business to a 
bridge institution; 
(3) Transfer by the Bank of England assets, rights or liabilities of an 
institution or bridge institution to one or more asset management 
vehicles; 
(4) cancellation, reduction or conversion by the Bank of England of certain 
liabilities of the institution to the extent necessary to absorb losses and 
recapitalise the institution or the successor entity to as level necessary 
to restore market confidence (the bail-in stabilisation option); and 
(5) Transfer by the Treasury of the institution into temporary public 
ownership. This option applies to a holding company of a bank, but not 
to other banking group companies’.16 
All of these can be achieved by using the stabilisation powers, such as the transfer of 
assets, shares and other property. The Bank of England and the PRA can further apply to 
the courts for insolvency, in order to ensure swift payment through the relevant 
compensation schemes. The FCA can do so where the institution holds clients’ assets.  
iii. Limitations 
In the following circumstances, an institution is deemed to fail or likely to fail 
(1) ‘if the banking institution is failing, or is likely to fail to satisfy the 
threshold conditions in circumstances where that failure would justify 
the variation or cancellation by the PRA or FCA of the banking 
institution’s permission to carry on one or more regulated activities; 
(2) the value of the assets of the banking institution are or are likely soon 
to be less than the value of its liabilities;  
                                                          
15 Council Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 
2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012 [2014] OJ 
L173/190, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN> accessed 14 November 2015 
16 HM Treasury (n 11) 19 
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(3) the banking institution is unable or likely to become unable to pay its 
debts as they fall due; or  
(4) extraordinary public financial support is required except when, in order 
to remedy a serious disturbance to the economy and preserve financial 
stability, it takes the form of either a State guarantee to back liquidity 
facilities provided by the central bank according to the central bank’s 
conditions, a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities, or an injection 
of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices and on terms 
that do not confer an advantage on the institution’.17 
Only when one or more of these conditions are satisfied can the regulators use their 
powers under the Special Resolution Regime. However, each of the different tools within 
the resolution regime has different additional conditions attached that need to be 
satisfied.18 These additional conditions reflect the severity and impact of each tool. For 
example, temporary public ownership has conditions relating to a serious threat to the 
stability of the financial system in the UK. On the other hand, conditions for transfer of 
specific assets to an asset management vehicle include the conditions on maximising the 
proceeds of its liquidation. 
iv. Compensation 
Provisions for compensation are made under sections 49 to 62. There are three types of 
compensation orders: compensation scheme orders, resolution fund orders and third party 
compensation orders.19 Their object is to comply with Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, i.e. the right to peaceful enjoyment of ones’ own property. In 
case of a transfer of shares or business by the Bank of England to a private sector purchaser 
under section 11(2), the Treasury must make a compensation scheme order under section 
50(2). In case of a transfer of shares or business to a bridge bank or assets to an asset 
management vehicle, the Treasury must make a resolution fund order under section 52(2). 
Finally, where the Treasury has placed a failing bank into public ownership, it must make 
either a compensation scheme order or a resolution fund order under section 51(2). Where 
any of the stability options have been used, the Treasury holds discretionary powers to 
make third party compensation orders.  
The different orders are a reflection of the severity of the situation and of what the 
receivers are likely to get in monetary terms. For example, a compensation scheme order 
requires an independent valuation of the transferred assets, to be arranged by the Bank of 
England. A resolution fund order on the other hand will be based on any contingent 
                                                          
17 ibid 21 
18 ibid 24-29 
19 ibid 69 
121 
 
economic interest in the proceeds of the resolution, captured in the resolution fund. The 
third party compensation orders can become quite complex. Generally, it will involve an 
independent valuer assessing the damage of those whose property rights were affected. It 
becomes complex when there is a bail-in, which in summary means that a failing bank will 
cancel, dilute or transfer the interests of existing shareholders and write-down sufficiently 
the claims of unsecured creditors. In a bail-in, the rule is that creditors must be in a position 
in which they are not worse off than when the bank had become insolvent. If creditors are 
worse off, then a compensation order must be made.20 In this case, an independent valuer 
needs to be appointed to assess the difference between the creditors’ position in a bail-in 
and in insolvency.  
c. Depositor Protection 
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”) was introduced through the Banking 
Act 2009 Part 4, sections 169 to 180. This is an important part of the Act for retail 
customers as it changes the usual insolvency hierarchy and gives preference to 
depositors.21 FSCS covered deposits now rank equally with other preferential debts, whilst 
those not covered are preferred over ordinary unsecured debt but rank below other 
preferential debts. This reduces the likelihood that the FSCS will need to contribute to the 
resolution. However, there are some special cases. Worth noting is the case of a bail-in, 
where the FSCS is required to contribute up to the amount it would have had to pay out in 
the alternative of an insolvency.  
In case of an actual insolvency, the bank liquidator is required to work together with the 
FSCS to facilitate prompt pay outs to eligible depositors or to facilitate the transfer of 
deposits as a whole to another institution. This is important considering the usually lengthy 
procedures involved in the liquidation of a bank. It would be unrealistic to expect 
customers to wait for months if not years to get their deposits back. It would completely 
defeat the purpose of the scheme as, with such a long waiting time, deposit holders would 
still try to withdraw their money when a bank gets into financial difficulty. In other words, 
the FSCS must pay out promptly if it is to prevent a run on a UK bank. 
d. Critical Analysis of the Banking Acts 
The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 and the nationalisation of Northern Rock are now 
widely praised as perhaps the first appropriate measures taken by any country to deal with 
                                                          
20 ibid 72 
21 ibid 66 
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a bank failure during the crisis. Even if this is exaggerated, it must be accepted that the 
handling of Northern Rock provided a blueprint for handling the subsequent smaller 
failures and, more importantly, for the much larger failures of RBS and Lloyds HBoS. But the 
main lesson is that the focus of policymakers should not only be on trying to prevent a 
crisis, but also on actually managing a crisis when one arrives. Herein lies a problem. If risk-
takers are, through this crisis management, protected from the negative outcomes of the 
risks undertaken, then they may in future engage in even greater risk.22 There is, however, 
great pressure on policy makers to take immediate action, as inaction will lead to 
disastrous outcomes. But once action has been taken and support has been provided, it is 
very difficult to take it away again when the crisis is over. The best safeguard against this 
form of moral hazard is, in this case, to have a resolution system in place for large and 
complex financial institutions.23 A badly run bank should be allowed to fail rather than 
relying on the availability of a lender of last resort, a deposit guarantee scheme or even a 
bailout by the government.  
The Banking Acts are necessary steps towards such a resolution system in the UK. It may, 
however, not be enough. Although it may be adequate for smaller national institutions, the 
large financial institutions that are deemed to be systemically important have often 
adopted a very complex corporate structure. This makes the application of such Acts 
difficult in practice; the suggestion is made that systemically important financial institutions 
should be required to write and update a winding-down plan together with their business 
continuity plans.24 If this winding-down plan is deemed to be inadequate, then supervisors 
should be given the power to force through changes in the corporate structure of the 
systemically important institution. Although the requirement to draft these plans has now 
made its way into law via the BRRD, and although the plans form the basis of important 
conversations between the regulator and the banks, it remains an untested tool for 
systemically important institutions. 
The main reason why insolvency laws for financial institutions are different from those for 
other companies is because of the wider social and economic implications a bank failure 
has. The damage to customers, especially those who are deemed less able to fend for 
themselves, such as most deposit holders, as well damage to society as a whole, needs to 
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be limited. The Banking Act 2009 and the BRRD reflect this in the objectives set to the 
liquidator in the Special Resolution Objectives discussed previously: the priority goes to 
safeguarding deposits. It is further reflected in the associated Third Parties Compensation 
Regulation, which makes provisions for third parties left behind in case of a failure, as well 
as the FSCS specifically designed to protect deposit holders. The predecessor of the 2009 
Act, namely the Banking (Special Resolutions) Act 2008, has been used and demonstrated 
that the safeguarding of wider public interests and of depositors does not please all parties 
involved. It is, for example, difficult to balance the right of shareholders with such a form of 
prudential regulation.25 Shareholders enjoy their possession of shares as defined and 
protected by the ECHR. This does not sit well with the requirement for regulators or the 
government to intervene through the Special Resolution Regime in the Banking Act 2009 or 
with the arrangements in the preceding Act. In fact, the issue is recognised within the 
Special Resolution Regime as it seeks to avoid interference with the property rights in the 
Human Rights Act 1998. It also defines an extensive mechanism for compensation as and 
when deemed appropriate. 
4. UK Financial Investments Ltd 
a. Introduction 
The previous chapter contained several case studies of UK bank failures during the financial 
crisis. These failures included mortgage lender Northern Rock and RBS, a large, globally 
operating, bank which had just pulled off the spectacular but disastrous takeover of Dutch 
lender ABN Amro. These failing banks were (part-) nationalised using emergency 
legislation, such as the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, as previously described in this 
chapter. The nationalisations raise questions about how the UK government should 
manage its investments in these banks. UK Financial Investments (“UKFI”) was created for 
this purpose: to manage the government’s investments at arm’s length. Firstly, the creation 
and the operating framework of UKFI are explained. The formal rules and guidelines under 
which UKFI should be run are critically analysed. Thereafter, the impact of state-ownership 
on competition and the impact of the EU rules on state-aid are examined.  
The objective of this analysis is to examine the impact of state-ownership of UK financial 
institutions on their corporate governance. The question is whether the political pressures 
and potential government intervention can be merged with running a commercial 
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organisation that is at the same time trying to adapt to a swiftly changing regulatory 
environment. It might be that this gives rise to conflicting interests between the various 
actors in corporate governance at these banks. In particular, there is a danger that the 
political objectives of the owners may conflict with the ordinary commercial objectives. In 
the next chapter follows a discussion on the long term solutions proposed for the financial 
sector. It is important to realise that a substantial part of the financial sector is still in 
government ownership. This could have an impact on the proposed solutions.  
b. The Creation of UKFI 
The creation of UKFI in November 2008 was an immediate result of the financial crisis that 
had now reached the UK institutions. In January 2008, as described previously in more 
detail, Northern Rock was fully nationalised. On the morning of 8 October 2008, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, announced proposals to restore confidence in 
the banking system and to put banks on a stronger footing, including an immediate £25 
billion capital injection via a recapitalisation fund and another £25 billion available if 
needed.26 These measures left the UK government with a substantial stake in various UK 
banks that would need to be managed. On 3 November 2008, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Alistair Darling, announced the creation of UKFI for  
‘managing of the Government’s shareholding in banks subscribing to its 
recapitalisation fund …’27 
This announcement contained a summary of the relationship between the government and 
the objectives and targets for UKFI. 
‘The Government’s investments will be managed on a commercial basis by 
a new arm’s-length company. … Its overarching objectives will be to 
protect and create value for the taxpayer as shareholder, with due regard 
to financial stability and acting in a way that promotes competition’.28 
From this summary statement it would appear that the government does not want to 
actively manage its investments but leave the company at arm’s-length. It would thus be 
shielded from political influence and decisions that may be politically convenient but not 
commercially sound. This is further supported by the fact that it seeks to maximise value 
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for the taxpayer as shareholder. There are other ways in which it could have maximised 
value for taxpayers, for example by cheap lending. The point is that as a shareholder the 
taxpayer’s interest means that the investments must be run on a commercially sound basis 
with the aim of generating a healthy return. The additional constraint of having to regard 
financial stability seems only natural, given that the capital injections were made for the 
purpose of maintaining financial stability in the first place. And the constraint relating to 
competition would appear to arise naturally from national and EU law on state-aid. 
The statement continued that the UK government would seek to influence the 
remuneration policy 
‘UKFI will work to ensure management incentives for banks in which it has 
shareholdings are based on maximising long-term value and restricting the 
potential for rewarding failure’.29 
At this stage, it becomes less obvious that the government actually intends to have its 
investments managed at arm’s length or even on a commercial basis. Of course, the idea 
that management’s rewards should be directly linked with the performance of the bank 
over a longer period is in itself entirely reasonable and even desirable. The potential 
problem lies with the context in which remark is made as well as some of the wording. 
The announcement further made it clear that the UK government wanted to ensure that 
the banks would continue to lend and stimulate the UK economy. 
‘It will also oversee the conditions of the recapitalisation fund, including 
maintaining, over the next three years, the availability and active 
marketing of competitively-priced lending to home owners and small 
businesses at 2007 levels’.30 
It is at this point that the statement becomes inconsistent at best. First, the government is 
here actively engaged in prescribing the lending objectives for the banks in which it holds 
investments. It clearly defines the levels at which it expects this lending to occur. Second, 
the levels that it prescribes do not make commercial sense nor are they desirable in the 
context of creating financial stability. It is obvious that the situation before the crisis was 
not sustainable and that it would not be desirable to return to such a position. The 
objective of providing emergency funding should be to allow banks to survive and clean up 
their balance sheets. It is understandable why such a lending objective is being prescribed. 
The taxpayer is not only a shareholder, interested in a return on its investment and 
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potentially selling its stake at a profit. The taxpayer also has a great interest in economic 
growth. To allow for economic prosperity, banks must be willing to lend to households and 
businesses. Although growth in the longer term is still achievable when banks decrease 
their lending in the short term, any economic growth in the short term will be non-existent. 
And it is here that a major problem can arise if taxpayers and politicians are not willing to 
accept a major correction in banks’ lending practices which lead to a deep recession in the 
short term. 
c. The Operating Framework of UKFI 
Two documents set out the rules for the interaction between HM Treasury and UKFI: the 
Shareholder Relationship Framework Document31 (“SRFD”) and the Investment Mandate32 
(“IM”). These are occasionally updated to reflect new responsibilities as banks fail (such as 
B&B). The latest versions are from October 2014, updating those of October 2010. 
Additionally, UKFI has subscribed to the UK Stewardship Code and it expects its investees to 
comply with the Corporate Governance Code on a “comply or explain” basis.33 UKFI has 
also issued the UKFI Sustainability Policy.34 
i. Shareholder Relationship Framework Document 
The SRFD, which manages the shareholder relationship, establishes the objectives for UKFI 
and sets out how it will pursue them. The main objective as set out in section 3.1 is to  
‘develop and execute an investment strategy for disposing of the 
Investments (or, in the case of UKAR, the underlying investments in NRAM 
and B&B) in an orderly and active way through sale, redemption, buy-back 
or other means within the context of protecting and creating value for the 
taxpayer as shareholder and, where applicable, as provider of financial 
support, paying due regard to the maintenance of financial stability and to 
acting in a way that promotes competition.’ 
There are further points that are included in this objective. As per section 3.1(A), UKFI is 
not to be a permanent investor in its investments. Instead, UKFI must maximise sustainable 
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value for the tax payer. UKFI must also take the overall UK financial stability into 
consideration in value-realisation transactions, disposal or restructuring of its investees, as 
per section 3.1(B). Finally, as outlined in section 3.1(C), UKFI must promote competition, 
both ensuring that the UK financial services industry looks after the consumers and that it 
respects commercial decisions of the institutions. 
Section 6 of the SRFD gives the framework for interaction between UKFI and the boards of 
the investees. UKFI will seek to strengthen the boards of directors with the appointment of 
appropriately qualified non-executive directors. If the investee is wholly government-
owned, then UKFI will exercise the associated rights originally conferred on the Treasury. 
With all of its investees, UKFI will engage in matters of board composition within the 
principles set out in section 7 relating to preservation of the independence of the 
investees. This section 7 is crucial as it should ensure that the government does not the 
investee companies for political purposes. This is best exemplified in section 7.1, where it 
states that UKFI 
‘will manage the Investments on a commercial basis and will not intervene 
in day-to-day management decisions of the Investee Companies (including 
with respect to individual lending or remuneration decisions save, in the 
case of the Wholly-Owned Investee Companies, to the extent provided in 
the applicable Investee Company Framework Document).’ 
The engagement with the investees will be proportionate to the percentage of government 
ownership. Hence, for a wholly-owned investee, its board would report directly and only to 
UKFI. For investees that are listed, section 7.2(B) provides that UKFI 
‘will engage actively with the Investee Company in accordance with best 
institutional shareholder practice. … the Listed Investee Companies will 
continue to be separate economic units with independent powers of 
decision and, in particular, will continue to have their own independent 
boards and management teams, determining their own strategies and 
commercial policies (including business plans and budgets)’. 
The question is whether these parts of the SRFD are adhered to in practice. There are 
numerous areas where the government’s interests may conflict with the commercial 
objectives of the institutions. For example, the institutions may want to reduce the size of 
their balance sheet whilst at the same time the government wants to increase lending. 
Another example is the desire of the institution to attract, reward and retain its talented 
staff, whilst the government wants to avoid headlines of large bonuses at bailed-out banks. 
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Other parts of section 7 make it clear that HM Treasury wants to prevent any distortions or 
impede competition in the banking sector. It also states that UKFI must adopt procedures 
to manage any conflicts and insider information. These are aimed to ensure that the 
investees are managed within the European and national competition regulation. The 
function of monitoring, reporting and securing compliance with competition regulation lies 
with UKFI as per section 8. However, section 9 makes it clear that the Treasury has a large 
say over what happens at UKFI. 
ii. Investment Mandate 
The IM complements the SRFD. It contains important provisions on how UKFI is to manage 
the investments it holds. The overarching approach to managing these investments is 
captured in section 3. 
‘In managing the Investments, UKFI will (on behalf of HM Treasury) follow 
best institutional shareholder practice. This includes compliance with the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee’s Statement of Principles together 
with any developments to best institutional shareholder practice arising 
from recommendations or guidance contained in the Walker Review or 
elsewhere’. 
This makes it clear that UKFI is to act as a normal shareholder following the relevant best 
practices. This implies that it is not to seek to implement government policies which would 
be contrary to those best practices. In fact, it re-emphasises the independent nature that 
UKFI should have, not influenced by the Treasury, in managing its investments. However, 
UKFI must work together with the Treasury in regard of the actual disposal, sale or 
restructuring of any of its investments. Section 4 provides a wide framework in which this 
must take place.  
As UKFI has started to sell off part of its investments, it is now holds more investments in 
listed companies. This is treated separately in the IM. Special attention is given to the 
exercising the voting rights attached to investments. This covers topics such as 
remuneration, where section 7 provides that UKFI will seek to ensure that the 
remuneration policy will be in line with best practices as set out by the G20, the Walker 
Review and the FCA. UKFI should also seek to ensure that the costs of dismissing a director 
are reasonable and fair. Finally, as a counterbalance, UKFI should also seek to ensure that 
remuneration is such that the investee can attract the staff needed to maximise 
shareholder (and thus taxpayer) value. 
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d. UKFI Today 
On 20 May 2015 it was announced that UKFI is to become a subsidiary of UK Government 
Investments, a new company wholly owned by HM Treasury.35 The Shareholder Executive, 
a division within the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, will become a division in 
this new company. The Shareholder Executive is involved in a wide variety of government 
initiatives.36 These include 23 state-owned businesses, ranging from the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority to Working Links, from the Met Office to Royal Mail, and from 
Companies House to the Green Investment Bank.37 It will also be instrumental in setting up 
the British Business Bank.  
Since its creation, UKFI has not only looked after the government’s investments in the 
rescued banks, it has also successfully sold off parts of these investments. On 17 
November, 2011, Northern Rock was sold to Virgin Money.38 On 17 December 2013, a six 
percent stake in Lloyds was sold.39 Further sales, including a sale of Lloyds’ shares to the 
general public, are being planned. Although one can argue over the timeframe, this would 
evidence a clear determination by HM Treasury to sell off its stake in the nationalised 
institutions. It would also allow the government to get at least part of the money back that 
it has put into the failed banks. The reality is that privatisation carries political risks. If the 
share price subsequently increases, the critique will be that it was sold at too low a price. It 
also means that the government has less direct control over the former investees.  
5. Rules on Competition and State-Aid 
a. Competition Rules within the UK 
In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”), established by the Enterprise Act 2002 s1, was 
responsible at the time of the financial crisis for safeguarding competition rules. The OFT 
derives its power from various statutes, including for example the Competition Act 1988 
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and the Enterprise Act 2002. The Competition Act 1988 prohibits anti-competitive 
behaviour. Firstly, it prohibits anti-competitive agreements per Chapter 1 of the Act and 
Article 101 of the EC Treaty. Secondly, it prohibits abuse of a dominant position per 
Chapter 2 of the Act and Article 102 of the EC Treaty. For example, the OFT can refer 
mergers to the Competition Commission for investigation if it leads to a substantial 
decrease in competition. With this authority, the OFT but also the Competition Commission 
played an important role in safeguarding competition within the UK during the period in 
which several UK banks had to be rescued. Often the solutions taken had the potential to 
reduce the competition in the UK banking sector. It must be noted that the OFT has been 
replaced on 1 April 2014 by the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”), established 
by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. 
The rescue of HBoS by Lloyds, which was announced on 18 September 2008, had the 
potential to create a dominant player in the UK retail banking market.40 On that same day, 
the Secretary of State, using his powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 s42(2), asked the 
OFT to look into the effects of this merger and to report on it in accordance with s44 of the 
same Act.41 The OFT concluded that the merger would result in a substantial reduction of 
the competition without relevant benefits to the customers affected. There was a large 
overlap between the activities of Lloyds and HBoS, in particular in the areas of personal 
banking, such as savings, loans, credit cards and mortgages, in corporate banking, such as 
banking services to SMEs, and in insurance, such as PPI.42 Furthermore, HBoS was seen as a 
major driver of competition whilst Lloyds was the market leader. A merger could therefore 
significantly strengthen the position of Lloyds. The OFT thus concluded that the conditions 
for referral to the Competition Commission were met. 
On the 24 October 2008, the day that the OFT published its report, the Enterprise Act 2002 
(Specification of Additional Section 58 Consideration) Order 2008 (SI 2008/2645) came into 
force. The OFT and the Competition Commission have a duty under s57 to bring to the 
attention of the Secretary of State if any of the considerations specified in s58 are met. 
These conditions are, for example, matters of national security as per s58(1). The Business 
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and Enterprise Secretary of State under s58(3) has the power to modify or add to these 
conditions. The order passed added the following condition. 
(2D) The interest of maintaining the stability of the UK financial system is 
specified in this section (other than for the purposes of sections 67 and 68 
or references made, or deemed to be made, by the European Commission 
to the OFT under article 4(4) or 9 of the EC Merger Regulation). 
On 31 October 2008 the Business and Enterprise Secretary of State thus exercised his 
powers to allow the merger between Lloyds and HBoS despite concerns over competition 
on the grounds of maintaining financial stability in the UK. This resulted in mixed 
responses.43 Those in favour argued that the government had to take decisive action to 
ensure financial stability and that competition was a secondary concern in this. The other 
side argues that different solutions might have been possible and that in the longer term 
problems with competition would need to be addressed. In any event, the merger of Lloyds 
and HBoS clearly demonstrates that the government was willing to override national 
competition rules in securing financial stability. 
b. The EU Rules on Competition and State-Aid 
The national rules on competition are not the only ones relevant. In fact, the national rules 
are based largely on an implementation of the EU competitions rules. The EU rules come 
into play when several Member States are involved. Furthermore, the EU has rules relating 
to state-aid, something which was provided by many Member States to banks during the 
global financial crisis.44 Furthermore, it would be far less likely that these rules and 
regulations could be brushed aside as easily as the national rules previously discussed. The 
European Commission has been especially concerned about state-aid provided to financial 
institutions and has engaged with the relevant institutions to ensure that in the longer term 
competition would be restored. The Commission has taken a longer term view in this, 
thereby acknowledging that removing the threat to financial stability was more important 
in the short term.  
The principles and consequences of EU rules on state-aid are examined. The Treaties of the 
European Union set out the EU’s constitutional basis. The two main treaties are the Treaty 
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on European Union,45 originally the Maastricht Treaty,46 and the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union,47 originally the Treaty of Rome48 to which the UK was not a 
signatory. These treaties have been amended on several occasions, most recently in the 
Treaty of Lisbon.49 In the timeline of the global financial crisis and the aid provided to ailing 
banks, it is necessary to go back to the consolidated versions of these treaties in 200650 and 
in 2008.51 Within these treaties, there are limitations set out on the aid that governments 
can give to their national enterprises. These fall under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Title VII Common Rules on Competition, Taxation and Approximation of 
Laws. The background concept behind this part of the treaty is to create a single internal 
market without trade barriers or unfair competition. 
As mentioned previously in the discussion on competition at a national level, the main 
articles on competition are 101 and 102. The 2008 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Title VII Section 1, Article 101, states that 
‘The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, in 
particular … (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage …’ 
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The 2008 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 102, states that 
‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. …’ 
There are two articles very similar to the two branches of rules on competition in the 
Competition Act 1988, enforced by the OFT. Especially Article 102 was relevant to the 
merger between Lloyds and HBoS discussed previously. 
The rules on state-aid are set out in Section 2 “Aids Granted by States”.  Article 107 at 1 
says that 
‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.’ 
It continues at 3 to provide exceptions under which state-aid may be granted. 
‘The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal 
market: … (b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of 
common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State’. 
If state aid has been provided, then the Commission will keep it under close scrutiny in 
Article 108(1). 
‘The Commission shall, in corporation with the Member States, keep under 
constant review all systems of state aid existing in those States. It shall 
propose to the latter any appropriate measures required by the 
progressive development or functioning of the internal market’. 
If the Commission does not approve of the state-aid granted, then it will inform the State 
to change the situation using its power granted under Article 108(2). If the State does not 
comply it will be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
‘If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, 
the Commission finds that aid granted by a State or through State 
resources is not compatible with the internal market having regard to 
Article 107, or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State 
concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time 
determined by the Commission’. 
The Commission would also like to be informed of changes in 108(3). 
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‘The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit 
its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such 
plan is not compatible with the internal market having regard to article 
107, it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 
2. The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into 
effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision’.52 
These EU Treaty Articles set out the rules on competition and state-aid. The focus for the 
European Commission was mainly on the latter.  
c. Application of EU rules on State-Aid 
The discussion on allowing the government of Member States to provide aid to the 
financial institutions in their country centred around Article 107 3(b) as quoted earlier. The 
question arises whether, in light of the ongoing global financial crisis, a failure of a bank 
would constitute a serious disturbance in the economy. If so, providing state-aid may be 
allowed. The Commission started to issue guidelines early on in the financial crisis when it 
became obvious that various governments had already or were about to intervene in their 
national banks. In the end, a series of guidelines53 were issued keeping pace with the 
developments during the crisis and events in individual Member States.54  
The first communication, referred to as the Banking Communication,55 sets out guidelines 
to be used when assessing aid given by Member States to their banks. The three underlying 
principles56 to be applied are set out in s15. First, that the serious disturbance must be 
remedied. Thus the aided banks must be made viable in the long term without continued 
aid. This would include an analysis of alternative options and of a long term business plan. 
Second, the aid provided must be proportionate. The state-aid should not be used, for 
example, to finance acquisitions or other investments. Third, measures must be taken that 
will minimise any distortions to competition in the European Single Market. In particular, 
                                                          
52ibid 92 
53 European Commission, ‘State aid temporary rules established in response to the economic and 
financial crisis’ (31 July 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/temporary.html> accessed 14 November 
2015 
54 European Commission, ‘State aid: Overview of decisions and on-going in-depth investigations in 
the context of the financial crisis’ (3 September 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-762_en.htm> accessed 14 November 2015 
55 Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis [2008] OJ C270/8 available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1025(01)&from=EN> 
accessed 14 November 2015 
56 Slaughter and May, ‘Commission publishes guidelines on restructuring aid to banks’ (14-20 August 
2009) 
<http://slaughterandmay.com/media/847977/eu_competition_newsletter_14_aug_20_aug_2009.p
df> accessed 14 November 2015 
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this may include divestments and sale of parts of the bank to favour entry of competitors 
or cross border activity. State-aid must certainly not be used to the detriment of 
competitors. For example, state-aid may not be used to offer terms that competitors 
cannot match to obtain better interest rates, lower collateral costs or similar.  
The second communication, the Recapitalisation Communication,57 builds on this. It sets 
out three common objectives of recapitalisation: restoring financial stability, ensuring 
lending to the real economy and dealing with the systemic risk of a possible insolvency. 
With these objectives in mind, there are three concerns for competition: banks 
recapitalised by one Member State should not have an unfair advantage over banks in 
another Member State, recapitalisation schemes should differentiate in accordance with 
risk profiles so as not to give any undue advantage, and public recapitalisation should not 
put those banks that not have recourse to public funding in a less competitive position. The 
communication further contains comments from the European Central Bank and provisions 
on the type of capitalisation and the minimum price. 
The third communication is the Impaired Assets Communication.58 By this time, 
governments of Member States had started to devise schemes to help banks with their 
assets on which they were likely to incur losses. These include, for example, the securities 
related to US sub-prime mortgages. Schemes devised include purchase through the 
creation of a bad bank containing the impaired assets as well as insurance schemes against 
losses from impaired assets. By setting out the guidelines for state-aid relating to impaired 
assets, the European Commission tried to increase the disclosure of potential future losses 
and improve transparency of financial markets, thus restoring some of the confidence 
between banks.59 The guidelines introduced include the requirement of full disclosure of 
the impairments prior to government intervention. The relevant assets should be valued by 
independent experts, certified by bank supervisors and validated by the Commission. Other 
guidelines similar to those on recapitalisation apply as well. Together with the guidelines on 
                                                          
57 Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: 
limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition 
[2009] OJ C10/2 available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:010:0002:0010:EN:PDF> accessed 14 
November 2015 
58 Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community 
Banking Sector [2009] OJ C72/1 available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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59 European Commission, ‘State aid: Commission provides guidance for the treatment of impaired 
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recapitalisation, the guidelines on impaired assets cover the majority of state-aid provided 
by Member States and thus ensure a level-playing field in the European market. 
When the financial crisis had passed its peak, the focus shifted from ensuring stability to 
restructuring the aided banks with the aim to remove government support. The fourth 
communication, Restructuring Communication,60 contains three principles which the 
Commission will apply. These are simply that the bank must be made viable for the long 
term, that restructuring costs are shared fairly with the owners and that distortion of 
competition is minimal. One of the main points made by the Commission is that, in order to 
ensure stability, banks will have to stress-test their business.61 The communication on 
restructuring is the logical next step taken by the Commission following the timeline of 
events, as it now seeks to ensure that the emergency measures start to unwind, removing 
state-aid and bringing the European Market back to a normal state. 
The next communications by the Commission, the fifth,62 the sixth63 and the last,64 prolong 
the crisis framework as previously established. They do, however, gradually apply stricter 
rules. Most notably, in the final prolongation, the Commission seeks to create a more 
effective restructuring process by requiring a full restructuring plan, including a capital 
raising plan, to be in place before any state-aid may be granted to recapitalise the bank.65 
Furthermore, any shortfall in capital must first be to detriment of the shareholders and 
junior debt holders before any state-aid can be provided in the form of recapitalisation or 
                                                          
60 Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [2009] OJ C195/9 available at 
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61 European Commission, ‘State Aid: Commission presents guidelines on restructuring aid to banks’ 
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asset protection schemes. It also arranges for a cap on remuneration and other strict 
remuneration policies for failed banks. 
d. The European Commission and State-Aid in the UK 
The measures taken by the European Commission discussed so far are of a general nature. 
They apply within the whole of the EU and intend to give guidance and create a level 
playing field. Besides these general measures, the European Commission has also looked at 
individual cases of state-aid granted by Member States to failed banks. It should be noted 
that the Commission, and in particular its then Commissioner for Internal Markets and 
Competition, Neelie Kroes, took a rather pragmatic approach.66 In the UK, the European 
Commission has been involved in aid which was granted to individual banks and building 
societies as well as the stabilisation plan and the asset protection scheme. The first 
approval given by the Commission was for the rescue of Bradford & Bingley.67 The 
Commission approved the sale of the retail deposit book and branches to Abbey National 
and the nationalisation and winding-down of the rest of the bank. The Commission noted 
in particular that no aid was given to the purchaser of the branches, Abbey National, and 
that the UK government had committed to presenting a restructuring plan within six 
months. 
The next three issues the Commission dealt with were the UK stabilisation plan, the lending 
to business plan and the asset-backed securities guarantee scheme. The UK stabilisation 
plan, launched on 11 October 2008, included the recapitalisation of the UK banks and 
building societies in exchange for shares, a guarantee scheme for short term and medium 
term debt for those unable to access funding, and an extension of the short term liquidity 
scheme by the Bank of England. The Commission swiftly approved this package and 
prolonged it on several occasions, noting that the measures were aimed at restoring 
confidence, were non-discriminatory and time-limited.68 The Commission also swiftly 
approved the lending scheme to businesses, under which the UK government guarantees 
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67 European Commission, ‘State aid: Commission approves UK rescue aid package for Bradford & 
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lending to SMEs.69 Again, the Commission noted its non-discriminatory nature, its time limit 
and that it was an appropriate, necessary and proportionate way to support the real 
economy. The Commission gave the same arguments to approve the Asset-Backed 
Securities Guarantee scheme, which was designed to aid the mortgage backed securities 
market.70 
Thereafter, the Commission looked at state-aid to individual banks. The first was Northern 
Rock.71 This was not a straight forward affair as the Commission first launched an in-depth 
investigation72 about a year earlier. It was extended after the plans were amended to 
create a good bank and a bad bank.73 This amended plan was approved, with the 
Commission noting that the aid was kept to a minimum, the good bank had long term 
viability without state support and that normal competition would be restored by winding 
down the bad bank. This last argument was based on the observation that Northern Rock’s 
aggressive yet unviable growth model in itself was a distortion and that bringing it back to a 
viable size would benefit competition. 
The Commission applied the earlier approvals for the UK stabilisation plan and the EU-wide 
guidelines for restructuring to approve the state-aid of recapitalisation given to Lloyds to 
the extent of 17 billion pounds.74 The plan approved contains a significant divestment 
package in Lloyds’ core business area of UK retail. The objective of this divestment was to 
ensure competition was not distorted by the aid granted. Similarly, the Commission applied 
earlier EU wide guidelines on impaired asset relief and on restructuring aid for banks to 
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approve the impaired asset relief and restructuring for RBS.75 The Commission notes in 
particular the long term viability of the bank without state support and the required 
reduction in size of the bank. 
6. Conclusions 
The second research question asked what the effect is of new legislation and other 
initiatives on corporate governance at UK banks. This chapter contained a close 
examination of the legislation enacted in the wake of the crisis to deal with the banking 
failures. This constituted mainly the two Banking Acts, which defined the main powers as 
well as the limitations ordained to HM Treasury and the financial regulators to deal with a 
failure of a bank. This chapter also contained a study of what happened with the rescued 
banks, in particular their management within UKFI and the relevant rules on state-aid and 
competition. The conclusion must be that none of the emergency legislation nor any of the 
establishment of UKFI was set up with the direct purpose of improving corporate 
governance at UK banks. However, that does not mean they do not have an effect on it, as 
the research question rightly asks. The main effect can be found in the recognition of 
customer, deposit holders and even the general public at large as important stakeholders. 
The third research question asked what specifically the effect of state-ownership is on 
corporate governance at UK banks. The answer to this question can be found in comparing 
the described setup of UKFI with everyday reality. 
a. Stakeholders 
The Banking Act 2009, together with the BRRD and its transposition into UK law, establish 
the framework for dealing with the failure of a UK bank. The main beneficiary of an orderly 
failure, whether through a bail-in, a private purchaser, a bridge institution or any of the 
options available, has to be the general public. There are several obvious reasons for this. 
Unlike with the failures of Northern Rock or RBS, the tax payer should not need to provide 
enormous public funds to bail out the failing bank. In contrast to the global financial crisis, 
this would mean that there is no large increase in government debt or other severe 
pressure on the public finances. It would thus also prevent the trigger into a recession 
which followed the financial crisis. This means the overall economic impact of the failure of 
a bank would be limited. From a corporate governance perspective, it means that these 
measures implicitly recognise the importance of the general public as a stakeholder in the 
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banks. The interest of the wider environment in which the bank operates is taken into 
account by protecting public funds and the UK economy from its failure. 
More specifically than the general public at large, the depositors with the bank are better 
protected. They see their deposits, or at least up to a reasonable amount, protected via the 
FSCS. In practice this means that they rank highest in case of a failure and that a prompt 
repayment of their deposits by the liquidator can be expected. This is another implicit 
recognition of the importance of one of the stakeholders of a bank. Here, the depositors 
are recognised as important stakeholders. The other purpose of the FSCS is to prevent a 
run on a bank that is perceived to fail. This in turn makes a bank safer which, as per the 
argument above, would be in the interest of the public at large. 
The protection of these stakeholders is not done without proper safeguards. The 
limitations seek to ensure that there can only be an intervention when it is absolutely 
necessary. However, these conditions, especially for extra-ordinary public financial support, 
are phrased in the context of the stability of the financial system within the UK and a 
serious disturbance to the wider economy. Again, in these conditions one can find the 
recognition of the general public as a stakeholder in the bank. There are also safeguards in 
terms of compensation payable. As and when required, these actions may lead to the 
situation that various parties involved need to be compensated for actions taken by HM 
Treasury and regulators. This would typically be the case where the solution includes a 
transfer of assets or parts of the business. This recognises the property rights of the 
shareholders, who play a crucial role in the corporate governance process.  
b. The Role of the Government and Commercial Objectives 
The third research question asked what the effect is of state-ownership on the corporate 
governance at UK banks. The core element in answering this question is whether the 
government would or not act like an ordinary shareholder. If it is the former, then state-
ownership would make little difference. If it is the latter, then it clearly would. The 
framework documents that were issued by UKFI would suggest that the government’s 
intention is to keep their investments at arm’s-length. It suggests that there is no interest in 
interfering with the institutions beyond that what might be expected from the ideal 
shareholder, who abides by all the relevant codes of practice. There is good reason to do 
so. By running these nationalised banks on a sound commercial basis, it would allow their 
management to maximise the value for shareholders. This is in the clear interest of 
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taxpayers, who would be best served if the investments are sold off at the highest price. It 
would ensure that they see the majority of their money returned. 
This is not how it worked out in practice. As discussed, the government, through UKFI, 
sought to influence the remuneration and other management incentives. In principle there 
is nothing wrong with that. It makes perfect sense to align remuneration to the long-term 
value and the well-being of the bank. It also makes perfect sense to restrict potential 
rewards for failure. In fact, any ordinary shareholder may seek to do this. The problem is 
twofold. First, every year in the lead up to the annual bonus round, the media would be full 
of speculation about remuneration at the failed banks. It placed enormous pressure on the 
government to reduce the overall variable payments to a level at which the nationalised 
banks would arguably no longer remain competitive. The second part of the problem is 
that, as a consequence of the first, the perception is created, rightly or not, that the 
nationalised banks are a ‘political football’. Highly skilled staff, who have a choice of which 
bank they work for, would not be attracted by the idea of working for such a bank. As a 
consequence, the nationalised banks struggle to attract the best staff they need to return 
them to public ownership. 
Another area the government sought to influence was the lending policy. The nationalised 
banks were in a position where they needed to strengthen their capital position whilst at 
the same time reducing their balance sheet size. So the last thing these banks would want 
to do is to extend lending in the UK. This would weaken their capital position and increase 
their balance sheets, contrary to the banks’ objectives. It was also directly contrary the 
objectives of the regulators, which sought to stabilise the banks and the UK financial 
system. In order to comply with the government’s wishes, internationally active banks such 
as RBS were forced to sell a substantial part of their international operations. In doing so, 
the bank would reduce its balance sheet enough to allow it to increase domestic lending. In 
the case of Lloyds HBoS, the question is whether it was desirable in the first place to extend 
domestic lending, considering that the bank was already forced by the European 
Commission to sell part of its UK branches due to competition concerns. In the case of 
Northern Rock, its domestic growth had been so aggressive that its main objective was to 
return its lending practices to a manageable size. In other words, the government’s desire 
to stimulate the UK economy by increasing lending by state-owned banks was often 
directly at odds with the banks’ objectives and with the regulators’ objectives.  
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Finally, it has to be noted that state-ownership has the potential to reduce competition. 
The absence of competition in the UK banking market is discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter. The conclusion therefore has to be, firstly, that the government did not 
manage its investments at arm’s-length as it set out to do, and secondly, that the 
government’s objectives for the banks was often detrimental to the banks’ commercial and 
regulatory objectives. That said, it has to be pointed out that the government sought to 
address two points which are recurring themes in the research. The first is that, by 
interfering with pay at the nationalised banks, it sought to address the shortcomings in the 
banking culture, in its ethics. The second is that, by trying to stimulate the UK economy, it 
recognised the importance of banks to the general economy. It recognised the importance 
as the general public as a stakeholder in the banks. By way of its actions, the government 
was addressing some of the fundamental weakness of corporate governance at UK banks. 
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Chapter 5 – Structural and Long Term Solutions 
1. Introduction 
The objective is to be able to formulate, at the end of this chapter, a substantial part of the 
answer to the second research question: what is the effect of new legislation and other 
initiatives on corporate governance at UK banks? Combining this analysis with that of the 
previous chapter, which analysed the emergency measures designed to deal with the 
failure of a UK bank, it is possible to draw some conclusions on how effective these 
combined new measures will be.  
The failures of UK banks revealed weaknesses in their corporate governance. In chapter 
three, in which a number of case studies were examined, these weaknesses were 
identified: there were problems with culture, value and ethics; the boards were largely 
ineffective; and controls and risk management were ineffective. It was further 
demonstrated that the framework to deal with the failure of a bank was inadequate. 
Finally, it was noted that over the last decade, largely due to financial innovation and the 
growth in size of the banks, the minimum standard of what constitutes good corporate 
governance had gone up. In the previous chapter, the short term measures were examined. 
Because these measures focussed mainly on dealing with the failing banks and how to keep 
them operating, the other weaknesses were not addressed by them.  
The structural and long term reforms should therefore seek to remedy the identified 
weaknesses in corporate governance of UK banks. The reforms are organised within the 
context of the weakness that they seek to address. However, before doing so, there is a 
short overview of the framework set out by international and EU responses. The 
international recommendations are a persuasive model of reform for the UK. There has 
been a large amount of reports by international groups analysing what had gone wrong and 
suggesting improvements, including those written by the Senior Supervisors Group,1 the 
International Monetary Fund2 and the Basel Committee.3 The EU responses, in the form of 
regulations or directives, either apply directly in the UK or need to be transposed. 
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Recommendations by the reports from international organisations found their way in to 
the UK national reports. There were two important reports commissioned in the UK: the 
Walker Review4 and the report by the Independent Commission on Banking.5 This in itself is 
a problem of comparative law, as the legal transpositions of harmonised principles6 may 
not address the weaknesses in the UK, reducing their effectiveness.7 The second issue of 
comparative analysis in this chapter is that of direct comparative analysis, or how to 
compare different aspects of different legal systems.8 Considering a wider context can help 
to overcome these issues.9 
2. International Framework 
a. Response from the G20 
The initial reports focussed broadly on two things: default prevention, in particular through 
the reduction of systemic risk, and the handling of an actual default. The reduction of 
systemic risk can be achieved in several ways. An important step has been to create more 
transparency in the derivatives market through the introduction of clearinghouses. Another 
important step, and more relevant to this research, has been the design of measures to 
improve the stability of systemically important financial institutions. With all these new 
measures, it is important to keep in mind that the risk one tries to reduce can be known, 
unknown or unknowable.10 Note that, for example, Basel’s economic capital and its 
minimum requirement is largely based upon known risks only.11 This categorisation of risks 
will influence all answers to questions as: how safe should a financial institution be, or 
would it restrict financial intermediation and investment? How far should new regulation 
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go in preventing a new crisis? And, ultimately, how can risk management and good 
corporate governance take into account the different types of risk, in particular the 
unknown risks?  
Starting with the international responses, one of the first global responses came from the 
G20 leaders. It was very clear where the G20 thought the responsibility for the crisis lies: 
‘Major failures of regulation and supervision, plus reckless and 
irresponsible risk taking by banks and other financial institutions, created 
dangerous financial fragilities that contributed significantly to the current 
crisis’. 12 
Failures of corporate governance and risk management at the banks as well as failures with 
the regulators, acting as gatekeepers, have led to this crisis. 
b. Responses from the Senior Supervisors Group 
The Senior Supervisors Group first published a report in March 2008 on the events of 
2007,13 which was later followed by a second report in October 2009 as a consequence of 
the continuing and deepening of the crisis.14 The Senior Supervisors Group, which is 
composed of the financial regulators of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the 
UK and the US, combines the opinion and expertise of some of the most powerful and most 
experienced financial supervisors worldwide. Their first report examines how different 
banks were responding to the financial crisis and what distinguishes those that are 
successful from those that are not. The Group identifies four key areas in which firm-wide 
risk management practices made a key difference to a bank’s performance.15 First, the 
successful banks had an effective firm-wide risk management system in place that could 
share valuable information throughout every level of the organisation, including the board 
and the Chief Risk Officer. Second, firms that had rigorous and independent valuation 
practices were better prepared to revalue and write down the complex credit structures 
that they had on their books. Third, the banks that did well had aligned their capital 
management, liquidity management and balance sheet management, thereby controlling 
their balance sheet rather than providing incentives to balloon it. Fourth, and last, banks 
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that did well overall had much better risk information systems, allowing management to 
critically assess their risk positions and change underlying assumptions. Better systems 
were often able to integrate their market risk, i.e. the risk of changing share prices, interest 
rates and exchange rates, with their counterparty risk, i.e. the risk of default of the 
counterparty. The differences between banks in these four key areas of risk management 
had most impact in three lines of business: in CDO structuring, warehousing and trading, in 
syndication of leveraged financing loans and in conduit and SIV business.16 Engagement of 
senior management played an important role in how the bank fared so far. Banks where 
senior management was able to implement its balance between risk appetite and its desire 
to do business, where it could identify, understand and act upon risks and finally where 
there was a good flow of information throughout the structure aided by cross-disciplinary 
communication – these banks were much better able to withstand the crisis to date.17 
The second report by the Senior Supervisors Group18 adds to this by adding ten areas of 
continued improvement. One of these is that most boards are being adjusted to increase 
their strength and engagement in risk management.19 This goes together with improving 
risk reporting to the board and integrating risk management throughout the bank. Having 
said that, the Senior Supervisors Group notes that it is generally unhappy with the board’s 
monitoring of adherence to the bank’s risk appetite. In fact, the risk appetite of the bank is 
often not well stated nor defined. Especially the remuneration policy was generally not 
aligned with the defined risk appetite, but often driven by a desire to attract and retain 
talented individuals.20 Many of the other points refer to the inflexibility of the banks’ IT 
systems and infrastructure. These have been found to be lacking the flexibility to adapt to 
an increase or change in demand for new types of risk to be measured, including stress-
testing and counterparty risk measures. 
c. The Basel Committee 
i. Response to the G20 
The Basel Committee wrote the leading Basel II report, which advocated the structure of 
three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process and market 
discipline, as was discussed in more detail in chapter two. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath 
of the crisis, the Committee drew up a program of reform of the banking sector addressing 
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the issues raised by the G20. The Committee describes the objective for reform following 
the crisis as ‘to better protect consumers, depositors and investors’.21 In its report to the 
G20 the Committee outlined key elements to improve the resilience of the banks and the 
global banking system.22 These elements can be divided into micro-level or firm-level 
improvements and macro-level or global improvements. 
On a firm-level, the committee looked at capital, liquidity, risk management and market 
discipline.23 This segmented approach corresponds closely with the three pillar approach of 
Basel II. Several different improvements to capital were suggested. Firstly, the definition of 
tier 1 and tier 2 capital, which represents the different quality levels of capital that a bank 
can hold, was improved. A greater emphasis was placed on common equity, which is 
regarded as the highest quality of capital.  Secondly, the risk that this capital needs to cover 
was extended to include those risks that were not appropriately covered previously. For 
example, during the crisis no capital had to be held for complex derivative transactions that 
the trading arm of the bank was engaged in. As a result, capital requirements for the 
trading book are introduced, including measures to cover the risk that a counterparty in 
such a complex transaction would fail. Furthermore, the overall level of capital required 
was increased by raising the minimum percentage levels of capital that a bank must hold. 
Lastly, measures were proposed to restrain the leverage one could take based on capital. 
Apart from new restrictions on capital, controls on the liquidity of the banks was 
introduced. During the crisis it was not merely capital that was inadequate but, with 
funding drying up, liquidity proved a major problem for banks as well. The committee 
proposed a liquidity ratio, which can be used to measure the bank’s resilience to a 
temporary disruption in the funding market. 
In relation to the second pillar of the three pillar approach, namely supervisory review, the 
Committee conducted a review in the following areas to address any weaknesses revealed 
in the banks’ risk management systems: 
- ‘Firm-wide governance and risk management, 
- Capturing the risk of off-balance sheet exposures and securitisation activities, 
- Managing risk concentrations, 
- Providing incentives for banks to better manage risk and returns over the long 
term, and 
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- Sound compensation practices’.24 
This resulted in several separate reports, such as the report on sound compensation 
practice25 and the report on enhancing corporate governance of banks.26 The points listed 
here represent a recurring theme throughout most of the reports that were written by 
other organisations. 
In relation to the third of the three pillars, market discipline, the Committee concluded that 
the disclosure provided by the banks, both of the risk and of the capital base, was 
inadequate. Due to the extensive use of off-balance sheet instruments and securitisation, 
the reporting on risk and capital was insufficient and inadequate; the committee has 
proposed new guidelines to cover these aspects. Furthermore, an increased disclosure of 
remuneration practice, already mentioned as part of the second pillar, has been proposed. 
The question here is whose remuneration to disclose and to whom; remuneration will be 
discussed in more detail later on. 
On a macro-level, the two main concerns raised by the committee are procyclicality, or the 
increase in risk as the economy grows, and systemic risk, or the risk arising from 
interconnectedness of markets and its participants. Procyclicality is countered by 
restraining the leverage in a situation where credit is cheap via the leverage ratio. At the 
same time, the capital ratios will be strengthened during a good period to provide a buffer 
during subsequent bad years. A special countercyclical capital buffer is introduced for this 
purpose.27 Finally, as not to overstate the profit on loans during good times, which later 
have to be adjusted to a loss in a downturn, additional loan loss provisions are proposed. 
These measures are aimed at the procyclical amplification of shocks over time. At the same 
time, it is necessary to recognise the systemic risk in system, namely that through the 
interconnectedness of the banks such a shock would rapidly spread and affect many banks 
at the same time. To reduce systemic risk, the Committee proposed an overhaul of the 
over-the-counter derivative markets, extra capital requirements for inter-financial 
exposure and limitations to overreliance on short-term interbank funding.28 Dealing with 
the actual default of a bank remains a difficult problem. One suggestion is to have 
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contingent capital, which allows capital instruments to be written off or converted to 
common shares.29 Further difficulties that remain unresolved arise in the failure of a cross-
border bank, highlighted by the differences in intervention tools for an orderly resolution 
during the recent crisis. 
ii. Basel III 
If you ask a bank employee, he or she may say that the Basel III report is the single most 
important report produced in the wake of the crisis. Although that statement certainly 
holds true from a regulatory perspective and indeed it may present the banks with a great 
amount of work in the coming years to implement it in full – it may not necessarily be the 
most important report from a corporate governance perspective. Especially if one regards 
corporate governance as merely ‘a system by which companies are directed and 
controlled’.30 However, the proposals will have an impact on shareholders as the amount of 
capital that is required to undertake the same banking activities will be higher. This can 
only have a negative effect on the return on equity; hopefully the risks will be lower as 
well. 
Basel III consists of two documents, the first discussing the framework to manage liquidity 
risk31 and the second to outline a global regulatory framework.32 Many of the proposals 
contain further detailed implementations of the initial response made to the G20 discussed 
previously.33 The emphasis is on strengthening capital and liquidity requirements to 
improve the resilience in the banking sector. Basel III requires banks to improve the quality 
of capital; in particular tier 1 capital, the highest quality of capital, as well as to increase the 
risk that capital needs to cover and to increase the capital requirement ratio itself. 
Increasing capital ratios includes increasing the level tier 1 capital hold against risk 
weighted assets (“RWAs”) to 4.5% and the building up of both a conservation buffer and a 
countercyclical buffer. These capital ratios are complemented by a new leverage ratio. To 
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protect liquidity, something that proved disastrous during the crisis, two new ratios are 
introduced: the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio. A timeline has 
been drawn up for the introduction of these new or amended ratios. As stated before, 
most of these proposals are a more detailed implementation of the previously discussed 
recommendations to the G20. The amount of work that these new measures bring for 
banks is enormous as they require coordination between very different parts of the 
organisation, infrastructure, process and technology. 
All these combined individual measures show an underlying trend towards a much stronger 
and more integrated form of risk management. The bringing together of the different parts 
of the organisation is crucial in forming this newly integrated risk management. Compared 
with Basel II, the conclusion can be that, at the very least, the level of risk management 
that is required is significantly raised. The integration, or further integration, of a stronger 
risk management into the ‘system by which companies are directed and controlled’ can be 
identified as a unifying objective of all the measures outlined in Basel III and as its biggest 
influence on corporate governance of banks. This in itself should not be surprising, as risk 
management is often seen as such a specific element of corporate governance for banks,34 
as discussed in chapter two. The fact that risk management is an element of corporate 
governance for any company is amongst others acknowledged through the UK Corporate 
Governance Code35 and by the Financial Reporting Council,36 as discussed in chapter two. 
iii. Corporate Governance of Banks 
The Committee has previously published reports specifically on corporate governance of 
banks, both in 199937 and a short period before the crisis in 2006.38 Both reports appeared 
shortly after the OECD had published their updated reports on corporate governance, also 
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in 199939 and 2004.40 Following the crisis, and taking into account various other reports 
that have been published since, including those by the Senior Supervisors Group on risk 
management during41 and after the crisis,42 discussed previously, and by the OECD,43 the 
committee has updated its report on corporate governance of banks in October 201044 and 
again in July 2015.45 For this research, the October 2010 version is the most relevant as it 
contains the direct responses to the financial crisis. Given the importance of the 
committee, this report is a very significant aid in answering the research questions. Among 
some of the failures of corporate governance of banks, the Committee mentions explicitly 
and upfront 
‘insufficient board oversight of senior management, inadequate risk 
management and unduly complex or opaque organisational structures and 
activities’.46 
The committee highlighted six areas in which it believes the greatest focus for 
improvement must be: 
1. ‘Board Practices, 
2. Senior Management, 
3. Risk Management and Internal Controls, 
4. Compensation, 
5. Complex or Opaque Structures, and 
6. Disclosure and Transparency’.47 
The committee identifies fourteen basic principles that together represent important 
elements of an effective corporate governance development process for banks. These 
principles address the areas listed above where the Committee believes the focus for 
improvement should be. Note that in the latest version of July 2015, the first eleven 
principles are at some points slightly reworded but remain in essence very much the same. 
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Because the Committee is one of the most influential organisations worldwide shaping 
financial regulation, it is worth going through each of the fourteen principles in some detail: 
they are likely to shape the debate on corporate governance of banks for the coming years. 
Rather than discussing each principle in turn here, they are discussed in the following 
sections where they are placed in the context of the weaknesses they seek to address. 
Some of them relate to board effectiveness, whilst others relate to culture and 
remuneration. Each principle is thus matched, as best as possible, to the corresponding 
weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks. 
iv. The Role of the Financial Regulator in Corporate Governance 
There is one principle, however, which merits separate discussion. The July 2015 version of 
the principles of corporate governance adds a new principle, Principle 13 in its new 
counting system, which includes the role of supervisors in corporate governance at banks. 
‘Supervisors should provide guidance for and supervise corporate 
governance at banks, including through comprehensive evaluations and 
regular interaction with boards and senior management, should require 
improvement and remedial action as necessary, and should share 
information on corporate governance with other supervisors’.48 
This is quite a novel point. It means that, although the board and senior management are 
primarily responsible for the governance of the bank, the supervisors should assess their 
performance in this context. Some of the details include that 
‘Supervisors should evaluate whether the board and senior management 
have processes in place for the oversight of the bank’s strategic objectives, 
including risk appetite, financial performance, capital adequacy, capital 
planning, liquidity, risk profile and risk culture, controls, compensation 
practices, and the selection and evaluation of management. Supervisors 
should focus particular attention on the oversight of the risk management, 
compliance and internal audit functions’.49 
This greatly expands the role of the supervisor. No longer should the supervisor focus only 
on the capital and liquidity position of the bank. Under these guidelines, the supervisor 
becomes responsible for supervising the entire internal processes at the bank as well as 
areas such as culture and compensation. The supervisor should also get increased powers 
over the composition of the board and senior management: 
‘Supervisors should evaluate the processes and criteria used by banks in 
the selection of board members and senior management and, as they 
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judge necessary, obtain information about the expertise and character of 
board members and senior management. … The individual and collective 
suitability of board members and senior management should be subject to 
ongoing attention by supervisors’.50 
It is not merely the suitability and expertise that the supervisor should look at. The 
supervisor should also have regard for the culture that is emanated from the top 
throughout the bank. 
‘As part of their evaluation of the overall corporate governance in a bank, 
supervisors should also endeavour to assess the governance effectiveness 
of the board and senior management, especially with respect to the risk 
culture of the bank’.51 
Overall, the implication of this last principle is that the supervisor, in other words the 
regulator, should become the guardian of all elements of good corporate governance at the 
banks. 
d. Other Jurisdictions 
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2009, or the 
Dodd-Frank Act in short, was the most comprehensive piece of legislation to be passed as a 
direct response to the financial crisis. It covers, amongst others: the supervision of financial 
institutions; a new resolution procedure for large financial companies; more stringent rules 
on banking capital; the creation of a new agency for enforcing consumer financial laws; the 
Volcker rule; regulation of over-the-counter derivatives; and so on. It is beyond the scope 
of this research project to examine this lengthy act in full. Instead, the say-on-pay 
provisions are examined as they are the main provisions described relating directly to 
corporate governance. Companies will be required to ask their shareholders to approve, 
albeit in a non-binding vote, the compensation package for their executive officers. This 
may include, under circumstances such as a merger, a say on any golden parachutes. The 
compensation committee must meet enhanced independent standards as already apply for 
the audit committee. A greater disclosure will be required on executive pay, in particular in 
relation to the financial performance of the company.  
The EU has implemented a range of regulations and directives in response to the crisis.52 
Some of this, such as the BRRD for recovery and resolution and the FSCS have been 
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discussed in chapter four. The Credit Requirement Directive IV53 (“CRD IV”), which goes 
together with the Credit Requirements Regulation54 (“CRR”), are the implementation into 
EU legislation of Basel III. These include the new major prudential requirements in relation 
to the capital that institutions are required to hold. Where the CRR is directly applicable, 
CRD IV has been transposed by the PRA and the FCA into their respective handbooks for 
their respective firms. For the Eurozone countries, the main responsibility lies with the 
European Central Bank (“ECB”). The European Supervisory Bodies, such as the European 
Banking Authority (“EBA”), are under certain articles tasked with drafting delegated 
legislation. This often involves drafting the relevant technical standards to support some of 
the articles. CRD IV and the CRR came into force on 1 January, 2014, although full 
compliance with Basel III is not a requirement until 1 January, 2019. The difference 
between CRD IV and the CRR is that the CRR focusses on the prudential requirements for 
capital, liquidity and leverage. On the other hand, CRD IV looks at deposit taking activities, 
but also at topics such as remuneration, board composition and transparency.  
Apart from technical differences and more detailed specifications of the capital 
requirements, the main difference between CRD IV and Basel III is that CRD IV sets 
restrictions on the remuneration. There will be a basic ratio of fixed and variable pay of one 
on one. Subject to shareholder approval, this can be increased to one on two. Those within 
scope would include senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions or 
anyone else whose remuneration is of such a level that they should be in those categories. 
There are some more technical requirements around it, however, it is fair to say that 
anyone who has worked in an investment bank in London for over five years is likely to be 
caught under this definition. Any of the variable remuneration is further subject to a 
clawback. Of the variable remuneration, at least fifty percent must consist of shares or 
equivalent ownership interests, whilst at least forty percent of the payment must be 
deferred. These are requirements that go well beyond what was agreed within Basel III. 
They are a reflection of the public opinion within the wider EU on bankers pay during the 
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crisis. Arguably, they have the potential of affecting London, which has by far the largest 
financial centre in Europe, the most. 
3. Changing the Culture 
a. Background 
One of the major weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks is the culture within the 
banks. In particular, there is an emphasis on growth and profit over risk management and 
the interests of external stakeholders. This is evidenced in chapter three by a large number 
of scandals, such as the LIBOR manipulation and the PPI mis-selling, as well as the problems 
at Barclays and the Co-operative Bank. This section contains an overview of the 
recommendations made to address these and of the actual measures taken. These include: 
restrictions on remuneration; increase in competition; restructuring the financial regulator 
to increase focus on conduct; and specific measures to address the manipulation of 
benchmarks such as LIBOR. 
b. Basel Committee on Corporate Governance 
The Basel Committee defined, as discussed previously, various principles of good corporate 
governance. Two are related to culture as they seek to provide guidance on the 
remuneration practices and their alignment with the bank’s risk appetite. 
‘Principle 10: The board should actively oversee the compensation system’s 
design and operation, and should monitor and review the compensation 
system to ensure that it operates as intended’.55 
‘Principle 11: An employee’s compensation should be effectively aligned 
with prudent risk taking: compensation should be adjusted for all types of 
risk; compensation outcomes should be symmetric with risk outcomes; 
compensation payout schedules should be sensitive to the time horizon of 
risks; and the mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation should 
be consistent with risk alignment’.56 
The Senior Supervisors Group named remuneration as a prime example of an area where 
the risk appetite of an organisation determined by the board was largely ignored in 
practice.57 Remuneration in banks is an area of much controversy and media attention. In a 
separate report, the commission argues for more transparency and disclosure on 
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remuneration practices.58 It can also be traced back to principles of fairness and integrity 
within an organisation as outlined by Cadbury. The point here is that bringing in staff from 
another organisation with the agreement of a large guaranteed bonus may not only be 
contrary the risk appetite of the organisation, it may also cause grievance with existing 
members of staff. 
It should be recognised that some of these points are not new. The FSA had previously 
made an effort to improve the connection between risk and rewards. It had done so via its 
handbook, in particular by way of SYSC 19. The aim was to try and make the remuneration 
risk neutral. This part of the handbook has now been updated following the 
implementation of EU legislation.59 It should further be noted that the UK government in 
fact resisted the EU regulation on bankers’ remuneration: it sought to challenge it through 
the court only to abandon it when the adviser to the European Court of Justice rejected its 
arguments.60 
c. The Walker Review 
i. Background, Mandate and Scope 
The Walker Review took place in the UK immediately after the financial crisis, ordered by 
the then Labour government. It contains some recommendations as regards remuneration, 
which are discussed here. The terms of reference for the review were 
‘To examine corporate governance in the UK banking industry and make 
recommendations, including the following areas: the effectiveness of risk 
management at board level, … the balance of skills, experience and 
independence required on the boards of UK banking institutions; the 
effectiveness of board practices and the performance of audit, risk, 
remuneration and nomination committees; the role of institutional 
shareholders in engaging effectively with the companies and monitoring 
the boards; and whether the UK approach is consistent with international 
practice and how national and international practice can be 
promulgated’.61 
 It is a mandate covering the basic elements of corporate governance for banks. The final 
report makes various recommendations in various areas: the role and constitution of the 
board, the board composition and education, the role of shareholders, risk management, 
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and finally remuneration. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Review is on several points in line 
with the previously discussed report on improvements to corporate governance by the 
Basel Committee62 but applied specifically to the UK situation. 
ii. Remuneration 
Remuneration has already been discussed in the context of principles 10 and 11 of the 
Basel Committee63 and in relation to the discrepancy between remuneration and banks’ 
risk appetite observed by the Senior Supervisors Group.64 The Walker Review takes a 
slightly different approach and bases its assessment of remuneration largely on a report by 
the Financial Services Authority called the Remuneration Code 2009.65 The Financial 
Services Authority has updated the Remuneration Code66 to reflect the Capital 
Requirements Directive EU CRD3, the Financial Services Act 2010 and the Walker Review 
itself. The objectives of the Remuneration Code 2009 are to 
‘… sustain market confidence and promote financial stability through 
removing the incentives for inappropriate risk taking by firms, and thereby 
to protect consumers’.67 
Although the Remuneration Code recognises that remuneration practices were not the 
dominant factor in the crisis, it states that it has certainly contributed. It is hoped that the 
proposed changes will not just help to avoid future crisis, it is especially hoped, despite 
recognising that it will not change the ‘bonus culture’ overnight, that it will bring about a 
change in attitude and behaviour with employees and management. It is noted as 
especially important, if not immediately obvious already, that the remuneration policy and 
practice is consistent with and promotes effective risk management; this was highlighted in 
previous recommendations concerning remuneration. It is perhaps a shortcoming of the 
Walker Review that it does not consider culture in light broader than remuneration. As will 
be discussed in the following sections, there are other elements of culture than are 
important to protect consumers. Some of these include acting with due care and integrity, 
creating accountability, promoting competition, and treating customers fairly. It could be 
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said that this would go beyond the scope defined in its terms of reference, however, when 
considering that customers are an important stakeholder in the banks, it does not.  
iii. Amending Legislation 
The review points out that much of the governance of remuneration is already arranged 
through the Companies Act 2006, for example, s420-422 provide reporting details on 
directors’ pay and s215-217 provide details on severance packages for directors. There is a 
category of what is called “high end” employees within financial institutions, perhaps more 
prominent than in any other industry, who earn more than the median of the board, often 
have a function of significant influence and who could materially impact on the risk profile 
of the entire bank.68 The Board Remuneration Committee should also have oversight over 
the remuneration policy for these “high end” employees. It should look at their 
performance objectives as well as any risk adjustments. Some form of disclosure on pay of 
these employees should also be required, without necessarily identifying them. 
The most important risk adjustment that can be made to align risk and reward is to defer 
pay until a later date. The review, in line with the remuneration code, recommends the 
deferral of a significant amount of pay for three or even up to five years.69 It should also be 
possible to claw back these rewards in case of, for example, misstatement or misconduct. 
Note that the Walker Review, as a UK report, can actually recommend how regulation 
concerning remuneration should be implemented as it advises within a national framework 
of legislation and regulation and within a national culture and context; the international 
reports could merely observe that a change was needed. 
d. Independent Commission on Banking 
The Independent Commission on Banking, which was established by the UK government in 
June 2010 and was chaired by Sir John Vickers, wrote a report to consider 
‘… structural and related non-structural reforms to the UK banking sector 
to promote financial stability and competition’.70 
The recommendations have three aims: to reduce the probability and impact of systemic 
financial crises in the future; to maintain the efficient flow of credit to the real economy; 
and to preserve the functioning of the payment system and guaranteed capital certainty for 
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small savers and small businesses.71 The report is broadly divided in two parts: the first part 
concerns financial stability whilst the second part concerns competition. This section on 
culture considers the latter part, because increased competition would strengthen the 
position of the external stakeholders. It would ensure that banks focus on providing value 
for money, reducing the chance of mis-selling. 
The ICB thus sets out its recommendations to improve the competition issues in the UK 
retail market. A few large banks dominate this market. Suggestions are made to make it 
easier to switch account and to ensure that some of the large banks make divestments. It 
examines how entry barriers can be responsibly lowered for new market entrants. The 
question here is whether improved competition and an easier process to switch banks will 
actually lead to more people switching banks. Even if this process becomes more 
straightforward, it may still be perceived to be difficult. It may also be that there is little 
appetite to switch banks as the perception is that there is little difference between 
products and services. The recommendations made by the report may make the process 
easier, but do not appear to address the underlying causes of the inertia, of the reluctance 
of people to change accounts. Perhaps such causes should be sought more in the field of 
behavioural economics. Of course, these arguments should not stop banks from being 
more competitive or offering better products. 
e. Reforming the Financial Regulator 
As some of the responsibility of the crisis is attributed to the gatekeepers, regulatory 
reform is taking place. On a global level, there is the creation of the Financial Stability 
Board to facilitate cooperation and to oversee global financial stability.72 Although this is 
not a regulator in itself, it does report regularly on worldwide improvement and reform on 
transparency, remuneration and related issues. Various institutes have been set up at EU 
level to facilitate regulation with the EU, such as the European Systemic Risk Board.  
The Financial Services Act 2010 contains provisions on the following: new objectives of the 
FSA in ss1-3; the remuneration of executives and of authorised persons in ss4-6; recovery 
and resolution plans in s7; short-selling in s8; the FSA’s disciplinary powers in ss9-13; 
measures to protect consumers in ss14, 15; the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in 
ss16, 17; powers to require information in ss18, 19; and a few other smaller items in the 
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remaining ss20-27. The main purpose of the Act was to strengthen the position and powers 
of the FSA to act in response to weaknesses revealed by the global financial crisis. As an 
example, sections 1 and 2 extend the objectives of the FSA to include financial stability and 
enhancing public education on the working of financial markets. Under sections 9 to 13, the 
FSA is granted new disciplinary powers, including increased powers of suspension and 
fining authorised persons. Section 7 further provides that authorised persons must make a 
so called living will, meaning a plan for what to do when they are suddenly no longer there. 
Finally, under section 8, the FSA can prohibit or require disclosure of short-selling. 
The working of the Financial Services Authority has initially been reviewed in the Turner 
Review.73 However, shortly after publication of this report a government, which had 
campaigned to return regulatory powers to the Bank of England, was installed.74 This 
agenda has been pursued and, through an amendment of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, three new institutions are established under the Bank of England.75 
Hence where the Financial Services Act 2010 provided some change in powers of the 
financial regulator, the FSA, the Financial Services Act 2012 completely change the 
regulatory landscape in the UK. The three new entities are: the Financial Policy Committee 
with responsibility for macro-prudential regulation; the Prudential Regulation Authority 
with responsibility for firm-specific regulation; and thirdly the Financial Conduct Authority, 
which will put consumer interest at the centre of regulation.  
The Bank of England holds the overall responsibility for financial stability. The PRA is a 
subsidiary of the Bank of England tasked with the prudential regulation of deposit takes, 
insurers and major investment firms. As the name suggests, the FCA is regulates conduct 
but is also responsible for the prudential regulation of those organisations not covered by 
the PRA. The naming of the PRA and FCA is therefore confusing, as the FCA is only a 
conduct regulator for dual-regulated firms, and both conduct and prudential supervisor for 
solo-regulated firms. The question for our research is whether the formation of these new 
gatekeepers will improve banking corporate governance. The most likely candidate to 
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stimulate improvements is the Financial Conduct Authority, which could aid strengthening 
the position of consumers as stakeholders – although the Financial Services Authority 
already made a point of improving awareness of its existence amongst consumers.76  
With the reform of the regulators also comes the updating of the handbooks. These 
changes contain the implementation of ethical standards. In particular, within the FCA 
handbook, are the Principles for Businesses (PRIN).77 These principles state, amongst 
others, that a regulated firm must conduct its business with integrity and with due skill, 
care and diligence. It also states that it must have regard for customers and treat them 
fairly. Similar principles are defined for approved persons in the corresponding section 
(APER).78 The section on Senior management arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC) 
was discussed earlier as it contains the arrangements for remunerations (SYSC 19).79 The 
PRA has a set of fundamental principles, which are slightly different from the FCA’s 
principles, although they both feature integrity and due skill, care and diligence.80 All of 
these additions or updates to the regulatory handbook give in particular the FCA some 
ways of enforcing ethical standards. It should be noted that, separately, the Banking 
Standards Board, an industry body without statutory powers, was set up with the aim to 
issue ethical guidance and standards. However, given the difficulty of doing so, it had not 
issued any nine months after coming into existence.81 The first annual review instead looks 
at themes, explaining that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cultures are hard to define and that no single 
template exists.82 
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f. Benchmarks 
In the wake of the LIBOR scandals, the Financial Services Act 2012 contains provisions on 
misleading statements, misleading provisions and specifically misleading statements etc. in 
relation to benchmarks. Section 91(1) provides 
‘A person (“A”) who makes to another person (“B”) a false or misleading 
statement commits an offence if— 
(a) A makes the statement in the course of arrangements for the setting of 
a relevant benchmark, 
(b) A intends that the statement should be used by B for the purpose of the 
setting of a relevant benchmark, and 
(c) A knows that the statement is false or misleading or is reckless as to 
whether it is.’ 
This follows the findings that traders frequently promised all sorts of things to their 
colleagues that were tasked with the actual LIBOR rate submission. Likewise, traders who 
deceived their rate setting colleagues by amending their own prices of assets would now 
fall under section 91(2) 
A person (“C”) who does any act or engages in any course of conduct which 
creates a false or misleading impression as to the price or value of any 
investment or as to the interest rate appropriate to any transaction 
commits an offence if— 
(a) C intends to create the impression, 
(b) the impression may affect the setting of a relevant benchmark, 
(c) C knows that the impression is false or misleading or is reckless as to 
whether it is, and 
(d) C knows that the impression may affect the setting of a relevant 
benchmark. 
It is important to note that section 91(3) provides a justification for such actions as it may 
occur in a future financial crisis 
In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is a defence for the 
person charged (“D”) to show that the statement was made in conformity 
with— 
(a) price stabilising rules, 
(b) control of information rules, or 
(c) the relevant provisions of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 of 
22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European 
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Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back 
programmes and stabilisation of financial instruments. 
The purpose of these provisions is both to give the regulators the most convenient tools for 
these situations as well as an attempt to clean up and re-establish public trust in the 
banking sector. 
4. Increasing Board Effectiveness 
a. Background 
The failures examined in chapter three have demonstrated clear weakness at board level. 
In the cases of RBS and Barclays, the board did not and could not challenge a dominant CEO 
sufficiently. The rapid expansion at Northern Rock and at HBoS was not challenged by the 
board. Generally, the boards lacked experience in banking and could thus not provide 
adequate oversight and challenge. It further allowed a culture to be established within the 
banks placing growth and profit before anything else. Especially the case study of the Co-
operate Bank provided a persuasive argument for increasing board effectiveness. This 
sections sets out the most important responses and measures taken to address these 
weaknesses. 
b. Basel Committee on Corporate Governance 
The majority of the principles on corporate governance set out by the Basel Committee 
relate to board effectiveness. It starts with the first principle, which is almost an overriding 
general objective of what the board’s responsibility is. 
‘Principle 1: The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including 
approving and overseeing the implementation of the bank’s strategic 
objectives, risk strategy, corporate governance and corporate values. The 
board is also responsible for providing oversight of senior management’.83 
This goes back to Cadbury who states that the ‘Boards of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their companies’,84 as discussed in chapter two. The risk management 
function at board level has again been highlighted as important. The oversight of senior 
management is explicitly mentioned here, presumably as a consequence of the failure of 
board members to challenge senior executives at several banks. 
‘Principle 2: Board members should be and remain qualified, including 
through training, for their positions. They should have a clear 
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understanding of their role in corporate governance and be able to 
exercise sound and objective judgement about the affairs of the bank’.85 
This point highlights the importance of the education of the directors. Directors above all 
should be knowledgeable on banking and finance: general commercial skills and experience 
may be sufficient in other organisations, but banks require specialist knowledge. As with 
the first principle, this conclusion has presumably been drawn by lessons from failed banks. 
The Senior Supervisors Group noted that boards are already trying to expand their 
knowledge base and financial expertise as a response to the crisis.86 
‘Principle 3: The board should define appropriate governance practices for 
its own work and have in place the means to ensure that such practices are 
followed and periodically reviewed for ongoing improvement’.87 
 
‘Principle 4: In a group structure, the board of the parent company has the 
overall responsibility for adequate corporate governance across the group 
and ensuring that there are governance policies and mechanisms 
appropriate to the structure, business and risk of the group and its 
entities’.88 
These go back to principles discussed in chapter two. The two principles specifically go back 
to Cadbury: elements of a successful system of corporate governance include openness, 
integrity and accountability. Integrity and accountability are aided by the internal 
information and control systems as set out in the Turnbull Guidance and internationally by 
the IMF and OECD. Both the quality and the integrity of the information are crucial for 
transparency and accountability. 
‘Principle 5: Under the direction of the board, senior management should 
ensure that the bank’s activities are consistent with the business strategy, 
risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the board’.89 
This principle may sound obvious but it is not by any means. The Senior Supervisors Group 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the lack of consistency between the risk appetite defined 
by the board and that implemented at lower levels.90 The fact that the board may agree on 
a risk appetite and strategy may be one thing, but overseeing that this is implemented and 
adhered to throughout the entire bank is an entirely different matter. It requires clear lines 
of communication and information both from the board into the business but also the 
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other way; this is outlined in the next principles. But it also requires that other important 
issues, such as remuneration, adequately reflect the risk appetite that the board is willing 
to take; this is outlined in later principles. 
‘Principle 6: Banks should have an effective internal controls system and a 
risk management function (including a chief risk officer or equivalent) with 
sufficient authority, stature, independence, resources and access to the 
board’.91 
 
‘Principle 7: Risks should be identified and monitored on an ongoing firm-
wide and individual entity basis, and the sophistication of the bank’s risk 
management and internal control infrastructures should keep pace with 
any changes to the bank’s risk profile (including its growth), and to the 
external landscape’.92 
‘Principle 8: Effective risk management requires robust internal 
communication within the bank about risk, both across the organisation 
and through reporting to the board and senior management’.93  
‘Principle 9: The board and senior management should effectively utilise 
the work conducted by internal audit functions, external auditors and 
internal control functions’.94 
Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9 build upon principles 3 and 4 providing further detail on the internal 
controls and systems. In these principles, it is emphasised that especially the information 
on the bank’s risks must be accurate and of high integrity. But these systems need to be 
flexible so that in a time of rapidly changing markets they can quickly be adapted to the 
new situation. Keeping these large information structures flexible within a bank is no 
simple task. However, as per the first and fourth point noted by the Senior Supervisors 
Group,95 banks with a very good and adaptable risk management system in place that 
shared information at every level of the organisation, including the board, found it easier to 
stay on top of things during the financial crisis. 
 ‘Principle 12: The board and senior management should know and 
understand the bank’s operational structure and the risks that it poses (i.e. 
“know-your-structure”)’.96 
 ‘Principle 13: Where a bank operates through special-purpose or related 
structures or in jurisdictions that impede transparency or do not meet 
international banking standards, its board and senior management should 
understand the purpose, structure and unique risks of these operations. 
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They should also seek to mitigate the risks identified (i.e. “know-your-
structure”)’.97 
These in essence come back to the earlier discussed key principle of transparency but also 
to the educational requirement of the board. Note that Principles 12 and 13 have been 
dropped in the July 2015 version of the report. Instead, it lists the next Principle 14 as the 
new Principle 12.  
‘Principle 14: The governance of the bank should be adequately 
transparent to its shareholders, depositors, other relevant stakeholders 
and market participants’.98 
It is quite remarkable that only in the last of its fourteen principles the Committee finally 
mentions shareholders and stakeholders. It mentions these in the context of the third pillar 
of Basel II, disclosure. The most important thing is that it does not just mention 
shareholders, but the Committee acknowledges that there is a whole range of 
stakeholders, including depositors and other market participants, who need to be involved 
and informed. It uses an enlarged group of actors in the system of corporate governance, 
as was previously done by the OECD99 globally and the Winter report100 within the EU, as 
well as in earlier reports by the Committee.101 Several reasons can be put forward as to why 
it is mentioned only in the last principle. It could be because the inclusion of stakeholders 
would make the report less palatable in the UK and US. The report is after all a compromise 
between all the views of participating nations. 
c. The Walker Review 
i. The Board 
The Walker Review notes that some boards were far more effective than others at creating 
solutions and implementing these at the time of the crisis than others, despite the fact that 
they had the same obligations to their shareholders.102 This difference was also noted by 
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the Senior Supervisors Group103 and allows for some comparison between good and bad 
practices. The Walker Review seeks to investigate this difference by answering several 
questions, most notably by questioning whether to extend the statutory responsibility of 
the board to include depositors or even society as a whole and by examining the role of 
non-executive directors. Although the review considered extending the responsibilities 
beyond those to shareholders to include employees, depositors and taxpayers, as well as 
the creation of a non-executive director for public interest, it recommends focussing on the 
existing core accountabilities rather than expanding on these.104 The main argument 
presented in support of not expanding the responsibilities is that the Companies Act 2006 
s172-174, which describes the duties of the director, is sufficient: damaging public 
confidence and not meeting obligations to depositors is not the long-term interests of the 
company.105 It is further argued that giving more consideration to, for example, employees 
may cause conflicts with shareholders during a restructuring or take-over, leading to the 
dilution of existing shareholder power towards other stakeholders and thereby risking to 
fundamentally change the way that the UK markets operate.106 As discussed in chapter 
two, these specific sections in the Company Act 2006 have been called ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’ as it goes somewhat further than plain shareholder value.107 The 
question remains whether this part of the act is sufficient to promote stakeholder value in 
this specific situation.  
Instead of amending the existing statutes, the review concludes that a great deal can be 
achieved even within this existing framework.108 The requirement of specialist knowledge 
concerning the financial industry for the non-executive directors is greater than in other 
sectors. It requires a specialised set of skills and knowledge as the impact of the lack of it 
on society as a whole is far greater than in other industries. This observation corresponds 
with principle 2 of the Basel Committee109 as well as observations made by the Senior 
Supervisors Group on how board members are selected.110 It presents, however, the 
problem of independence of non-executive directors as the best place to build this 
knowledge is from within the industry itself. This would ask for extra scrutiny to be placed 
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on the selection process.111 But the knowledge and understanding of the financial sector as 
well as further training is essential for the optimal functioning of each non-executive 
director.112 Because of this specialist aspect, the time commitment of a non-executive 
director will be far greater than in other industry sectors.113 It would require additional 
supervision by the FSA on whether not only the non-executive directors are sufficiently 
knowledgeable and commit enough time, but also whether they engage proactively in the 
board discussions and act in line with the risk strategy.114 
Therefore, instead of arguing for a prescribed specific or specialised duty for board 
members of a bank, set out in statute, the answer would be provided by more intense 
supervision of the directors by the regulator. The FCA as custodian of corporate governance 
at UK banks would thus negate the necessity for such a duty. Avoiding such prescribed 
specialised duties is arguably desirable as it creates a potential problem in which other 
industry sectors would justify additional duties beyond the core accountabilities already 
defined. The Walker Review takes the correct approach in this instance. 
The FCA would thus ensure that the directors are knowledgeable and engaged, which is 
essential for the proper functioning of the board. The executive needs to be challenged and 
tested on the proposals that he puts forward.115 The non-executive directors need to be 
especially satisfied that the risk assessment is done properly and that the outcome is in line 
with the overall risk strategy. For the chairman, it is possibly even more important that he 
is extremely knowledgeable on the financial sector and that he can commit at least two 
thirds of his time to this role. It is also very important that he possesses the leadership skills 
necessary to ensure that he can facilitate and encourage informed and critical 
contributions from the directors, in particular on matters such as strategy and risk.116 
Altogether, the board should regularly undertake a critical evaluation of its performance 
and governance as well as that of the separate committees. Part of this evaluation should 
focus on whether the board has a sufficient skillset and understanding to address the 
challenges of risk and decisions it has to take.117 
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ii. Shareholders and the Stewardship Code 
The review notes that there are two types of shareholders, distinguished by the time 
horizon of their investment. Some fund managers may hold the stock only for a short 
period, deciding to sell it again if they do not like the direction the company is going. On 
the other side, there are the investors who intend to hold on to the stock for a long period 
of time. This group of investors may seek to influence the decisions of the board if they do 
not like the direction that the company is going in.118 The two groups themselves may 
operate under different pressures: the fund managers may seek short-term targets on a 
few selected investments whilst the other group may consider a longer term view on a 
large and diversified portfolio of investments. The review takes the position that influence 
of major shareholders executed principally through buying and selling is highly 
unsatisfactory as an ownership model. The suggestion is that, as a counterpart to the 
obligation of the board to its shareholders, the investors should have a  
‘… reciprocal obligation involving attentiveness to the performance of 
investee companies over a long as well as a short-term horizon. On this 
view, those who have significant rights of ownership and enjoy the very 
material advantage of limited liability should see these as complemented 
by a duty of stewardship’.119 
Although some fund managers may be hesitant to subscribe to such a code, the least that 
can reasonably be expected in the governance process is that they are involved in the 
selection of the board and in holding it to account on their performance. 
The Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, renamed the Institutional Investor Committee 
on the 18th of May 2011, published the Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional 
Investors.120 The Code has the following aim: 
‘… to enhance the quality of the dialogue of the institutional investors with 
companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders, reduce the 
risk of catastrophic outcomes due to bad strategic decisions, and help with 
the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities’.121  
The code is made up of seven principles. It requires investors to develop and publish a 
policy on how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities and how they will deal 
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with a conflict of interest between this policy and acting in the interests of their clients. The 
investors will need to monitor their investee companies. In particular, they need to satisfy 
themselves that the board and its commissions are effective. They need to maintain an 
audit trail of the monitoring activities. Investors may, either collectively or individually, 
escalate their activities of required but should do so in line with guidelines that they have 
clearly set out themselves. Finally, investors should have a clear policy on voting and report 
on their stewardship and voting activities. 
The Financial Reporting Council is currently responsible for the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, formerly called the Combined Code.122 All companies with a Premium Listing in the 
UK are required under the Listing Rules to report on how they have applied the UK 
Corporate Governance Code. The Walker Review suggests that it should be placed within 
the remit of the Financial Reporting Council to design principles of best practice in 
stewardship by institutional investors and fund managers.123 In practice, this would mean 
that the Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors is ratified by the Financial 
Reporting Council as some form Code of Stewardship. As with the Combined Code, it 
should be done on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. The Financial Reporting Council would be 
responsible, in consultation with relevant parties, for updating the Code of Stewardship. 
The Review suggests that investors and fund managers regulated by the Financial Services 
Authority must make public whether they subscribe to the Code of Stewardship or not. 
Unfortunately, this initiative is only UK based. Although demands can be placed on UK 
investors, it may be difficult to engage foreign institutional investors, including for example 
sovereign wealth funds or foreign public sector pension funds, to subscribe to such a Code 
of Stewardship. 
The ownership structure and the behaviour of shareholders have not featured in the 
international reports discussed so far. These international reports, whether written by a 
small group such as the Senior Supervisors Group, or a very large group, such as the Basel 
Committee, contain compromises between the different backgrounds and customs of the 
individual members. It underlines the different views on share ownership in different 
countries. In particular, the case study of Japan in chapter six will present an approach 
based on relationships between different companies. The governance structure relies 
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heavily on these relationships, providing a very different model than discussed for the UK. 
In order to achieve any result or agreement, these international reports are either both 
extremely vague and general, or they seek to agree on very specific points whilst avoiding 
any contentious aspects. Ownership, the role of the shareholders and, extrapolating, the 
role of stakeholders are examples where the different participating nations have different 
historical, cultural and legal notions. The Walker Review, being a UK report, is better placed 
to make recommendations on these issues. Ownership most certainly requires attention. 
iii. Governance of Risk 
For any business, the management of financial risk as well as many other types of risk is 
important and subject to a set of constraints. For large financial institutions, however, it is 
part of their core strategic objectives.124 They principally take on financial risk and often a 
much higher form of leverage than is normal in other types of industries. Moreover, the 
consequences of these risks are potentially much larger in terms of social costs, exceeding 
the downside risk to shareholders. Hence, regulatory requirements have been put in place 
to restrain these risks, including, for example, capital requirements. The board would need 
to make decisions on whether new complex structures or overseas operations would give 
sufficient return taking into account the regulatory costs rising from the associated risks. 
The Senior Supervisors Group125 has emphasised the same point, by highlighting that banks 
with good and flexible risk management systems that reached up to board level were able 
to deal with the crisis much better; likewise, the Basel Committee has included this in, for 
example, principles 1 and 5 of its report on corporate governance.126 
The Review is concerned mainly by how the governance of risk by the board can be made 
more effective alongside the regulation.127 It summarises, that 
‘… the obligation of the board in respect of risk should be to ensure that 
risks are promptly identified and assessed; that risks are effectively 
controlled; that strategy is informed by and aligned with the board’s risk 
appetite; and that a supportive risk culture is appropriately embedded so 
that all employees are alert to the wider impact on the whole organisation 
of their actions and decisions’.128 
                                                          
124 ibid 91 
125 SSG 
126 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 26) 
127 Sir David Walker (n 4) 91 
128 ibid 92 
172 
 
Note that this is again very much in line with what the Basel Committee has dictated, in this 
case in principles 4 to 8.129 The new regulation that is being developed should aim to 
eliminate the risk of a crisis reoccurring, but the Review notes that it must not be the job of 
the regulator to sit on the board of the banks. The regulators must stand back to allow for 
new developments, products and inventions whilst satisfying itself in the capabilities and 
effectiveness of the board to discharge its obligations in relation to the associated risks. 
Although one may wish to place the oversight of risk within the audit committee, the 
review argues against this. Not only is the audit committee already loaded with the 
demanding task of financial reporting and internal control, the task of risk management for 
a financial institution is so large that it may easily overload the audit committee. Instead, 
the review recommends establishing a separate board risk committee which should focus 
on ‘the fundamental prudential risks of the institution’.130 These risks include leverage, 
liquidity risk and market risks including interest rate and currency risk, credit risk and 
counterparty risk. These prudential risks present a demanding task in their own right for 
this Board Risk Committee, which should therefore not be distracted by other risks such as 
information technology or reputational risk. It should solely focus on a strategy for 
fundamental prudential risks, including a strategy for capital and liquidity management, 
taking into account any potential changes in the economic and financial environment. 
The Board Risk Committee, which as any board committee should largely consist of non-
executive directors, should be supported by a Chief Risk Officer (CRO). The requirement of 
a Chief Risk Officer within the bank emphasises a small but important part of principle 6 of 
the Basel Committee, where this important role is only briefly mentioned.131 The Chief Risk 
Officer should operate at board level risk governance but be independent of any business 
unit.132 Besides the usual daily tasks, the Board Risk Committee must be involved in any 
major strategic transactions, such as a potential acquisition, to ensure that proper due 
diligence has been conducted and to assess the consequences of the risk profile of the 
company after the transaction. It needs to take into account whether it falls within the risk 
tolerance and appetite as defined in the risk strategy. This is essentially principle 5 as 
defined by the Basel Committee.133 Note that the risk strategy, tolerance and appetite 
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should be included in a risk report, which must form part of the annual report and 
accounting obligations.134 
5. External Stakeholders 
a. Background 
The financial crisis clearly showed the enormous impact of the (expected) failure of a bank. 
It has great consequences for the customers, deposit holders, the small business’ ability to 
obtain loans, and the general economy as a whole. The previous chapter already contains 
an analysis of the specific resolution regimes that are setup to tackle the failure of a bank. 
This section looks in more detail at the interests of external stakeholders in a bank and how 
they can be protected best, especially considering the possibility of a future failure. There is 
thus a different emphasis. The interests of external stakeholders, such as retail clients and 
small businesses, could be served by the creation of a ring-fence or even a complete 
separate between retail and investment banking. Another possibility is to protect the 
taxpayer from bailing out a bank by making bond holders pay. Such measures are examined 
in this section. 
b. The Independent Commission on Banking 
i. Retail Ring-Fence 
The Independent Commission on Banking proposes to create a separation between retail 
and investment banking, or, in other words, to create a ring-fence within the bank. These 
proposals are later followed by the Liikanen report, a similar set of recommendations made 
at EU level.135 At UK level, the Commission presents three arguments for creating some 
separation between retail banking and investment banking.136  The first reason is that, if a 
bank would get into trouble, it will be easier to separate the investment bank from the 
retail bank, as much of this separation will have been done before the problems arise. This 
would make it easier to resolve the bad part of the bank whilst keeping the retail part 
running as usual, thereby minimising the impact on the economy as well as the potential 
losses for account holders. It would also ensure that taxpayers do not have to pay for 
bailing out parts of the failing bank. The second argument concerns the separation of 
balance sheets: by separating the balance sheet of the individuals and small businesses 
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from that of the global activities, it will prevent contagion in case of problems in the global 
economy or financial system. It would mean that the risks that fall beyond the control of 
UK authorities and regulators are separate in balance sheet terms from the domestic 
activities. The third argument is that it would remove the implicit government guarantee of 
a rescue in case of a failure. The parts that are required for normal functioning of the 
national economy are already safeguarded whilst the others can easily be resolved. These 
arguments link back to the public at large as an external stakeholder in the bank. All three 
arguments describe clear benefits to the general public: preventing or minimising losses to 
account holders, minimising the impact on the economy and reducing the need for a 
government rescue. 
The proposal to create a retail ring-fence is a specific measure that would come to full 
effect in case of a banking insolvency. As discussed in chapter one on methodology, 
insolvency laws, or essentially the priority given to each creditor, are anchored in each 
country’s history and culture. The choice that is made here is to put depositors and small 
businesses, which are deemed to be less able to fend for themselves, at the top of the 
hierarchy of creditors. This would also ensure that the government no longer needs to 
spend public money to bail out a failing bank, which benefits society as a whole. The 
commission notes that it received several objections to the proposals of ring-fencing. They 
fall into three broad categories.137 This first category argues that the benefits from the 
universal banking model come from unfettered intermediation between savers and 
borrowers and the diversification of risks. This enables banks to hold lower capital and have 
access to cheaper funding. The second category of objections goes exactly the other way: 
rather than advocating the universal banking model, the proposal is a complete separation 
of retail and investment banking in a return to the situation under the Glass-Steagall Act. 
The argument is that in the universal banking model the retail bank is an undesirable 
subsidiser of the investment bank. By separating the two, the investment bank will lose its 
implicit government guarantee and overall financial stability will increase. The third 
category contains the practical objections: it will be difficult to create a workable 
implementation of ring-fencing. 
Taking these objections into consideration, the commission has drawn up the following 
purpose and objectives for ring-fencing: 
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‘The purpose of the retail ring-fence is to isolate those banking activities 
where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a 
bank’s customers in order to ensure, first, that this provision is not 
threatened as a result of activities which are incidental to it and, second, 
that such a provision can be maintained in the event of the bank’s failure 
without government solvency support. A retail ring-fence should be 
designed to achieve the following objectives at the lowest possible cost to 
the economy: 
- Make it easier to sort out both ring-fenced banks and non-ring-fenced 
banks which get into trouble, without the provision of taxpayer-funded 
solvency support; 
- Insulate vital banking services on which households and SMEs depend 
from problems elsewhere in the financial system; and 
- Curtail government guarantees, reducing the risk to the public finances 
and making it less likely that banks will run excessive risks in the first 
place’.138 
This contains several interesting points. The very first sentence recognises that the bank 
has a very clear obligation to the smooth functioning of economy and to customers. By 
doing so, the commission states very clearly that stakeholders are not only very important 
but they are a very large group namely society as a whole. It is a clear recognition of the 
importance of the general public as an external stakeholder. It further states clearly that 
even in case of a failure, these stakeholders are still the bank’s responsibility and not the 
government’s. Here the Commission’s recommendation differs completely from the Walker 
Review: although the Walker Review recognised that banks had these obligations to 
stakeholder and society, it recommended to deal with these obligations within the existing 
legislation139 instead of creating new legislation to reflect these obligations. It is possible 
that the Walker Review came to this conclusion after examining more specifically the 
duties of directors rather than the organisational structure of the bank; nonetheless, it 
decided that stakeholder protection was sufficiently covered by the Company Act 2006 
s172 and that an extension might conflict with shareholders’ interests. 
ii. Ring-Fencing Principles 
As with a normal everyday fence, this fence has two main measures: where to put it and 
how high it should be? For both the location and the height, the Commission has 
developed a set of five principles. The first ring-fence principle “Mandated Services” states 
that ‘only ring-fenced banks should be granted permission by the UK regulator to provide 
mandated services’.140 Mandated services are defined as banking services whose 
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interruption would come at significant economic costs and where customers are generally 
not capable of planning for such an interruption. Examples of mandated services include 
taking deposits and providing overdrafts. 
The first principle sets out what should be included within the fence; the second principle 
sets out what must not be included. Here, the commission has made a trade-off between 
financial costs and improving financial stability. The US has introduced something similar in 
the Volcker Rule, which restricts certain activities for banks to engage in.141 Under the 
Volcker rule, US banks are not allowed to engage in proprietary trading activities and are 
limited in their exposure to hedge funds and private equity firms. The Commission argues 
that this rule is not sufficient to define prohibited activities within the ring-fenced part of 
the bank.142 The Commission specifies many criteria that would make services prohibited: 
any banking services that meet any of the following requirements 
- ‘make it significantly harder and/or costlier to resolve the ring-fenced 
bank; 
- directly increase the exposure of the ring-fenced bank to global 
financial markets; 
- involve the ring-fenced bank taking risk and are not integral to the 
provision of payment services to customers, or the direct 
intermediation of funds between savers and borrowers within the 
non-financial sector; or 
- in any other way threaten the objective of the ring-fence’.143 
Some examples that the Commission has included are services which would result in a 
trading book asset, services which would result in a requirement to hold regulatory capital 
against market risk and the purchase or origination of derivatives or other contracts which 
would result in a requirement to hold regulatory capital against counterparty credit risk. 
The third ring-fence principle is that of “Ancillary services.” ‘The only activities which a ring-
fenced bank should be permitted to engage in are: the provision of services which are not 
prohibited; and those ancillary activities necessary for the efficient provision of such 
services’.144 Ancillary activities that commission provides as example include employing 
staff and owning or procuring the necessary operational infrastructure. In particular, a ring-
fenced bank should be permitted to conduct financial activities beyond the provision of 
non-prohibited services to the extent that these are strictly required for the purposes of its 
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treasury function – i.e. for risk management, liquidity management, or in order to raise 
funding for the provision of non-prohibited services. This is an important concession. 
The fourth ring-fence principle “Legal and operational links” is 
‘Where a ring-fenced bank is part of a wider corporate group, the 
authorities should have confidence that they can isolate it from the rest of 
the group in a matter of days and continue the provision of its services 
without providing solvency support.145 
The fifth ring-fence principle “Economic links” is 
‘Where a ring-fenced bank is part of a wider corporate group, its 
relationships with entities in that group should be conducted on a third 
party basis and it should not be dependent for its solvency or liquidity on 
the continued financial health of the rest of the corporate group. This 
should be ensured through both regulation and sufficiently independent 
governance. 
The measures described sound relatively simple, but their implementation is not 
necessarily easy. Consider the third and fourth principle: the technological infrastructure, 
the bank’s IT systems, as well as any other operational links, will be shared between the 
entities inside and outside the fence prior to the creation of this fence. The question must 
be answered to which part of the bank which operational element belongs in case of 
insolvency. It will be not only difficult to sort this out but also costly, with the potential to 
require duplicated infrastructure within the bank.  
iii. Absorbing Future Losses 
The under-capitalisation of banks during the financial crisis threatened them with 
insolvency. If a systemically important bank did become insolvent, the government bailed it 
out with mixed consequences for those involved. Equity holders were largely wiped out 
whilst creditors and bank employees were largely unaffected. This raises questions of 
fairness as well as whether the current setup is in fact a destabilising one. Furthermore, the 
approaching insolvency forces a bank to reduce its risk, which may in itself be damaging to 
the economy. Altogether, the commission sees a clear need to improve the capacity of 
banks to absorb future losses. 
The commission distinguished between the capacity to absorb losses before and after the 
bank is put into resolution.146 In either case, only equity is used to absorb losses. This 
equity, following Basel III, is made up by the hard minimum requirement of 4.5% of the risk 
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weighted assets (“RWAs”) and the additional capital conservation buffer (“CCB”).147 Under 
Basel III, this minimum requirement has gone up from 2% under Basel II,148 but the 
commission suggests that it could be further increased to 7%. The Commission proposes to 
do just that: ring-fenced banks with a ratio of RWAs to UK GDP of 3% or more should be 
required to have an equity-to-RWA ratio of at least 10%; if this ratio of RWAs to UK GDP is 
between 1-3% then the equity-to-RWA ratio should be between 7-10%.149 The Commission 
does so whilst acknowledging several points against increasing the capital ratio even 
further.150 It recognises that banks are likely to deleverage to reach the minimum ratio 
rather than increasing equity. This deleveraging process may have a profoundly negative 
impact on the UK economy as all the large UK banks will deleverage at the same time. 
Another problem is the potential establishment in the UK of a so-called EEA-branch by 
another EU bank, which is primarily regulated in its home country. This bank could operate 
under less stringent capital requirement, thereby competing under different terms with UK 
banks. It may even serve to drive some activities out of the regulated banking world into 
the shadow-banking world as costs are too high. 
Apart from practical problems that may arise from adopting the higher capital ratios 
proposed by the commission, there is a legal issue concerning EU legislation. The EU’s 
Capital Requirement Directive IV,151 which seeks to implement most of the Basel III 
report,152 seeks to harmonize the capital requirements imposed across all the EU members. 
It does not aim to specify a minimum requirement to which individual member states can 
add their own increases and it certainly does not aim at allowing member states to set a 
lower minimum. The clear aim is to harmonise. The commission recognises this legal 
obstacle, however, it argues that it is of great international benefit were the UK to adopt 
the higher requirements it proposes.153 The commission points at the fact that the 
composition of the banking sector within each EU Member State is very different, making it 
undesirable to set one standard for all. The UK has several large and internationally active 
banks, which requires them to set higher standards. Additionally, the insolvency regimes 
differ across EU Member States, which means that a banking failure is dealt with differently 
and consequently has a different impact. Consequently, some Member States may attach 
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more value to a safer banking system with higher standards than others. It is a clear 
example of a harmonised report not working as a transplant in a country’s specific 
situation. 
Although the commission accepts that RWAs are part of the primary method for measure 
capital, it also recognises that the use of RWAs leads to the potential manipulation of the 
weightings.154 Hence another method based on non-weighted assets should be used in 
support. An appropriate minimum of equity to non-weighted assets could act in support: if 
the risk weights are manipulated and too low, this additional minimum requirement would 
catch it. Basel III proposes to use precisely this ratio with a minimum of 3%155 but the 
commission proposes to increase this in line with their proposed increase on the RWAs 
based ratio to 4.06% instead.156 
So far, only equity has been discussed as potentially absorbing losses. The commission sees 
advantages in exposing liabilities to losses as well. At present, debt would only be exposed 
to losses if a bank went into insolvency. Hence, when the banks that approached insolvency 
during the crisis received bailouts, the debt holders would not take any losses. By forcing 
these debt holders to shoulder some of the losses, market discipline would be sharpened 
and thereby it could reduce excessive risk taking.157 This type of bail-in scheme is now, by 
way of the BRRD, part of the Special Resolution Scheme in the Banking Act 2009, as 
discussed in chapter four. Another safeguard for depositors is the FSCS. The Commission 
notes two issues158 with this: firstly, the depositors are not able to apply the same market 
discipline as other creditors can. Secondly, well-run banks may have to pay for the 
insolvent bank through higher contributions to the FSCS. The solution proposed by the 
commission is to move depositors up in the hierarchy above other creditors. This has now 
been implemented as discussed in chapter four. 
c. Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (“FS(BR)A”) implements a variety of 
different measures that are important for corporate governance at banks and thus for this 
research. The first part of the FS(BR)A, sections 2 to 12, implement the ring-fencing scheme 
as proposed by the ICB. The banks must ring-fence their retail and small- and medium-sized 
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enterprise and deposit taking activities in legal entities that are clearly separate from those 
that are considered risky. These would include the wholesale and investment banking 
activities. The exact details of the ring-fencing rules will be set out in secondary legislation 
and in the PRA rulebook. On top of this, the capital requirements for banks are further 
increased by introducing a so-called Primary Loss Absorbing Capacity (“PLAC”). Again, most 
of the technical details will be set out in separate secondary legislation. The point of 
introducing PLAC is that losses will be absorbed by the shareholders and unsecured 
creditors, rather than the tax payer.  
Some of the tools available in the case of the failure of a bank, which have already been 
discussed in chapter four, are introduced by the FS(BR)A. The bail-in option in case of a 
failure, as discussed in chapter four, which emanated from the BRRD, is introduced. The 
FSCS is amended to include the ranking as preferential debts in case of insolvency. The FSCS 
is required to ensure prompt pay-outs, as well as other new statutory duties to ensure 
smooth operations. The FS(BR)A also implements several of the recommendations made by 
the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. This includes the Senior 
Management Regime, which covers persons within a designated senior management 
position. The most important aspect is that these persons will be criminally liable if they 
take, or agree to take, a decision that causes a financial institution to fail. For this, they 
must have displayed conduct that falls far below what could reasonably be expected of a 
person in their position. Clearly this rule is a major change. Although whether anyone 
would ever be convicted under this rule is questionable, the fact that this is now possible 
increases the accountability of those in such a position. 
The FCA and PRA set out the detailed rules in this respect.159 In particular, the Senior 
Management Regime sets out that key individuals must allocate and map out their 
responsibilities. Those key individuals will continue to fall under an approved person 
regime, where the regulator needs to give approval. The Senior Management Regime 
works in conjunction with the Certification Regime, which covers staff that would pose a 
risk of significant harm to the firm or any of its customers. Although the staff itself does not 
need to be approved by the regulator, the procedures for fitness and propriety a firm must 
have place around them does need to be approved. 
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6. Conclusions 
a. The Increased Complexity 
If anything should be clear from this chapter and the previous one, then it is that the 
amount of regulation in the banking sector as well as its complexity has grown 
dramatically. Of course, this comes on top of the fact that managing a bank in itself has 
become far more complex, given the scale of the institutions and the swift developments in 
financial markets. In terms of regulation, especially the rules around capital and liquidity 
requirements have become incredibly lengthy and technical. The rules around recovery and 
resolution, bail-in and ring-fencing are of equal complexity. This is not necessarily a bad 
thing in itself, and it is not the purpose of this research to assess this. However, what 
inherently does follow, is that the role of senior management and of the board at a UK 
bank has become far more difficult. Aside from the usual strategy planning and other 
common agenda items, a significant amount of time will have to be spent on the programs 
to implement and comply with this new regulation. It would seem almost impossible to do 
this if senior management and the board do not have the required knowledge and skills to 
do this. This now comes back to the point made at the end of previous chapters: the 
standard of what comprises good corporate governance at UK banks keeps rising. 
This means all elements of corporate governance must be of a higher standard. The 
information that reaches senior management must be of a higher standard. This means 
that the internal information flows and control processes must be of a higher standard. The 
complexity and technical level of the information that must flow through the organisation 
to monitor, for example, the ring-fencing, or the latest capital requirements, is far higher 
than what it was even only ten years ago. The same applies to the risk management 
function. There are far more detailed requirements on, for example, the calculation of 
counterparty risk or the treatment of non-centrally cleared derivatives. The entire risk 
management function must step up a level. Furthermore, many of the requirements cut 
directly across the departmental silos that exist within a bank. Many trading operations 
within a bank are organised across asset classes, each with their different systems and risk 
management. This makes aggregation of risks as well as a coherent implementation of new 
regulation incredibly difficult. The problem becomes even more complex when considering 
different entities within the banking group. It increases the need for transparency and 
cooperation. It may also require a reduction in organisational complexity. In summary, it is 
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a direct consequence of the increased complexity of the regulatory landscape that the 
overall standard of what constitutes good corporate governance is rising. 
b. The Culture with the Bank 
Although much of the new regulation is of a prudential nature, aiming to reduce the chance 
of a failure by increasing the minimum requirements, there are other important changes 
that aim to improve the culture within the banks. The major thrust of these regulations 
seek to address the remuneration structure within the banks. In its initial response to the 
G20, the Basel Committee already noted that incentives at banks should be better aligned 
to manage the risk and returns over the longer term. It also noted in this context the 
importance of sound compensation practices. The Basel Committee implemented this in its 
principles of corporate governance. In particular, Principles 10 and 11 require the board to 
design a compensation system that is effectively aligned with prudent risk taking. The 
compensation should be adjusted for the related risks taken and compensation payout 
schedules should be sensitive to the time horizon of risks. Furthermore, the payment 
should take the form of a mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation, again 
aligned with the risks taken. 
Within the UK, the Walker Review makes similar recommendations on remuneration. In the 
US, the Dodd-Frank Act specifies remuneration requirements. Although these do not go 
nearly as far as those in the EU, the point is that remuneration is becoming more 
transparent and must be put before the shareholders. In the EU, the Basel III 
implementation in CRD IV is extended to include strict requirements on pay within the 
relevant financial institutions. Limitations are placed on the proportion of variable pay as 
well as the form in which the pay-out must be made. Finally, a clawback is implemented on 
variable pay. The fact that pay in banks has come under scrutiny worldwide, and that 
restrictions of different severity have been imposed worldwide, tells the undeniable story 
that there is something fundamentally wrong with the culture within the banks. It is clear 
that personal gain and greed have been a major motivation for some of those working in 
the industry. Under the reward structure before the crisis it was possible to take substantial 
risks with possibly unlimited upside and almost no downside. This is now changing as 
deferred rewards can be cancelled and there is even the threat of a clawback. The 
incentives are moving towards aligning the risks taken by individuals with the way they are 
paid, which will hopefully improve the culture within banks and move it beyond a focus on 
short-term financial targets. 
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c. Board Effectiveness 
The first three principles of corporate governance as set out by the Basel Committee 
defined the role of the board. Of particular importance is the second principle, which 
includes that board members should be and remain qualified, including through training, 
for their positions. Furthermore, they should have a clear understanding of their role in 
supporting good corporate governance and be able to exercise sound and objective 
judgement about the affairs of the bank. The Senior Supervisors Group confirmed that 
those banks with more experienced, knowledgeable and effective boards got through the 
crisis in better shape. This has been echoed by the Walker Review, which concluded that 
the requirement on knowledge of the financial industry for the non-executive directors is 
greater than in other sectors. In particular, it requires a specialised set of skills and 
knowledge which is unique to the finance industry. It also reflects the potential impact any 
failure at a bank would have on society at large. But these points come back to the first 
conclusion made previously: the overall standard of what constitutes good corporate 
governance at a UK bank is going up. And, by implication, the standard of what is required 
of a board member will go up. The knowledge required to challenge and oversee senior 
management is substantial, especially considering the new regulation discussed in this and 
the previous chapter. In practice, it may well be that it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
find such highly skilled individuals. 
A new weapon in the arsenal of the UK regulators to ensure board effectives is the FS(BR)A 
senior management regime. Those individuals that now fall below the standard and cause a 
bank to fail face the prospect of criminal prosecution. Although some of the exact details, 
especially those in relation to the burden of proof, are currently undergoing change, the 
regime is likely to stay in place. It means that, if RBS had failed whilst this regime was in 
place, it may well have been possible to prosecute Fred Goodwin. It is clear that this was 
the central thought behind the introduction of this regime. Whether it actually works in 
practice remains to be seen. For the moment, at the very least it will focus the minds of 
people in relevant positions or of those considering to take up such a position. Although 
this new form of accountability is to be applauded, it does also raise questions. Would it, 
for example, deter any suitable candidates to take such a position? It is not unlikely that 
they will have a choice of similar positions, perhaps at non-banks, where they will not be 
subject to such a regime but receive comparable remuneration. In other words, there is the 
possibility that, indirectly, it could undermine board effectiveness as well.  
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d. External Stakeholders 
External stakeholders are explicitly recognised by the Basel Committee. In principle 14 of 
their code of corporate governance, it is mentioned that the bank should be adequately 
transparent to its shareholders, depositors, other relevant stakeholders and market 
participants. This is something, but not a great deal. Transparency is a first step, but it is 
difficult to see how this would go beyond providing accurate information for a current 
account or providing accurate profit and loss statements. It is disappointing that it does not 
go further in recognising the importance of external stakeholders especially in light of how 
detrimental the financial crisis was for them. However, it can be argued strongly that within 
EU and UK reports and legislation there is an implicit recognition of the importance of 
external stakeholders. This was done throughout this chapter, in particular with reference 
to the ring-fence proposed by the ICB, the FSCS and the BRRD. By placing a ring-fence 
around the retail banking activities and splitting them from the investment banking 
activities, there is an implicit recognition of the importance of the safety of retail banking. 
Customers, as an external stakeholder, need to be assured of a sound financial 
infrastructure and the safety of their deposits. This last point is further emphasised by the 
implementation of the FSCS. It can therefore be said that this scheme also implicitly 
recognises the importance of customers as external stakeholders. Finally, in the event of a 
bank failure, it is important that the impact to financial stability, the financial 
infrastructure, the economy and society in general is minimal. The BRRD seeks to achieve 
this by creating a framework for an orderly wind down, recovery or bail in of a failing bank. 
It could thus be said that the BRRD implicitly recognises the importance of a broad range of 
external stakeholders. The conclusion must therefore be that, although most of these 
proposals will remain untested until the next bank failure, it can be argued strongly that 
there is a growing recognition of external stakeholders and that the structural and long 
term solutions discussed in this and the previous chapter go some way to address their 
most important concerns. 
Lastly, it is important to highlight the new principle 13 of the July 2015 guidelines for 
corporate governance at banks by the Basle Committee. It is important because it does not 
only recognise the regulators as an important stakeholder, it effectively makes the 
regulators the custodian of corporate governance at banks. It places the burden on the 
regulators to check whether all internal systems and controls are in place and whether they 
are adequate. It places the burden on the regulators to ensure that the board and senior 
management are capable and consists of the right people to do the job. They must check 
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the risk culture, compensation practices and so on. This is in contrast to what is proposed 
by, for example, the Walker Review, which places the burden with the shareholders. The 
review highlights the reciprocal obligation on investors involving attentiveness to the 
performance of investee companies over a long as well as a short-term horizon. It is 
suggested that those who have significant rights of ownership and enjoy the very material 
advantage of limited liability should see these as complemented by a duty of stewardship. 
It would appear that the Basel Committee has reached the conclusion that the investors 
can or will not do this, and that it is therefore up to the regulators instead to do it. This 
raises the difficult question how the regulators should do this. The FCA and PRA contain a 
diverse workforce ranging from industry experts to those who spent their lives at various 
regulators, from low to highly experienced professionals. Clearly, these should not 
prescribe how a regulated firm is run. However, the diverse nature and experience of the 
workforce should allow for an objective and measured approach to looking after corporate 
governance at UK banks.  
A further consideration is the potential for political interference. This can take several 
forms, for example through public questions to the regulators in the Treasury Select 
Committee, or simply through statements in Parliament or to the media. The case for 
political pressure on the regulators may be even stronger when the bank is largely state-
owned and the objectives are not aligned, for example, when handing out a large fine or 
when approving the appointment of a former politician to the board. In this light, it is 
important that the regulators are seen as independent from political interference, but not 
from accountability, and perhaps the appointment process of the most senior officials at 
the Bank of England and the FCA should be reviewed in this context. Regardless of the 
quality of the persons appointed at the regulator, this must be done by way of a 
transparent process and perhaps even an independent committee. 
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Chapter 6 –Japan’s Financial Crisis and Reforms 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters presented the case of the UK in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. This chapter presents the case of Japan during and after the financial crisis that hit 
the country in the nineties. The objective is, in summary, to examine whether there are any 
parallel experiences from which conclusions may be drawn. Following the Second World 
War and the American occupation,1 Japan experienced a period of rapid economic growth.2 
It saw the rise of large industrial groups, called the keiretsu, in which different companies 
worked together.3 This period came to an end with the bursting of the asset price bubble in 
1991. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 dealt a further blow to Japan’s economy. Since the 
problems started in the early nineties, the Japanese government has taken various 
measures to revitalise the economy and to improve its financial system. It has tried to 
reform its financial markets through liberalisation and through the creation of an 
independent financial regulator. It has pushed Japanese financial institutions to resolve 
their non-performing loan problem, to reform their lending practices traditionally based 
upon relationships and, importantly, to reduce their dominant role in Japan’s system of 
corporate governance. The government has further tried to improve Japan’s informal 
corporate governance practices via changes to the Commercial Code, which in 2005 was 
largely replaced by the Company Law. Many of the changes replaced outdated laws based 
upon legislation imported from the US legal system during the post-war occupation or even 
from Germany during the Meiji period. Such changes include the option to choose a US-
style board structure and the establishment of board committees and external directors. 
Successive Japanese governments have gradually attempted to change corporate 
governance practice, which had been painfully exposed as inadequate in the nineties. The 
aim of the current chapter is to provide a detailed overview of the important facts and a 
historical outline of the crisis and of the piecemeal reforms introduced by the Japanese 
government. In further contains both an analysis of the impact of these measures and 
reforms in Japan as well as the comparative analysis with the current situation in the UK. 
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There are clear parallels between the situation and responses in Japan and the current 
issues faced in the UK. As explained in chapter one, when discussing research 
methodology, a comparative analysis is justified and hopefully reveals valuable ways to 
improve the situation in the UK. To assist in answering the research questions, the 
comparative analysis must focus on the area of corporate governance and seek to draw out 
parallels between the failures and the responses in both countries. Of particular interest is 
the case study Long Term Credit Bank. This bank failed, was nationalised and later re-
privatised. This case is compared with the failure and nationalisation of UK banks. 
2. Corporate Alliances and Corporate Governance 
a. The Rise of the Keiretsu 
Before the Second World War, during Japan’s period of territorial expansion,4 the zaibatsu 
were the large and dominating business conglomerates. The big four zaibatsu were Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. They consisted of a family owned holding company with 
many subsidiaries. The zaibatsu played an important part in the period of industrialisation 
following the Meiji Ishin.  At the time, Japan was gradually increasing its empire, acquiring 
for example the RyuKyu Islands (Okinawa) and Taiwan. The zaibatsu played an important 
role in the colonisation of these territories. As a result, they held close links with the 
military and political leaders. After Japan had capitulated at the end of the Second World 
War, a long rebuilding process of the industrial sector began.5 For the zaibatsu, the holding 
companies were dismantled during the American occupation. Although the holding 
companies were dismantled, the essence of the structure remained in place. The 
underlying factories, plants and sales networks, although in places severely damaged by 
the war, remained largely unchanged despite a change in ownership structure. In the early 
1950s, these structures were once more allowed to strengthen their informal approach. In 
effect, what previously were the various business units of the zaibatsu now formed the 
keiretsu groups. The zaibatsu had hence been transformed from a single firm or single 
holding company with hierarchical control over its subsidiaries to a network of individual 
organisations working together. 
The transformation and rise of the keiretsu relied heavily on the support of the industrial 
policy and the intervention by Japan’s government to plan its economy and allocate the 
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available resources. These policies have been developed and implemented by the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”), renamed in 2001 to Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (“METI”).6 Japan’s industrial policy was aimed at rebuilding the 
country’s industry after the destruction of the war. MITI had enormous influence over 
subsidies, licenses, imports and exports and provided ‘administrative guidance’ to 
industries. It therefore formed a cooperative partnership with Japanese business, initially 
with the aim to rebuild Japan. The government, through MITI, formed an ‘iron triangle’ 
together with corporations and the banks (including the Bank of Japan). Corporations 
would provide political support for the government, which in turn provided a stable 
environment for the corporations to prosper. The corporations and banks formed part of 
the same keiretsu as main borrowers and main lenders respectively. The government and 
the banks provided for stable fiscal and monetary policy. These strong ties in the ‘iron 
triangle’ dominated Japan’s business environment after the war.  
b. Alliance Capitalism 
The keiretsu groups are the most important feature of Japan’s post-war business 
environment. They are business networks without a legal structure sitting above individual 
companies and hold them together. Although these networks are not prescribed in a legal 
structure and are mostly created indirectly, they are nonetheless very strong. In the 
seminal work by Michael Gerlach, keiretsu are described to operate as a form of ‘alliance 
capitalism’.7 There are several characteristics of alliance capitalism. The groups of 
companies working together own large parts of each other through cross-shareholdings. 
This form of ownership serves as a symbolic commitment as companies of the same 
keiretsu take a direct interest in each other’s welfare. This ownership structure also serves 
as a protection against any unwanted interference by potential owners that are not part of 
the keiretsu, such as institutional investors. Closely aligned with this form of ownership is 
the co-monitoring of performance by interlocking directorships. Many senior executives of 
a company inside the keiretsu will serve as a director on the board of another company 
within the keiretsu. Again, it also provides additional protection against any outside 
influence as no outsiders are allowed on the boards inside the keiretsu. The ties between 
the different boards are further strengthened by various informal organisations, such as 
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Presidents’ Clubs. An example of such a club is the SanKinKai, a club within the Dai-Ichi 
group that meets every third Friday.  
Co-operation is not restricted to ownership and boardroom membership. It extends to 
sharing complete business units between keiretsu members, in particular shared 
intelligence units. The market research of Japanese firms is highly rated and shared 
between keiretsu members. This underlines the description of a corporate alliance, as 
groups of companies work together to enter into new markets or to expand in existing 
ones. Co-operation extends to the priority which group members receive when it comes to 
business opportunities and finance. Contracts for the production of small parts or the 
provision of services are often made with other keiretsu members because of their linkage 
and not because they offer more competitive prices or superior service. 
There are different organisational models among keiretsu groups. First, there is the 
horizontal or financial keiretsu. The group of companies has ties based on financial linkages. 
The group of companies itself can be quite dispersed, but they share a Main Bank in the 
middle of the network. The main horizontal keiretsu include Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
Sanwa, Dai-Ichi and Fuyo. Some of these are directly linked to the pre-war zaibatsu: Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo are the remnants of their zaibatsu namesakes. They all consist of 
an enormous variety of companies clustered around their Main Bank. Mitsui consists of 
Sakura Bank and other companies such as Mitsui Bussan, Mitsukoshi, Suntory and Toyota. 
Mitsubishi consists of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi as the Main Bank and, amongst other, 
Mitsubishi Corp, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi Motors, Nippon Oil, Nikon and Kirin 
breweries. Sumitomo follows the same pattern as it includes Sumitomo bank as Main Bank 
and counts Sumitomo Corp, Asahi Breweries and Mazda amongst its other companies. This 
short list of affiliated companies confirms that these keiretsu have a Main Bank as a spider 
in the middle of the network and a range of different companies around it, varying from 
carmakers to breweries. They are held together by the financial link and collaboration 
between the companies themselves. It is not surprising that employees of a particular 
keiretsu are expected to buy the drinks from their affiliated brewery. 
The second form of the keiretsu organisational structures is the vertical or production 
keiretsu. As the name suggests, the ties between the companies are based upon the 
production process. The companies within the group are mainly assemblers and suppliers. 
These keiretsu structures are most dominant in automobile production, such as Nissan and 
Toyota, and in electronics, such as Hitatchi, Toshiba, Matsushita, Fujitsu and Canon. Some 
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of these vertical keiretsu are themselves part of a horizontal keiretsu as previously 
discussed. Toyota is part of Mitsui, for example. Production keiretsu do appear in other 
sectors as well, consider for example Nippon Steel. The common element of all these 
production keiretsu is that they are based around the supply chain. Pyramids of suppliers of 
parts and sub-parts are created, consisting not just of large corporations but also of small- 
and medium enterprises. Within these supply chains there is interlocking through both 
ownership and directorship, creating large strategic alliances.  
The third group is the distribution keiretsu. The linked companies are the producers, the 
distributors, the wholesale and retail outlets. These go a step beyond the production 
keiretsu by also controlling the distribution and sales of their products. There are also 
keiretsu that do not fit easily within any of the categories as links appear tenuous. The basic 
structures, however, are the same and in this they are also different from their 
predecessors, the zaibatsu. The zaibatsu had a single holding company, which was owned 
by a family. The keiretsu on the other hand, or at least its larger components, are publicly 
traded companies. The control is different as well: where the single holding company 
formed the headquarters and main place of decision making for the zaibatsu, in the 
keiretsu such control is exercised by linked directorships. Furthermore, the zaibatsu were 
competing directly for profit, whilst keiretsu compete mainly for market share. 
Although the large keiretsu are Japan’s large corporate conglomerates that speak to the 
imagination and get most of the attention, it should be noted that the real engine behind 
these is formed by small- and medium enterprises. In fact, the majority of Japan’s 
population does not work for a large company but for a small- or medium sized company. 
They do fit into the keiretsu structure, in particular the vertical or production keiretsu, 
where they are part of the supply chain, but often they are at the bottom of this chain and 
there is more competition. Subcontracting to smaller companies gives certain advantages, 
including the reduction of costs and thereby improving competitiveness. The large 
manufacturers avoid building enormous factory plants for parts. They operate at lower 
costs by extracting low prices from their suppliers and demand a high quality of the 
supplied goods. At the same time, the risk is shared with the group of suppliers. 
Furthermore, the small suppliers get the long-term contracts needed to invest and obtain 
technological advantages by sharing key personal with the large manufacturing companies. 
But this relationship is exclusive and works only within the keiretsu. It creates high prices 
for Japanese consumers and prevents foreign players from entering the Japanese market. 
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c. Characteristics of Japanese Companies 
Aoki developed the standard theory that contrasts Japanese companies with their Western 
counterparts, but in particular with US companies. 8 The contrast is made following the 
success of Japanese firms in the 1980s, when they presented an attractive alternative to 
the way US companies operated. The comparison is done from an economic perspective 
rather than a legal perspective. Nonetheless the theory has gained such weight and 
provides so much insight that it needs to be discussed in detail. Aoki coined the term J-Firm 
to describe the theoretical Japanese firm and the term A-Firm for the US firm. Perhaps the 
main merit of the theory is that, under these theoretical descriptions of the firms, it brings 
together many different elements that were previously studied in mere isolation. Some of 
these elements have already been mentioned in the context of alliance capitalism above, 
such as cross-shareholding, but also include elements from different fields such as human 
resources management. The main drawback of the model is that it is a theoretical concept 
that tries to model the average Japanese company and as such no actual company will 
operate exactly as the model describes. But again, the value of the model lies in the way it 
bundles the individual elements that make up the Japanese company. 
One such element of the J-Firm is the way in which the information structure and 
coordination is set up.  The A-Firm is said to have a vertical coordination and vertical 
information structure. That means that decisions are made at the top and send down the 
chain of command to the workforce. The J-Firm on the other hand is said to have a 
horizontal coordination and horizontal information structure. This means that the 
workforce on the ground is involved in the actual decision making and by doing so also 
influences the strategic decisions that are made at the top. This system is taken a step 
further at companies such as Toyota, where rotation on the factory floor form an important 
part of improving decision making and idea generation amongst the workforce.9  
The elements of shareholders and stakeholders have already been raised to some extend 
when discussing alliance capitalism. In the A-Firm, the shareholders play the most 
important part. In the J-Firm, in sharp contrast, there are not only shareholders but also the 
employees and the enterprise unions. Part of this stems from the difference of what 
holding shares stands for in the different firms. Shares in the A-firm are freely traded and 
floating, they are highly liquid. Shares in the J-Firm on the other hand, whilst perhaps listed 
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on an exchange, are largely held by affiliated companies and therefore locked. The purpose 
of owning shares in a company is not seen as a capital investment but as an expression of a 
relationship. It implies that the reason for holding shares not merely relates to short-term 
potential capital gains but to a longer-term interest in the well-being of the company.  
These different reasons for holding shares are reflected in the perceived ownership of the 
company, its management and employees. The ownership of the A-Firm rests simply with 
the shareholders. However, in the J-Firm, the ownership, if not the legal then at least the 
practical or perceived ownership, lies with the entire community of the company. The 
company can be regarded as a community of members with the company board presiding 
as a community council, which guides the company along. This community is protected by 
friendly cross-shareholdings in other firms, which both reduces the risk of a take-over and 
reduces any unwanted shareholder pressure or influence on the board. The board is 
therefore free to exercise its role as senior leaders of the community or perhaps as 
mediators between shareholders, employees and unions. In a paternalistic view, the board 
may even be regarded as benevolent guardians of the community. 
The employees demonstrate the same level of commitment in the J-Firm as discussed for 
the shareholders and the board. It introduces the idea of the ‘company man’, ensuring the 
lifetime loyalty of the employee working as part of the collective, as a member of the 
community. This is reflected in the HR system, which is built around the lifetime 
employment system. During a lifetime of employment, an employee rotates around various 
places in the company, creating generalist knowledge rather than specialist knowledge. As 
well as rotating, the employee receives in-house training or is sent to affiliated keiretsu 
firms for short time periods to increase their skills and to share knowledge and expertise. In 
the A-Firm, employees become more specialised and, seeking to maximize their own 
careers instead of the collective, they work for different companies for shorter time 
periods. The incentive structure in the J-Firm is aligned with its HR system. Promotion and 
wage are both determined by age or seniority, as opposed to merit as in the A-Firm.  
Promotion is mainly determined by factors such as seniority, length of service and, to a 
lesser extent, skills. This type of hierarchy works in conjunction with the horizontal 
coordination structure outlined before. Finally, any movement in jobs by the employees 
and hence competition for skills comes from other areas within the same company. The A-
Firm faces such competition mainly from outside the company, in other words from 
different companies. 
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The central idea behind labour in the J-Firm is ‘commitment’, whereas the central idea in 
the A-Firm is ‘exit’. This idea of commitment in labour comes back in many production 
concepts, such as job rotation and problem solving on the work floor, quality control circles 
and consensus-building within the company. Any response to a downturn in a company’s 
fortunes is also based upon this central idea. The A-Firm will reduce headcount and make 
employees redundant, thereby reducing costs and maintaining profitability. The J-Firm on 
the other hand will try to retain workers and maintain employment by reducing working 
hours, thus placing more weight on the duty to look after those within the company 
community. 
It should be noted here that there is important academic writing that contests the 
existence of keiretsu.10 With substantial evidence it is argued that, for example, cross-
shareholdings do not exist and that lifetime-employment does not formerly exist in law. 
These arguments may have some force, but it simply goes too far to completely deny the 
existence of keiretsu, as the examples mentioned here so far already prove that they exist. 
Furthermore, this academic stream heavily criticizes the existence of something akin to the 
J-Frim. This appears to ignore the point that both the A-Firm and the J-Firm are economic 
models based on reality. They generalise the characteristics found within different 
Japanese companies and of course no specific Japanese company will completely satisfy 
them. Creating these models allows for some comparison and discussion, as long as the 
restrictions of the model are kept in mind. 
d. Corporate Governance 
Another important question in the context of this research project is how corporate 
governance functions within the J-Firm and within the A-Firm? In the classical A-Firm, the 
shareholders are the owners of the company and monitor the performance of the 
company.  In the J-Firm this monitoring role is performed from inside the keiretsu by the 
Main Bank.11 The Main Bank performs such a central role that it is often referred to as the 
Main Bank System. The Main Bank holds both a substantial amount of companies’ share in 
the pattern of cross-shareholding, but also provides credit and loans and often even 
provides advice on the development of the company. The immediate conclusion is that it is 
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central to the corporate governance of the J-Firm and monitors the performance of all 
companies within its keiretsu, but is this a sufficient analysis? 
With a way of organising companies that is so different from in particular the US, it is 
important to keep in mind that some of the basic theories of corporate governance were 
developed in a US context. Consider in particular the Berle-Means problem of monitoring 
associated with the separation of ownership and control. Answers have included outside 
directors, the market and institutional investors. When discussing corporate governance in 
the UK in chapter two, it was observed that the Cadbury report did not go far beyond 
shareholders appointing a board of directors and auditors whilst ensuring an appropriate 
governance structure was in place. Subsequent UK reports, resulting in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, have not moved far beyond this. This creates the danger of studying 
Japan’s corporate governance by trying to find equivalent elements of system in the UK or 
the US. 12 This type of comparative analysis in academic literature has resulted in a search 
for the solution to the monitoring and control problem in Japan. The Main Bank would 
usually hold a large amount of equity in cross-shareholdings, provide a large part of the 
loans and be intimately familiar with the company’s plans and health. It is therefore 
understandable that the generally accepted solution is that the Main Bank performs this 
role. Although this may be partially true, it is not the complete answer. 
The Main Bank would under normal circumstances not take on some of the tasks normally 
associated with monitoring and control. Firstly, it would remain passive unless the 
company would be near failure, rather than active. Secondly, and related, it would normally 
not remove underperforming board members. The point here is not to show that the Main 
Bank did not perform the role of control and monitoring properly, rather, the point is to 
question whether that was its role at all. An alternative model is offered by what has been 
coined “contractual governance”.13 The name refers to the “implicit contract” that exists 
between the different companies within a keiretsu. As discussed, the companies in keiretsu 
have strong relationships, for examples as supplier of components, assemblers and 
distributors. They usually also hold blocks of each other’s shares. This means that each 
company within a keiretsu takes a direct interest in the other companies delivering good 
quality products or services at a competitive price whilst turning over a decent profit. 
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The point is thus that an investment in equity is not just an opportunistic short-term 
transaction aimed at obtaining a good return: it is a long-term investment that underlines 
the relationship between companies in the supply chain and removes opportunism.14 For 
example, it greatly reduces the possibility that a manufacturer will suddenly go to a 
different supplier in order to get a better deal, allowing the original supplier to make long 
term plans and investments. Hence the situation of shareholders within a keiretsu is far 
more complicated than in the US or the UK, as shareholders are also either, in the case of 
companies, trading partners, or, in the case of the Main Bank, creditors. One question is 
why this system would not lead to companies within the keiretsu producing efficiently. The 
point is that competition outside the keiretsu, with other business groups, is very intense. 
This forces each part of the keiretsu to produce efficiently to ultimately produce 
competitive goods or services.15 This analysis and understanding of the role of holding 
shares and of the Main Bank provides a much clearer picture of how corporate governance 
in Japan should be studied. 
As discussed previously, the role of employees in Japanese companies is quite different 
from that in US or in the UK, with its own characteristics including lifetime employment, 
generalists over specialists and the seniority wage system. The board consists completely of 
employee insiders. As a result, employees have received a great amount of attention in the 
debate on Japan’s corporate governance. The idea from the theory of the A-firm, that 
Japanese companies regard their employees as important stakeholders and as an 
important that requires investment, has been challenged.16 Some critics argue that, in the 
absence of a competitive labour market, other explanations present itself to explain the 
importance given to employees. These explanations can be found in the political sphere, 
arising from a fear of socialist movements and their potential political success, as well as in 
the firm specific sphere, arising from a desire to curtail the power of the unions. This 
downplay of the importance of employees is further supported by the fact that employees 
are merely engaged with the company but not active in its process of governance.17 Their 
input was often used to improve the production process18 on the floor, but it did not 
extend beyond that. A counterargument to this is that Japanese companies generally 
focussed on the expansion of market share, rather than increase in profit: this is beneficial 
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to the employees as it creates work. It is not advantageous to the shareholders if they are 
only looking for a return on their investment. 
3. The Financial Crisis 
a. The Bursting of the Bubble Economy 
The corporate landscape in Japan, as set out in the previous section, had developed since 
the end of the Second World War and made Japan one of the largest economies in the 
world by the end of the 1980s. This came to an abrupt end. In December 1989, the Nikkei 
index reached its peak at 38,916 points. It went below 30,000 in March 1990 and below 
25,000 in November 1990. It dropped further and went below 20,000 in March 1992. On 
January 23, 1993, the Japanese prime minister finally conceded that the ‘bubble economy’ 
had collapsed, several years after the initial crash of house prices and the bust of the asset 
price bubble.19 It was followed by the loss of power by the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) 
in the elections of August 1993, which signified a major political landslide in Japan as the 
LDP had been the ruling party since 1955. At the same time, every economic forecast since 
the bubble had burst said the bottom had now been reached. Slowly, there was a 
realisation that a growth rate of at best a few per cent per year would be the norm long-
term. It raised questions about the sustainability of how Japan conducted its business: 
were lifetime employment and the enormous amount of corporate investment still 
sustainable or was a shift to return on capital becoming a reality? Manufacturers have 
started both to cut down on their domestic overproduction and to move production 
abroad to cheaper nearby countries, thereby ‘hollowing out’ Japan. It is without doubt that 
the financial crisis of the early 1990s would have a wide impact on Japan beyond its 
financial system and its economy. 
The bursting of the bubble and the crashing of house prices may have been the direct 
trigger of the financial crisis, but the immediate underlying cause of the problems were the 
bad loans, in particular those relating to real estate.20 How did Japan get to this point? 
Going back to the period from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, Japan had started a 
program of financial deregulation. There was a variety of reasons for the start of this 
program, including a large issuance of government bonds which Japan’s banks could no 
longer absorb and pressure from the US to open Japan’s financial markets. The reduction in 
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tight control by the regulator was not replaced by an improved risk management practice 
at the banks themselves. From the 1980s onwards, Japanese banks started to lend 
aggressively, backed by continuously rising asset prices, though without the financial 
innovation that financial institutions outside Japan were developing. In the nineties, when 
the bubble burst and asset prices collapsed, the banks were ill prepared and the 
government slow to address the issues. In fact, the approach taken by the government and 
the regulator was one of forbearance, severely underestimating the impact of the bad 
loans on the general economy. By reducing the number of loans and by trying to increase 
their capital whilst share prices were falling, the banks were unable to support the 
Japanese economy by providing new loans to businesses. The government did not take 
serious action until 1997 when it introduced the so-called Big Bang reforms. 
b. The Role of the Main Bank 
Despite efforts to deregulate Japan’s financial markets slowly before the mid-1980s, 
Japan’s capital markets were underdeveloped compared to, for example, their US 
counterparts. As a result, much of a company’s financing would be done through loans with 
the banks, rather than through the capital markets. The Main Bank, as discussed previously, 
sits in the centre of the keiretsu structure.21 It provides most of the financing to the other 
companies within the keiretsu through both loans and cross-shareholding. The close 
relationship between the Main Bank and the companies go beyond these financial and 
ownership interests. For example, a Main Bank would often initiate a support or rescue 
action if a company would come into financial difficulty. There is also the corporate alliance 
that is formed between the Main Bank and the various companies within the keiretsu, 
which includes for example the exchange of personnel and other group activities. 
Due to this level of embeddedness, the Main Bank makes most of its decisions concerning 
financial support based upon the relationship with the clients rather than on any factors, as 
might happen in an open and critical capital market. The bank does not take a critical view 
on why the money is needed or what the borrower’s position is, but instead takes a more 
paternalistic role as befits its role in the keiretsu. This creates a further problem when a 
company would lend from other banks as well, something that was not at all uncommon. 
The issue is that these other banks would rely on the Main Bank to do all the due diligence, 
monitoring and any necessary intervention. This type of behaviour is referred to as ‘convoy 
behaviour’. It was actively encouraged by the Ministry of Finance, which went as far as to 
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protect Japan’s banking sector from both internal and external competition and from 
competition from capital markets. Ironically, it did this to promote stability within the 
financial system. It would even force a merger with a stronger bank if a weak bank 
threatened to go into default. 
The role of the Main Bank in the financial crisis has been heavily criticised and it has been 
suggested that the Main Bank and the keiretsu in itself have become outdated.22 A large 
part of the critique on the Main Banks is based on their reluctance to deal with their non-
performing loans. These loans were provided based on the relationship with the company 
instead of any financial merit and forcing companies to now default on these loans would 
therefore bring various difficulties. First, it would adversely affect and strain the 
relationship between the bank and the company. It would be a loss of face on both sides. 
Second, the bank is also likely to hold a substantial amount of equity of the company it is 
about to bankrupt, which means that the bank would lose twice. Overall, renewing bad 
loans was the easier option. 
A further problem was posed by the Jusen, or non-bank financial institutions created by 
banks in the 1970s. Whilst banks at the time were mostly interested in corporate 
customers, these Jusen primarily entered into the home mortgage business, originally set 
up to facilitate the large move from people from rural Japan to the cities. When, at a later 
stage, the banks themselves moved into the mortgage business, the Jusen found it difficult 
to compete. As a result, the Jusen moved more and more into lending to real estate 
businesses, an area in which banks were still reluctant to lend. When the asset bubble 
burst, the Jusen had an enormous amount of nonperforming loans: an estimated 38% of all 
their loans were deemed to be nonperforming.23 A series of rescue packages by the 
Japanese government was needed to rescue the Jusen. All of these were hopelessly 
inadequate and by 1995 the percentage of nonperforming loans had reach 75%, with as 
must as 60% completely unrecoverable. The enormous amount of bad loans residing with 
the Jusen and with the banks obviously caused great problems in Japan’s financial system. 
c. 1997: Asian Crisis, Failing Financial Institutions and Big Bang 
The Asian Crisis in 1997 changed the game. Many of the South East Asian nations saw their 
currencies devalue and stock markets collapse. The IMF had to intervene in several 
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countries, including South Korea. It is often claimed that this intervention by the IMF was 
very beneficial to South Korea as it forced the country to introduce a swift series of drastic 
reforms to clear up the problem, in contrast with the much slower approach Japan was 
taking. Although Japan was not directly hit by the crisis, many of its nearby trading partners 
were hit, causing an economic slump in Japan itself. With exports to the region declining 
rapidly, many Japanese companies were in trouble or went out of business altogether. 
Several large Japanese financial institutions failed, including Sanyo Securities, Yamaichi 
Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. In particular, Yamaichi was active outside of 
Japan, making the financial malaise for the first time an international rather than a 
domestic problem. Japan’s government finally had to act. 
The government made ¥1.8 trillion available, which was distributed amongst banks in 
March 1998.24 Unfortunately, this capital injection was not sufficient. The Financial 
Reconstruction Act was passed, which allowed for failed banks to be nationalised and 
reorganised or to be put under receivership and reorganised as a bridge bank. A bank could 
also apply for nationalisation before it failed. Both Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon 
Credit Bank were nationalised under this Act. These two cases of nationalisation are 
discussed in more detail later. The Rapid Recapitalisation Act was also passed, allowing the 
injection of capital into undercapitalised banks and allowing healthy banks to apply for 
public funds. These two Acts together raised the government’s commitment to ¥17 trillion 
for depositor protection, ¥18 trillion for the failed or nationalised banks and another ¥25 
trillion for capital injection.25 Independent institutions were created to aid in solving the 
crisis: the Financial Reconstruction Commission was created to make decisions under the 
Financial Reconstruction Act and in June 1998 the Financial Supervisory Agency was 
created as an independent financial regulator. The government also advocated the “Big 
Bang” Reformation Plan in November 1996. This is discussed later on this chapter. 
d. The Case of Long Term Credit Bank 
One of the most significant banking failures during the crisis was that of Long Term Credit 
Bank (“LTCB”). The bank was created in 1952 with the aim of providing long term financing 
to the rebuilding Japanese industry.26 LTCB also slowly started its overseas expansion, 
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which it stepped up shortly after the Oil Crisis, as this economic shock slowed down the 
economy. In 1989, nearly at the peak of the bubble, LTCB was at the height of its power 
and was the ninth largest corporation in the world measured by asset size. When the 
bubble burst, LTCB’s decline started. In 1996, during an inspection by the Ministry of 
Finance, it was discovered that LTCB had around $40 billion non-performing loans on their 
books. These findings were covered up. Only when the Asian Financial Crisis intensified in 
the summer of 1998 did rumours surrounding LTCB cause its share price to collapse. 
In autumn 1998, under pressure from the US to take action, Japan nationalised LTCB after it 
collapsed. Around the same time Nippon Credit Bank was nationalised. The drama 
intensified when a criminal investigation revealed illegal payment of dividends, which, once 
leaked, drove several managers involved to commit suicide. In winter 1998 the government 
appointed Goldman Sachs to find a buyer for LTCB. The creation of alliances between 
Western and Japanese companies now gathered speed. One of the most prolific alliances 
was the one between Renault and Nissan in 1999. In that same year, many of the smaller 
Japanese banks consolidated to create four megabanks. In spring 2000, Ripplewood, a US 
private equity firm, took control of LTCB and rename it to Shinsei. For the next few years, a 
struggle ensued between the government, the FSA and Shinsei concerning the cleaning up 
of the non-performing loans. Shinsei had a successful initial public offering in 2004. 
There are three important observations to be made. The first is that LTCB grew into one of 
the largest financial conglomerates worldwide at the expense of conducting prudent risk 
management. This is evident by the large amount of non-performing loans they had. It 
would appear that, similar to the banks that failed in the UK, LTCB had placed growth over 
risk management. The parallel is limited, because LTCB grew slowly over several decades, 
whilst the UK banks expanded rapidly within a few years. The UK banks thus showed a 
much greater emphasis on growth than LTCB. The second important observation is that 
LTCB did not acknowledge, and in fact covered up, the fact that it had so many non-
performing loans. It demonstrates that, at best, senior management and the board were 
not effective in dealing with the problems once they were aware of their existence. This 
observation is of a similar nature to the one made about boards and management at UK 
banks. The effectiveness of the board as well as the skills and knowledge of senior 
management were reasons behind the failures of UK banks. The final observation is that 
the Japanese government sold LTCB very swiftly after it was nationalised. The fact that such 
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a quick turnaround is possible supports the observation that the nationalised UK banks 
could, and probably should, have been privatised earlier as well. 
4. Legal Reform 
a. The Big Bang Reforms 
The Big Bang plans were proposed by the government in November 1996. Although gradual 
reform had been introduced in the years before, it was the first radical departure from the 
financial system set up in the nineteen twenties, strengthened during wartime. The 
reforms were based upon three principles: first, free markets; second, fair trade secured by 
transparent and reliable rules; and, third, an institutional framework that would satisfy 
international standards in areas such as legal, accounting and supervision.27 These three 
principles recognise some of the main problems. It addresses the absence of free 
competition within Japan’s financial system and the slow and inadequate response by the 
Ministry of Finance since the start of the crisis. 
In June 1998, the Laws for Financial System Reformation were enacted. They included 
amendments to the Banking Law, the Law of Securities Transactions and the Law of 
Insurance Industry. One of the focus areas was to improve the asset management sector. 
Despite large personal assets, most of this was kept as postal savings or other savings 
accounts. The market, in which formerly only life insurance companies and trust banks 
were allowed to operate, was opened up to banks and other insurance companies.  
Another area of focus was the corporate finance area, which had been liberalised with the 
introduction of several new financial instruments. Although large multinational companies 
already had access to international capital markets, the smaller sized companies now also 
gained access to ways of finance beyond simple loans. This also reduced the dependency of 
the smaller companies on their (main) bank, which were unwilling to lend to new 
applicants due to their own problems. 
In order to improve the working of capital markets, the rules on accounting and 
transparency were strengthened. It also served to clear up the problems of non-performing 
loans, as to date the scale of the problem for individual institutions was largely unknown. 
Further increase in competition in the financial sector was reached by allowing cross-over 
entry, for example, deposit-taking banks would now be allowed to set up a securities firm. 
                                                          
27 Akiyoshi Horiuchi, ‘The Big Bang: Idea and Reality’ in Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick (eds), Crisis 
and Change in the Japanese Financial System (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000) 234 
202 
 
Holding companies were again permitted to facilitate this. As mentioned previously, in 
order to regulate the financial industry independently from the Ministry of Finance, the 
Financial Supervisory Agency was created, reporting directly into the prime minister. More 
importantly, as a newly created agency, it did not have a history or close ties with financial 
institutions and could supervise at arm length, making it altogether a much more credible 
regulator. 28 One of the first main tasks of the FSA was to administer the Prompt Corrective 
Action rule. Under this rule, financial institutions periodically have to calculate and assess 
their own capital ratios, although subject to external audit, and take corrective action if 
they are taking too much risk. It was a preventive measure aimed at solving the tactics of 
forbearance used to that date. Unfortunately, it had the effect of exacerbating Japan’s 
economic difficulties by forcing the banks into conservative lending policies.29 Overall, the 
policy was accepted because drastic measures were necessary to force through changes. 
b. Commercial Code Changes 
From the period shortly after the crash in the early 1990s to well into the 2000s 
incremental changes were made to the Commercial Code.30 Until 2005, Japanese company 
law was part of the Commercial Code. In 2005 company law was separated out through the 
enactment of the Company Law, which exists next to the remaining Commercial Code. The 
Commercial Code in Japan has existed for some time. After Meiji Ishin in the late nineteen 
hundreds, when Japan started to look at how European nations had organised their affairs, 
and after arguments between proponents of French, English and German legislation, the 
Commercial Code was enacted in 1899 based largely upon the German Commercial Code of 
1861.31 As a result, the Commercial Code before the end of the Second World War was 
mainly German. Not surprisingly, after the Second World War, during the American 
occupation, the Commercial Code was amended in 1950 based on US company law, 
focusing on three areas: first, the facilitation and simplification of financing of companies, 
second, the reorganisation of corporate bodies and, third, strengthening the status of 
shareholders.32 It meant that ownership or capital and management were separated and 
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the board of directors was introduced. Despite US efforts, Japan was reluctant to include 
the protection of minority shareholders. 
Due to the behaviour of companies during the Oil Crisis, there was public anger and a push 
to place companies under greater control. Combined with the fallout from the failures of 
several major companies in the mid-60s, various changes were made to the company law in 
1974. The Special Measures Law on the Audit of Large Companies Limited by Shares was 
enacted. The changes resulted in more power for auditors in the supervision of business 
and the requirement of audit by accounting firms for large companies.33 In the 1980s, 
following more corporate scandals, more reforms were enacted although in a piecemeal 
manner. These included the general strengthening of supervision by shareholders, for 
example by introducing the right for shareholders to make proposals for the general 
shareholders’ meeting and by introducing voting in writing, as well as strengthening the 
power of auditors.  
Whilst these incremental changes were being enacted, it was clear that further 
amendments were needed following the financial crash in 1990 and the oncoming 
recession. The general belief was that the financial and economic crisis was caused by over-
regulation and thus by an over-regulated company law.34 Early deregulation included the 
lowering of the ceiling of the issuing of corporate bonds in 1990 and the abolition of this 
ceiling in 1993. In the same year, both the supervision of shareholders and the audit system 
were strengthened, for example by the reform of derivative actions and by the introduction 
of external auditors.35 The following deregulation plan that was introduced in 1998 
included more reforms to the company law. Changes included the introduction of a stock 
option scheme and the simplification of merger procedures. In 2001, the Three Year 
Program on the Promotion of Regulatory Reform started, which encompassed a review of 
both the Civil Code and the Commercial Code. Changes included further reform of 
derivative actions, the introduction of new classes of shares and a series of corporate 
governance reforms, which are discussed in 6.3.4. Finally, in June 2006, the Company Law 
came into force, replacing much of the Commercial Code and surrounding legislation. 
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c. Corporate Reform 
Before 2005, there were four different types of companies under Japanese law. First, there 
were the companies limited by shares. These were designed for large public companies. 
Second, there were the limited liability companies, which were intended for small and 
medium-sized companies with a maximum number of fifty members. In practice, after the 
Second World War, companies limited by shares were often used instead, usually unlisted 
and without issuing any shares. It has to be noted that Japanese limited liability companies 
are similar to the German ‘Gesellschaft mit beschränke Haftung (GmbH)’ and not to the US-
style LLC, as this part of the Japanese law was based upon German law dating from 1922. 
Third, there were limited partnership companies and, fourth, full partnership companies. 
Partnerships under Japanese law have a legal personality. 
With the enactment of the 2005 Company Law, limited liability companies following the 
German law were abolished and pushed into the expanding category of companies limited 
by shares. This therefore became an enormous category, ranging from small companies 
with virtually no capital to large multinational enterprises. It reflected the fact that 
distinction between the two categories had blurred already in practice. However, a new 
type of limited liability companies was created based upon the US style LLC. Besides the 
companies limited by shares and the new limited liability companies, the 2005 Company 
Law also provided for limited liability partnerships, modelled on the limited liability 
partnerships in the UK in 2000, and full partnership companies. The Company Law further 
distinguishes between public and remaining companies.  Public companies have a 
restriction on assignment only in relation to part of the issued shares.36 Thus the remaining 
companies require the consent of the company in the transfer of shares in relation to all 
the issued shares. Note that public companies do not have to be listed. Another distinction 
is made between large companies and other companies: large companies either have a 
share capital of at least half a billion Yen in the last business year or a debt of twenty billion 
Yen or more.37 The categories of public companies and large companies matter when 
determining the legally allowed governance structure of the company. 
Faced with a large number of corporate insolvency which followed the financial crisis and 
the Asian crisis, the then existing insolvency laws were deemed to be hopelessly out of 
date. Three new laws were introduced following a review initiated along with the Big Bang 
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Reforms.38 Although radical reform was planned, the economy worsened at such a rate 
that the rehabilitation of companies became most important. The first of the three new 
laws was therefore the Civil Rehabilitation Law of 2000, replacing the Composition Law of 
1927 which was based on the German system. The old Composition Law had several 
shortcomings, especially the absence of means to enforce an agreed composition plan, 
which meant that many resorted to settlement out of court.39 The new law therefore tried 
to improve both the economic and the legal situation by allowing debtors to rehabilitate 
with a majority consented plan approved by the courts. 
The Civil Rehabilitation Law of 2000 was quickly followed by the Law on the Recognition 
and Assistance for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings of 2000, based upon the UNCITRAL 
model law on cross-border insolvency in 1997,40 and the Corporate Reorganisation Law of 
2003. Before that, corporate reorganisation in Japan was based on legislation introduced 
from the US in 1952 and was aimed at large companies.41 The problem was that, as it 
meant that current management would lose power over the business to an administrator, 
many were reluctant to apply for this. The new Corporate Legislation Law amends this and 
allows the debtor in possession system.42 The last step was to replace the Bankruptcy Law 
1922 with the new Bankruptcy Law 2004. The aim of this new Law was to speed up the 
procedure and ensuring its fairness.43 As part of the new Bankruptcy Law, and following 
similar procedures in the Civil Rehabilitation Law and the Corporate Reorganisation Law, 
there is a system for pursuing the liability of directors for unlawful acts or breaches of 
fiduciary duties.44 Finally, the Company Law provides for special liquidation, which can be 
applied for to the courts by creditors, auditors, liquidators or shareholders when there are 
circumstances that obstruct liquidation. 
d. Corporate Governance 
The choice of governance structure under the Company Law of 2005 is based upon 
whether a company is classified as a large or non-large company and as a public or non-
public company.45 There is a large choice for smaller companies, but for large public 
companies the choice is limited to two options. The first option, which is relatively new and 
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introduced by changes to the Commercial Code in 2002, is the US-style board system. Here 
the company has a board, three committees within the board and an independent auditing 
firm. This option is so far not very popular as almost all large public companies are using 
the second option, which was already the convention before the US-style option was given, 
requiring only a board, a corporate auditor and an accounting firm.  
The general shareholders’ meeting may decide on various issues set out in the Company 
Law. 46 Shareholders who have held a certain percentage for a longer period of time are 
entitled to make specific requests. Shareholders who have held three percent or more of 
the voting shares from six months before the meeting without interruption are entitled to 
require directors to convene the general shareholders’ meeting, specifying the subject 
matter and reason for convening. Furthermore, shareholders who have held one percent or 
more of the voting shares without interruption for six months or longer are entitled to 
request directors to include a matter in the agenda. They cannot do this if a similar 
proposal had been made within the last three years and it failed to gain at least ten percent 
of the votes. Provisions have been made to reduce the influence of cross-shareholding and 
to empower other shareholders. If company A holds more than twenty-five percent of 
company B, or in effect controls it by other means, then company B does not have a vote. 
In other words, companies with cross-shareholdings cannot vote in each other’s general 
shareholders’ meetings. 
Until late in the 1990s, the general shareholders’ meetings in Japan did not have much 
meaning and were largely a formality. In practice, most of the companies would organise 
their meetings on exactly the same date, such as the last Thursday of June.47 The meetings 
would last for about thirty minutes and there would be no questions. In some cases it was 
not uncommon to have the first rows of the audience taken up by lifetime employee 
shareholders, who would cheer the management. This created an atmosphere in which it 
was particularly difficult to ask awkward questions, to criticize or to oppose the 
management. Although this did get complaints from other shareholders, the courts upheld 
that the meeting was conducted in a way compatible with what the law prescribes and that 
the other shareholders could have asked questions.48 The law has now been amended to 
strengthen the position of shareholders as this practice was unsustainable. 
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Companies limited by shares are required to have a director.49 Public companies, as well as 
remaining companies with certain choices of governance structures, must have a board of 
directors comprised of at least three directors. At the general shareholders’ meeting, 
directors can be appointed and dismissed with a normal majority, although companies 
have the option of issuing shares with a veto right on the appointment of directors, which 
implies that agreement beyond the general shareholders’ meeting is required. The 
standard period of appointment for a director is two years, unless the company has 
committees, in which case it is only one year. Shareholders, who have held their share for 
longer than various specified lengths of a few months, have additional rights to apply to the 
court to dismiss directors in case of inappropriate behaviour. The board must, amongst the 
directors, appoint representative directors who conduct the business of the company.50 If 
the company has committees, then there are senior executive officers, who are not 
necessarily directors, appointed by the board. 
The role of directors depends on whether the company has a board of directors or not.  In 
those with a board, only the representative directors can conduct the business of the 
company, but in companies without a board all directors can. If a company has committees 
within the board then the directors do not conduct the business but perform merely 
oversight or supervision. However, as discussed, this last form is not yet very popular. 
Except for this last form, with committees on the board, the board has the following 
powers:51 
1. To determine the execution of the business of the company, 
2. Supervise the carrying out of duties by the directors, 
3. Appoint and dismiss representative directors. 
The following fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the board:52 
1. Disposal or acquisition of significant assets, 
2. Borrowing of a large amount, 
3. Appointment and dismissal of important employees, 
4. Establishment, change, and abolition of branches and other organisational units, 
5. Significant matters involving the issuing of bonds, 
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6. Introduction of a system to ensure compliance with the carrying out of duties by 
directors in accordance with the law and the Articles of Incorporation (created 
under the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US) 
This structure, which is still in place in most Japanese companies, was based upon the US 
board system in 1950 when it was introduced. Consequently, it is regarded as a single tier 
system.  Hence, until the recent reforms, the Japanese board was a combination of both 
execution and supervision in a single board, which consisted of a large number of directors. 
A board size of over forty directors was not uncommon with effective power concentrated 
with just a few. Furthermore, these directors would be company insiders, with almost no 
externals appointed. In acknowledgement of some of the criticism on this system of 
corporate governance, the average number of directors has reduced since the 1990s and 
the position of executive officers was created. Although on only a voluntary basis, and not 
on a legal basis, the executive officers conduct the actual business without being members 
of the board. This creates in effect a two tier structure in which the directors become 
supervisors. Nonetheless, most of the directors are still lifetime employees of the company. 
This is different to the newly introduced company which has committees within its board, 
based upon the current US style, which has of course moved on since the 1950’s situation 
on which the old Japanese model is based. In these companies there is a statutory 
requirement for a senior executive officer. The role of the board is hence to supervise the 
senior executive officer. The three committees, which are the nomination committee, the 
remuneration committee and the audit committee, must each have at least three members 
of which at least half are external directors.  External directors are directors who are ‘not a 
business executing director of the company or subsidiary, their senior executive officer, 
manager or employee, and have, in the past, not occupied such a position in these 
companies’.53 
5. Conclusions 
a. Comparison of Bank Organisation and Corporate Governance 
Japanese companies operate in an alliance rather than on their own. In practice, it means 
that strong ties are formed between the companies that operate together. It results in 
strong relationships between companies that last for a very long time. This concept is not 
present in the UK. Although companies may frequently do business together, this does not 
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take the form of the keiretsu in Japan. This implies that the role which other firms play as 
external stakeholders in corporate governance is very different as well. In Japan, a much 
greater importance is placed on the firms within the keiretsu than a UK firm would place on 
its trading partners. Furthermore, in Japan these relationships are often strengthened 
through cross-shareholdings and regular exchange of employees, which is not the case in 
the UK. 
The practices within the companies themselves are fundamentally different as well. As per 
the analysis of the A-firm and the J-firm, the employee has a clear role as stakeholder in the 
Japanese company. He has, for example, the benefit of life-time employment, promotion 
by seniority and a large degree of protection in case of a downturn. The employee in the 
UK can be described, by contrast, as someone who seeks promotion by way of changing 
jobs and does not have a strong connection to the company. There is thus a clear 
difference between the importance of the employee as stakeholder in corporate 
governance in Japan and the UK. 
Finally, the banks play a different role in the corporate governance process in Japan as they 
do in the UK. The Main Bank sits in the middle of the keiretsu and assumes the role of 
monitoring the other companies. It holds a large amount of equity in cross-shareholdings 
and provides many of the loans within the group. It is therefore assumed that the Main 
Bank has the best knowledge on the companies’ financial health, in order to perform its 
role of monitoring and controlling these companies. This does not mean that the Main 
Bank should automatically be relied upon to do these tasks. After all, the Main Bank 
performs a substantial part of its business within the group based on the relationships 
rather than on financial fundamentals. This is very different from the role of the banks in 
the UK financial system. The UK banks are under pressure to achieve a good return on 
equity. This means that they are more conscious of the riskiness of any counterparties and 
how much capital they may need to hold against any loans. It is therefore fair to say that 
banks in the UK and in Japan play a fundamentally different role in corporate governance. 
b. Comparison of the Financial Crises 
There are clear similarities in the causes of the crises. Both started by the bursting of a 
property bubble: one in Tokyo and the other in subprime US mortgages. This points to the 
same underlying problem of poorly performing loans. In Japan, banks had a large amount 
of non-performing loans on their books. The UK banks had exposure to the non-performing 
loans, but in different forms. Domestic lenders, such as Northern Rock, had leveraged 
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themselves by securitising large parts of their risky mortgage portfolio. Large international 
banks, such as RBS, were active in and directly exposed to traded mortgage backed 
securities. In both crises, this resulted in a credit crisis as liquidity dried up. Banks were not 
willing to lend more money and those banks relying heavily on short-term funding got into 
trouble. Ultimately, in both crises, several banks collapsed and had to be taken into 
temporary government ownership. All these factors point to great similarities between the 
two financial crises. 
c. Comparison of Responses and Reforms 
In both the UK and Japan the insolvency laws were not designed to deal with the crisis at 
hand. In the UK, the insolvency laws did not provide adequately for the failure of a bank, 
which resulted in the Banking Act 2008 and 2009. In Japan, the insolvency laws were 
outdated overall. This caused problems when, during the prolonged period over economic 
decline, many companies became insolvent. The solution adopted in Japan to deal with the 
failure of large banks was to nationalise them. The difference is that, in the UK, a return to 
the private sector is proving to be a lengthy process, whilst in Japan this was done swiftly. 
The latter observation is somewhat deceptive, because after the privatisation followed 
several years of struggles between the bank, the government and the Japanese regulator. 
The struggles mainly concerned the non-performing loans the bank still had on its books. 
This is an argument in favour of keeping a nationalised bank under government control for 
a longer period, allowing an unhindered restructuring and clean-up to take place. Once 
privatised, this would become more difficult for the government to control. It must be 
noted that within Japan the government can more easily exercise its influence through 
MITI, the regulators and the Bank of Japan, compared to position the UK government is in. 
However, whether through formal or informal control over the bank, any interference by 
the government, as discussed in chapter four, is likely to conflict with the bank’s 
commercial and regulatory objectives. 
There is similarity between the problems emanating from the board during the crises in the 
UK and Japan. In the UK, the general observation was that boards at banks were ineffective 
in challenging and in conducting oversight. It was further concluded that the board and 
senior management lacked the skills, knowledge and experience required in their roles. The 
situation in Japan was that boards were equally ineffective but for different reasons. This 
can a large extent to be explained by the different role of the board in a Japanese company. 
The role has been described in this chapter as benevolent guardians of the community, and 
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as mediators between shareholders, employees and unions. As a consequence, Japanese 
boards can be very large in size. They can be composed of people from other companies 
within the keiretsu or former government employees. It is fair to say that these boards 
cannot challenge effectively and they do not contain the relevant skills and knowledge. 
However, this observation is grounded in the notion of what a UK board must do, not what 
a Japanese board must do. Following the crisis in Japan, the role of the board is slowly 
changing. It is difficult, given the different role of the board, to compare meaningfully the 
changes made to the UK and Japanese boards. 
Perhaps the most interesting difference between the responses in the UK and Japan is the 
difference in emphasis on aspects of ethics and culture within the banks. In short, there 
appears to be no response on this subject in Japan. In the UK, there is great emphasis on 
the accountability of senior management, on improving the culture and on preventing 
future scandals. This is at least partially driven by the fact that the taxpayer is still aggrieved 
over having to bail out the banks in the first place. But although, for example, non-
performing loans in Japan have increased demands for transparency, it does not appear to 
have driven a change in culture. It is not unlikely that this comes from the different roles 
banks play within the keiretsu, as well as from the different role of the employees 
themselves within the company. There are less, or at least there are perceived to be less, 
problems with business ethics within Japanese companies. This makes it difficult to 
compare meaningfully any changes made in the UK as regards the culture and values with 
any measures taken in Japan. 
Despite these difficulties, some broad and high level lessons can be drawn. The most 
important one is that neither the UK nor the Japanese model appeared to be able to 
prevent a financial crisis from occurring. In the UK, there was arguably too large a focus on 
short-term profits combined with a focus on shareholder value. In Japan, the opposite was 
true, with a focus on long-term relationships rather than short-term profit. The absence of 
commercial pressures and a sole focus on stakeholders is thus not an absolute solution for 
the UK. However, a combination of the two approaches, where all elements are combined, 
would appear to retain the best of both models. 
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Chapter 7 – Recommendations for Corporate Governance at UK 
Banks 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters provided detailed information on the failures of UK banks and the 
various reports, measures and legislation that were drafted in response. In this chapter, 
these are brought together to answer the following question: how can corporate 
governance at UK banks be improved? The issues raised by bank failures in the UK are 
compared with the relevant measures that have been examined so far. They are also 
compared with similar problems that arose during the financial crisis in Japan and the 
corresponding solutions. All of this is done in the form of reviewing the central weaknesses 
in corporate governance at UK banks and formulating recommendations accordingly. 
Before discussing the difficulties, weaknesses and recommendations for corporate 
governance at UK banks, it is worthwhile reflecting on the theories of existence of the 
company and of corporate governance outlined in chapter two, in particular in light of the 
research and conclusions drawn so far in this thesis. The contractual theory, which, either 
from a legal or economics perspective, models the company as a nexus of contracts, is not 
sufficient for banks. It lacks the important external elements, such as customers, the 
regulator, and society at large. It therefore cannot provide a good model for banks. The 
communitarian theory may go some way in describing the nationalised or rescued UK 
banks. In this theory, the state would use the company to further social welfare. This is in 
line with the conflicts observed between the commercial objectives and the political 
objectives for the rescued banks.  
In terms of models of corporate governance, the agency model appears to suffer from 
similar shortcomings as the contractual model for the existence of companies as it ignores 
the important external parts particularly relevant for banks. The stewardship model, which 
describes that board members look after the benefit of the company in the long term, 
would be able to capture this. External stakeholders’ interests can clearly be included 
under this long term objective. It would be possibility to extend, for example, the directors’ 
duties codified in the Companies Act 2006, which in s172 already includes the success of 
the company having regard for various stakeholders. It could be extended for banks to 
include special duties given the special nature and importance of banks in society. This 
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suggestion would raise the question whether such a special duty should then be included 
for all financial services firms or indeed for any firm with some national or strategic 
importance, or wherever the taxpayer may find himself on the hook. 
2. Difficulties in Formulating Recommendations 
a. Difficulties of Comparative Analysis 
In answering the question posed, it is important to keep in mind the difficulty associated 
with the comparative analysis performed in this research. These difficulties, which have 
been discussed to some degree in chapter two, may otherwise prevent the formulation of 
clear recommendations. They mostly arise when comparing international reports, EU and 
national legislation, or when conducting a comparative analysis with the case of Japan. The 
danger is that, as was outlined in the first chapter on methodology, one resorts to 
contrasting the different legal systems rather than to comparing them.1 Any comparison 
and thus recommendation made, must include an appreciation of the wider context in 
which the different legal systems reside. The international reports, such as those issued by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, are a compromise between representatives 
of many different national regulators. These include representatives from European 
countries, the US and Asian countries. This means that they reflect a variety of cultures and 
backgrounds. It combines an enormous diversity of financial history and culture. With the 
realisation that certain UK banks have become globally systemically important must come 
the observation that rules and regulations may need to rise above the national level as 
well. It must be recognised that there is a clear need to set regulations at a global level, for 
example to avoid or minimise regulatory arbitrage and to recognise that many banks are 
truly global organisations. 
The problems of comparative analysis are not restricted to finance and financial regulation. 
As the discussion in chapter one showed, the definition of corporate governance itself 
depends on the background of who defines it.2 Corporate governance is largely defined by 
a country’s history, the development of its rules, habits, laws and its culture.3 The problem 
here again is that, with banks operating globally and international organisations setting 
standards, corporate governance itself goes outside these national boundaries to become a 
                                                          
1 Pierre Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 Legal Stud 232, 234 
2 Donald C Clarke, ‘”Nothing But Wind”? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance’ 
(2011) 59 Am J Comp L 75, 79 
3 See Mark J Roe ‘Some differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’ 
(1993) 102 Yale L J 1927 or Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance’ (1999) 52 Stan L Rev 127 
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global concept.4 This can create friction between the need to regulate globally and the 
different nation laws and customs. As was noted for the regulation of globally systemically 
important UK banks, their corporate governance standards and norms may also need to 
rise above the national level. The problem is that corporate governance is a national 
concept, with different practices across the globe. This means that for these UK banks both 
UK specific elements will play a role as well as international guidelines, which may contain 
foreign elements. These different elements can easily conflict because, given their different 
background, they are not necessarily aligned.   
b. Difficulties of Comparative Corporate Governance 
Some of the general principles of corporate governance that are mentioned in international 
as well as UK standards of corporate governance were laid down as early as in the Cadbury 
report. Because they are so fundamental, they are a returning feature in many 
international reports on corporate governance that followed. The first general principle is 
transparency (or openness). It is also mentioned widely in Basel II as it is essential for its 
third pillar, the functioning of market discipline.5 Transparency can take different forms, 
depending on what part of corporate governance is analysed. For internal controls and risk 
management to function within the organisation, the right information must flow up to 
senior management and the board. For customers to make the right decision on where to 
open a bank account, sufficient information must be available to them on their risk, return 
and deposit protection. The second principle is accountability. It is especially important in 
banks because the increased importance of the risk management function. Decisions on 
defining the risk profile and actual risk taking must be challenged both upwards and 
downwards throughout the organisation. It has to be clear who is responsible for each 
decision. The third principle is integrity. The integrity usually refers to the information that 
is used in the management control systems, but especially in banking it should be extended 
to integrity of the people working there. 
However, in light of the discussion on comparative analysis, the question is often not 
whether these internationally accepted principles are part of good corporate governance, 
but what they mean and how they are implemented at a national level. This is where 
various national ideas on good corporate governance can differ. The case study of Japan 
                                                          
4 Arthur R Pinto, ‘Globalisation and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2005) 23 Wis 
Int’l L J 477, 485-488 
5 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Internal Convergence of Capital Measurements and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework’ (June 2004) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf> 
accessed 20 November 2015 
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demonstrated clearly that what is understood by these elements differs greatly from the 
UK. The concept of accountability implies that there is something over which you are 
accountable for towards someone else. In the old keiretsu structure, the board may be 
accountability towards the other companies within that keiretsu or towards its employees. 
The board was described in chapter six as a group of elderly statesmen looking after the 
various interested parties. The idea of assigning responsibility and challenging decisions 
thus takes on a very different form compared to a UK company. It has to be considered 
how the UK notion of transparency differs from that in Japan, where relationships itself are 
more important as well as trust and avoiding embarrassment or loss of face. Business 
partners, both within the UK and Japan, share information, thus providing transparency, 
but they do so on a totally different basis. In light of this difference in transparency, the 
third pillar of market discipline, which is based on transparency. Another difference is the 
concept of share ownership. In Japan, it is used to create friendly relationships between 
companies and to work together in a corporate alliance. In the UK, it is regarded as an 
investment without such intention. The role of employees is another difference between 
the UK and Japan. With concepts such as lifetime employment, the employee in Japan is 
regarded as a key part of the corporate governance arrangements. In the UK, the situation 
of the employee is different and often employees will change company several times in 
their career.  
Corporate governance in summary varies significantly between Japan and the UK. Such 
national differences make a comparative analysis more difficult. Comparing corporate 
governance between supranational and national levels will bring even further problems. At 
international level, inevitably some compromise is made as to common elements of 
corporate governance. Other considerations at this level may be to exclude areas in which 
no compromise can be reached. It is clear that any  internationally determined idea will 
look very different once implemented in different countries. Each country will give its own 
interpretation based on nationally established rules, regulations and customs. 
c. The Minimum Standard of Good Corporate Governance at Banks 
The research in the previous chapters demonstrated that the complexity around corporate 
governance at banks has increased significantly and that it continues to increase. The main 
areas of raised complexity are a consequence of the increasing size of the banks, increasing 
complexity of the markets and products they operate in, and increasing regulation of 
capital, liquidity and other areas.  Although this research focusses on the regulatory side, 
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the increase in complexity due to the increased size of banks and the developments in 
financial markets is substantial. The direct consequence is that the task of running a bank is 
becoming an increasingly difficult one. The knowledge and experience of the board has to 
be enhanced accordingly if it is to provide effective challenge and oversight of senior 
management. The internal systems and controls need to be more sophisticated to allow 
the required information to flow through the organisation. The regulatory requirements 
demand a both more and a higher level of detail to be contained in that information. The 
complexity of markets and products demands some increase in volume and detail on 
information, especially the information concerning the associated risks. These demands on 
internal systems and controls are further increased for the largest banks by their increased 
global presence and the associated needs to satisfy local legislation and regulators. 
The point is that the rise in complexity has led in turn to an increase in the minimum 
standard for each of the elements of good corporate governance. It means that the 
practices that constitute good corporate governance at UK banks are part of a concept that 
develops over time. And, it does not just develop, but raises its minimum standards. Every 
case study conducted as part of this research supports this observation. At Northern Rock 
and HBoS, the board and senior management failed to understand properly the risks 
associated with the complexity of their funding model. At RBS, senior management failed 
to understand the complexity of the markets they were involved in as well as the 
complexities arising from the take-over of ABN Amro. There was the additional failure to 
appreciate the wider importance of the bank within the UK economy. At Barclays, emphasis 
on growth and profit led to a culture that stimulated disregard towards all increasingly 
important external stakeholders. Finally, at the Co-operative, the governance structure was 
woefully inadequate for the increasing complexities associated with running a bank. All 
these cases point to a rising minimum standard of what constitutes good corporate 
governance at UK banks. 
d. Framework for Recommendations 
With these difficulties in mind, this chapter deals with the risks identified in the previous 
chapters and contains a framework of recommendations to address them. The principal 
starting point is that the identified risks can be addressed by improvements to corporate 
governance at banks. To address the risks at the right place, it is important to distinguish 
whether they relate to internal or external corporate governance. The distinction between 
internal and external corporate governance at banks is what the names suggest and has 
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been dealt with in more detail in chapter two. External corporate governance at banks 
focusses on the shareholders, the bondholders and, eventually, stakeholders. It shows the 
external relationship between a bank and its environment. This also comes back to the idea 
of corporate social responsibility: there is an obligation on the banks to ensure financial 
stability and to provide a sound financial infrastructure for the wider society. Additionally, 
in the unfortunate event of a bank failure, the costs to the economy and society should be 
minimal. Internal corporate governance describes the legal and regulatory framework for 
the management and supervision of an organisation and includes the instruments needed 
for good management, such as a system for internal control and risk management, and its 
understanding thereof.6 
This distinction needs to be considered alongside the observation that banks as 
organisations have unique properties. The three main unique properties are, first, the 
enormous importance of the system of credit for the economy at large, second, the unique 
properties of the corporate model, including the organisation of its legal entities and its 
typical opaqueness, and third, the way they are regulated and supervised.7 The main 
concern is for risks that are specific for banks, whether for banks individually, also known as 
micro-prudential, or for the banking system as a whole, or macro-prudential. The regulator 
is introduced as a stakeholder to monitor these risks or, in other words, for risk 
governance.8  
The proposition is thus to use a framework for recommendations based upon the 
distinction of internal and external corporate governance whilst taking into consideration 
banks’ unique properties. As discussed in previous chapters, it should be acknowledged 
that some progress has been made already. However, it is argued that it is not adequate as 
it mostly does not address the core reasons for the failures identified by this research. The 
core reasons are that some of the proposed basic elements of corporate governance were 
not in place and that their absence is not being addressed properly. 
3. Recommendations for Internal Corporate Governance 
a. Balance between Risk, Growth and Profit 
This research covered several UK banks which failed during the financial crisis. One of the 
main observations was that the risk appetite and culture within these banks was 
                                                          
6 Gottfried Wohlmannstetter, ‘Corporate Governance von Banken’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Gottfried 
Wohlmansstetter (eds), Handbuch Corporate Governance von Banken (Verlag 2011) 33 
7 Ibid 38 
8 Ibid 42 
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inappropriate. The emphasis was on growth and profit only. The first UK bank that failed 
was Northern Rock, as discussed in chapter three. This was a lender based in the north of 
England with little direct exposure to the US mortgage market. The main reasons it failed, 
discussed in the case study, were that its business model was based on, first, 
underestimating risks, in particular liquidity risk, and, second, a too high risk-reward 
strategy. The aggressive and high-growth-strategy was based on retrieving funding from 
the wholesale markets using securities mortgages as collateral, as opposed to the more 
conservative and traditional approach. When the crisis hit, management at Northern Rock 
was surprised because they had expected to maintain liquidity based on their collateral. 
The board and its risk committee at Northern Rock had discussed and approved the funding 
strategy. This same strategy was described from anything between inadequate to reckless 
in several reviews.9 The board had thus reached the wrong conclusion on its strategy and 
had done so without a backup plan. The fact that the board set out a course that was, 
certainly with the benefit of hindsight, the wrong one is in itself not so problematic 
provided it understood and took reasonable business risks: every organisation takes risks. 
The point is that the reviews clearly show that the risks taken were unacceptably high, 
certainly considering the nature of the business Northern Rock was engaged in. Its main 
business was consumer banking, which means it should have defined its risk appetite 
accordingly. It should not have undertaken an aggressive growth plan as it did, based on 
obtaining funding solely by using its securitised mortgages as collateral. It would appear 
that both the risk appetite and the strategy were not sufficiently challenged by the risk 
committee and by the board of directors as a whole.  
An even more dramatic example of inappropriate risk appetite was the take-over of ABN 
Amro by the RBS-led consortium. As discussed in chapter three, it was ‘the wrong price, the 
wrong way to pay, at the wrong time and the wrong deal’.10 The transaction was completed 
when the financial crisis had taken the markets in its grip. The transaction was financed 
almost completely by short term funding and was based on extremely limited due 
diligence. Additionally, it was found that, during earlier aggressive expansion, not enough 
attention had been paid to the risks associated with this rapid growth. By way of example, 
                                                          
9 See: Treasury Select Committee, ‘Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008, The Run on the Rock’ (2008) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf> accessed 20 
November 2015; Financial Services Authority, ‘The Supervision of Northern Rock: a Lesson Learned 
Reviewed’ (2008) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/nr_report.pdf> accessed 20 November 2015 
10 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland’ (December 2011) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/rbs.pdf> accessed 20 November 2015, 227 
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the investment banking arm did not provide any risk analysis of the markets in which it 
sought to aggressively grow. These factors ultimately contributed to the failure of RBS and 
the rescue by the UK government. Similarly, the case study of HBoS demonstrated that 
growth was the main driver to engage in securitisation and increasing reliance on 
wholesale funding. This caused a significant increase in complexity of the business model, 
which ultimately led to its collapse. Finally, the case study of Barclays showed that an 
increased pursuit of profit and growth, personified by its CEO, Bob Diamond, led to a 
culture where moral and ethics were largely absent. This in turn led to many scandals, from 
market manipulation and designing aggressive tax avoidance schemes to a breakdown in 
relations with its regulators.  
Based on these cases it can be concluded that there was a culture at board level within 
most of the UK banks to engage in strategies carrying a high risk in pursuit of growth and 
profit. Going back to the fundamental principles set out by the Basel Committee, it is clear 
that this course of action by the board and senior management, at the banks 
aforementioned, is completely contrary to the following principles: 
 ‘Principle 1: The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including 
approving and overseeing the implementation of the bank’s strategic 
objectives, risk strategy, corporate governance and corporate values. The 
board is also responsible for providing oversight of senior management’.11  
‘Principle 5: Under the direction of the board, senior management should 
ensure that the bank’s activities are consistent with the business strategy, 
risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the board’.12 
Setting out the risk strategy is a fundamental responsibility of the board and must be done 
in harmony with its strategic objectives. Accordingly, the board would need to define a 
clear risk policy framework. Within such a framework, important strategic decisions, 
including a take-over or other growth strategies, can be measured. In other words, it may 
well be acceptable for the board to engage in higher risks and a more aggressive culture, 
but taking higher risks has to imply that the controls and risk management framework 
around it are designed accordingly. The board must ensure that all of the bank’s activities 
are monitored and measured against such a framework. In the examples of Northern Rock 
                                                          
11 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance’ 
(October 2010) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf> accessed 20 November 2015, 7 
12 ibid 16 
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and HBoS, this would have meant that if the funding strategy had been based on short 
term funding, then the board should have set controls accordingly. This might have 
included frequent monitoring of the relevant funding markets or carrying out stress testing. 
If it was not realistic to implement such controls, then this risk should not have been taken. 
b. Remuneration and Culture 
A direct consequence of the pursuit of profit and growth, as described previously, is that 
this was reflected directly in the remuneration within banks. Targets were often short-term 
and based on financials only. The variable part of the total remuneration package was by 
far the largest component and often cash based. This exacerbated the cultural problems 
within the banks. The reason for taking high risks is the potential of gaining high rewards. 
The employees within the bank at all levels would thus pursue such a strategy. The 
potentially high rewards lead to the question how staff remuneration and their targets 
should be linked. Clearly, if the link between high risks and high rewards continues without 
safeguards, then this would be the wrong choice. It would stimulate excessive risk-taking 
amongst staff at all levels. The targets for employees must be more than financial targets. It 
is perfectly understandable to make financial targets part of staff’s objectives. As was 
examined in chapter five, the pressure on return on capital from the new regulation makes 
it more important to achieve sufficient returns to keep the bank a viable business. Equally 
important is the way in which these targets are achieved. Financial targets might be most 
important to the shareholders, but the way in which they are achieved is important to 
other stakeholders. In the two earlier case studies, Northern Rock and RBS, this is obvious 
because both banks failed, which was clearly not in the interest of stakeholders. Other 
examples include selling products to customers who do not need them, such as the PPI 
case discussed in chapter three. Setting targets and objectives drives the culture. By setting 
a wide range of non-financial targets, as is proposed here, stakeholders’ recognition can be 
improved. 
One way of tackling this problem is to set regulatory restrictions on variable pay within UK 
banks. This is, to some extent, already done by CRD IV, which was dealt with in chapter five. 
Note that this is one area where CRD IV differs significantly from Basel III, which it seeks to 
implement. The possible cause of this is that it was not possible to agree on any 
remuneration restrictions globally, as for some countries, such as the US, this would be 
unacceptable. Within Europe, where a more socialist thinking dominates, it has been 
possible to add such regulation and this is now applicable to the UK as well. The 
221 
 
shortcoming of such regulation is that it focuses only on the level of pay which it tries to 
restrict to an extent that is deemed to be socially acceptable. From 1 January 2015, the 
variable component is capped to the level of the fixed component for staff captured. This 
includes senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and anyone 
else whose salary and risk profile takes them to that level. Only with sufficient shareholder 
approval might this ratio be raised to twice the level of the fixed component. Equally 
important are the requirements to include clawback provisions of variable pay in case of 
conduct resulting into significant losses or failing to meet the standards of fitness and 
propriety. 
These provisions need to have some more teeth. Firstly, fixed pay levels will raise as a 
result of these provisions.13 This means that the overall level of remuneration remains 
unchanged. Secondly, if the variable part is reduced then the clawback will cover a smaller 
part of the remuneration. Thirdly, and most importantly, awarding remuneration, 
especially variable remuneration, should be linked directly to targets that measure the 
conduct and thus the employee’s standards of fitness and propriety. It is accepted that this 
cannot always be accurately done at the time of payment, as some misconduct may only 
come to light afterwards. But it is not good enough to have the standards of conduct 
included only in the claw back provisions. The closest CRD IV comes to moving away from 
financial performance targets is in Article 94(1)(a) where it states that for assessing 
individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria should be taken into account, 
and in Article 94(1)(k) where it states that all types of current and future risk shall influence 
the variable remuneration. The mandatory inclusion of risk is a good start. It forms a 
natural balance for financial performance targets. It should go further and include conduct 
related risk. It would have been better if non-financial criteria had been made mandatory.  
c. Board Effectiveness and Senior Management Experience 
The effectiveness of the board is of paramount importance. In the case study of Japan, it 
was apparent that many of the boards where ineffective, if only because they were 
composed of sometimes as many as forty people. Some of the measures taken to improve 
the effectiveness of these boards were: to stimulate reduction in size; the introduction of 
outside, independent non-executive directors; and to introduce committees with specific 
responsibility for nomination, remuneration and audit. Other measures to align the 
                                                          
13 Financial Times, ‘City bankers to evade EU bonus cap with role-based allowances’ (13 April 2014) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/02213446-c19d-11e3-b95f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3bApKRGyx> 
accessed 20 November 2015 
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interests of the board with those of the shareholders include the introduction of option 
award schemes. Although the boards at Japanese companies were seen to be ineffective 
for very different reasons from those relating to UK banks, and although the responses 
were different from what is proposed in the UK, the essential point is that an ineffective 
board is a serious problem for good corporate governance. Of course, the measures 
adopted in Japan should not be followed blindly, only what they were trying to achieve. 
The very first deeper underlying reason for the failure at RBS, discussed in chapter three, 
was the overall lack of effectiveness of board oversight and challenge. These failures of 
effectiveness include: the failure to challenge the focus on increasing revenue and assets, 
rather than capital and liquidity; the failure to identify the aggregate risk across the 
businesses; and the failure to challenge assumptions underlying the business model, 
including those behind the US subprime market and behind the funding market. This was 
particularly problematic when combined with the leadership capability and management 
style of Fred Goodwin. It was concluded that his management style deterred robust 
challenges from the board or other senior managers. From these observations it may be 
concluded that the board must not be merely reactive but it needs to challenge where 
appropriate. A prerequisite for making the challenge is that the board has sufficient 
knowledge to be able to do this.  
Similar problems of an ineffective board emerged from the case study of HBoS, discussed in 
chapter three. The board regarded itself, incorrectly, as a beacon of good governance, 
resulting in complacency rather than detailed scrutiny of how the bank was run. It was 
combined with a lack of banking knowledge on the board, which further reduced its 
effectiveness in challenging any decisions. The situation at RBS and HBoS confirms the 
importance of an active board that actually challenges the decisions taken. This is precisely 
the point highlighted earlier from the Japan case study. It also emerged from the case 
studies of Northern Rock and Barclays. The effectiveness of the board of banks was one of 
the main areas covered by the Walker Review, discussed in chapter five. Instead of 
amending the Companies Act 2006, the Walker Review suggests that much can be done 
within the existing framework, including ensuring sufficient knowledge exists within the 
board. It is further suggested that the FSA, now the FCA, must ensure that the non-
executive directors commit sufficient time, engage proactively in board discussions and act 
in line with the risk strategy. This means that the FCA must monitor the directors 
monitoring the senior management. Although the FCA under the Financial Services and 
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Markets Act 2000 has its ‘approved persons regime’ and although it has a regular dialogue 
with the banks’ boards, it would seem a stretch to suggest that this is sufficient to ensure 
an effective board. 
To make the board more effective, various measures have been implemented to improve 
the accountability of the board in case of failure. It should be noted that at present several 
amendments to these measures is proposed and that change is imminent. Chapter five 
deals with two measures in particular: namely the criminal liability under the Financial 
Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 s36; and the new liability added to the FSMA 2000. It is 
an either-way offence which, on indictment, would carry a maximum sentence of seven 
years. As discussed previously, the criminal liability regime under s36 is unlikely to get 
anyone convicted. The obstacles to any conviction include that the risk of a bank failure 
must have been foreseen, rather than should have been foreseen, and that the failure of 
the bank must have been caused by the alleged mis-management. The problem with the 
second part is that, as demonstrated by our case studies, there are usually many underlying 
factors contributing to the failure of the bank, many of which are beyond the control of 
senior management. It is not unreasonable to assume that, if it ever comes to a trial, 
enormous amounts of time will be spent on hearing expert witnesses on these points. 
Although it might be argued that even to be subject to a criminal investigation relating to 
this offence will cause more than enough problems for the individuals involved, it can 
hardly be regarded as a strong deterrent.  
On the other hand, the amendments made by FS(BR)A 2013 to FSMA 2000, in particular 
s64A and s66A, which come into force on 7 March 2016, do have teeth. As dealt with in 
chapter five, the FCA and PRA currently have a joint consultation paper out on this so-
called Senior Management Regime. Under s66A, the FCA can find a senior manager guilty 
of misconduct contrary to rules of conduct defined under s64A. The action that the FCA can 
take against individuals in these cases is specified under s66 and include: a fine; publishing 
a statement of his misconduct; suspend its approval; and limits or restrict the functions the 
individual may undertake. There is a much greater chance that an offender will be subject 
to action under these provisions compared with the regime under s36. The question is 
whether such regulatory action may form a sufficient deterrent which will stimulate the 
board to operate better and more effectively. There are sufficient roles a disgraced bank 
manager could perform, consider for example the speaking circuit or consultancy and 
advisory roles. It would seem likely that criminal liability, including the threat of going to 
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jail, is a more appropriate reflection of the seriousness of contributing to the failure of a 
systemically important bank. 
The effectiveness of the board can be further increased by implementing appropriate 
information control systems. From the Lloyds case study, it was apparent that divisions 
underestimated their risk. The risk function was not designed to check this whilst the 
divisions that recorded the largest losses went largely unchallenged by the board. In the 
case of RBS it was found that the quality of risk control and management information was 
severely lacking. The problem of inadequate risk and control systems was aggravated by an 
increasing level of complexity in the activities and products in which the bank engaged. In 
the period leading up to the financial crisis there had been a sharp increase in complex 
financial instruments, discussed in chapter three. In particular, as a consequence of the 
capital requirements introduced by Basel II, there had been a large growth in the 
securitisation market. This created highly leveraged products based on loans and 
mortgages, which allowed banks to transfer the risk of losses to the buyers. It formed part 
of a general trend towards more complex products and derivatives, where pay-off 
structures are leveraged and depend on some underlying benchmark or security, such as an 
exchange rate, interest rate or share prices. The rise of these products is not wrong in 
principle, apart from their use to avoid capital constraints. But what it does mean is that 
everything in the bank has to be lifted to a level capable of defining the strategy and 
monitoring and controlling the risks relating to these products. By way of example, senior 
management needs to provide sufficient guidance in its business strategy. Part of this 
concerns the clients and counterparties they are willing to engage with. Senior 
management must outline how it fits within its risk appetite. The associated risks must be 
understood, monitored and controlled. Both knowledge at board level and an appropriate 
risk and control system to support it are essential. 
4. Recommendations for External Corporate Governance 
a. Too-Big-to-Fail 
i. Capital Requirements 
The financial crisis had its initial causes, perhaps better described as triggers, which 
affected individual institutions, and reasons that allowed these trigger events to be 
exacerbated into the world-wide financial crisis. These two categories of problems, as they 
are different in their nature, require different consideration. The first category stems 
mainly from decisions taken at individual firms, even though many banks had made the 
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same problematic decisions. It contains, for example, overexposure to the US subprime 
mortgage market and a poorly construed business model. The second category relates to 
systemic risk in the financial system and the fear of contagion, discussed in chapter three. 
In summary, several banks had become too-big-too-fail and the ‘inter-connectedness’ in 
the financial system had increased dramatically. This means that if a very large bank would 
fail, it would have repercussions throughout the system, potentially causing a domino 
effect amongst other banks. It is proposed that this needs to be fully resolved before there 
can be good corporate governance at banks because it poses a danger to the interests of 
external stakeholders, from depositors to the general public and the overall economy. 
One of the first responses14 to the G20, discussed in chapter five, in order to reduce the 
systemic risk in the financial system was to address the opaqueness caused by the growth 
of over-the-counter products. These are more or less complex derivatives which are traded 
directly between banks themselves or between them and their clients. The main solution 
was to push these products to exchanges, which have become the newly created central 
clearing platforms, or CCPs.  Although whether the creation of these CCPs has actually 
reduced the systemic risk or merely concentrated it with these CCPs is a much debated 
question, which is beyond the scope of this research. It was also suggested to strengthen 
capital and funding requirements to prevent bank failure. This is covered by Basel III and, 
within the EU, by CRD IV. In the UK, the reduction of systemic risk was further explored by 
the Independent Commission on Banking15. The main idea, discussed in chapter five, was to 
create a ring-fence within the bank that would separate the investment banking activities 
from the retail activities. In case of a bank failure, this fence would protect the retail bank 
from losses at the investment bank. This approach has been open to criticism from both 
sides: one side argues that the fence would reduce the benefits of the wholesale banking 
model, making the model riskier by reducing the effect of diversification. The other side 
argues that the approach does not go far enough and banks should be split up completely.  
                                                          
14 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘The Basel Committee’s Response to the Financial Crisis: 
Report to the G20’ (October 2010) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf> accessed 20 November 
2015 
15 Independent Commission on Banking, ‘Final Report – Recommendations’ (September 2011) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/documents/icb_final_report_12sep2011.pdf> accessed 20 November 2015 
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ii. Ring-Fencing 
Ring-fencing made it into statute by way of the FS(BR)A 2013 ss1-12 and needs to be 
implemented by 2019. It has been the subject of a recent consultation paper by the PRA.16 
The one criticism of ring-fencing that is difficult to argue against is that its implementation 
will be riddled with problems. First of all, it will be difficult to define in statute or 
regulations how this fencing has to work exactly. Second, it will be extremely difficult to 
monitor. It requires a complete overview of all the different entities under a banking group 
as well as an overview of all the capital residing in or allocated to each entity. These entities 
would have to be separated artificially based on whether they are inside the fence or not. 
Likewise, the capital would have to be distributed and the actual flow of capital between 
the entities, or simple reallocation, would have to be closely monitored. Considering some 
banking groups consist of at least hundreds of different legal entities, this is difficult at best 
and, in case of a bank failure, open to endless challenges in the courts. Consider, in the 
daily running of the ring-fenced bank, how intrusive the PRA and HM Treasury would 
become. The question is also how UK banks will respond to the ring-fence requirements. 
HSBC, which has a large part of its operation overseas, is already reported to consider 
moving its headquarters out of the UK to Hong Kong.17 Such a move might include the sale 
of its UK retail branches but in any event would circumvent the ring-fencing requirement 
and the bank levy on its balance sheet. Overseas banks with a retail operation in the UK, 
such as Santander, are considering to move their non-retail activities out of the UK.18 It 
appears that the Treasury might be giving in to the pressure and water down the ring-
fencing requirements.19 
Finally, it should be noted that monitoring ring-fencing would take up considerable 
resources of the regulator. This would take time and resources away from other areas of 
supervision. During the period leading up to the crisis such a targeted approach by the FSA 
                                                          
16 Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Consultation Paper CP19/14 The Implementation of Ring-
fencing: Consultation on Legal Structure, Governance, and the Continuity of Services and Facilities’ 
(Oct 2014) <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2014/cp1914.pdf> 
accessed 20 November 2015 
17 The Sunday Times, ‘HSBC threat may torpedo plan to break up banks’ (17 May 2015) 
<http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/Finance/article1557065.ece> accessed 20 
November 2015 
18 Sky News, ‘Santander sounds alarm over bank ring fencing’ (23 January 2015) 
<http://news.sky.com/story/1413672/santander-sounds-alarm-over-bank-ring-fencing> accessed 20 
November 2015 
19 The Sunday Times, ‘Ring-fencing zeal wilts after banks’ threat to quit Britain’ (24 May 2015) 
<http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/Finance/article1559833.ece> accessed 20 
November 2015 
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contributed to the problems. The FSA would have picked up on the strategy Northern Rock 
embarked on. The FSA should have had regard for the safety of deposits, continuity of the 
bank and financial stability in the UK. Under any of these scenarios, it should have 
concluded that the aggressive growth strategy was dangerous and not in the best interests 
of deposit holders or of the UK financial system. At Lloyds, discussed in chapter three, the 
FSA was far more concerned with correct implementation Basel II than it was with other 
issues such as funding. The reason for this is obvious: resources at the regulator are limited 
and their time need to be justified. Hence committing a large amount of resources at the 
regulator to ring-fencing will lead to less supervision in other areas. And that is before one 
considers the amount of costs and resources it will require on behalf of the financial 
institutions itself. 
There are several ways in which the difficulties of implementing the ring-fencing 
requirement can be alleviated. First, clear rules and guidelines must be provided on how to 
deal with any technological infrastructure needed for both parts of the bank. It must be 
clear how, in all situations, the ring-fenced bank can continue to rely on the technological 
infrastructure when it is owned by the other part of the bank. This could be done, for 
example, by way of service agreements or by a form of separation of internal service 
providers from the banks. Second, there is a need to keep the migration process as 
straightforward, short and cost-effective as possible. Simple arrangements, such as 
dedicated specialist teams at both the banks and the regulators, who maintain open lines 
of communications, are a basic necessity.  Third, some sort of assurance that it will work in 
case of an actual failure is needed. This may be rather difficult. The regulators’ usual tools 
such as stress-testing are not best suited to test potential legal challenges to ring-fencing. It 
would be possible for banks to extend their recovery and resolution plans to include 
scenarios where legal challenges are made, which could cause delays or further payments 
or compensation. Perhaps these plans could outline scenarios not relying solely on this 
mechanism, but to ensure that others, such as the FSCS, are capable of serving in 
conjunction or as alternative. After all, ring-fencing is merely a part of a whole range of 
measures.  
As it stands, ring-fencing as originally proposed appears to be problematic. A possible way 
of improving it is by insisting merely on only separating out proprietary trading activities 
and specific other derivatives and securities related activities into separate legal entities. 
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This would be more akin to the Volcker rule and the Liikanen report.20 This would result in a 
much smaller and more practicable separation. There is an alternative. Consider the simple 
objective of the ring-fence: 
‘the purpose of the retail ring-fence is to isolate those banking activities 
where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a 
bank’s customers in order to ensure, first, that this provision is not 
threatened as a result of activities which are incidental to it and, second, 
that such a provision can be maintained in the event of the bank’s failure 
without government solvency support’.21 
It raises the question whether this is not achieved in a much better way by a complete split 
between the retail activities and the rest of the banking activities. Admittedly, re-
introducing a Glass-Steagall-type separation would be extremely intrusive. However, it is 
arguably no more intrusive then any of the forced mergers that took place during the crisis. 
The differences are that these mergers happened in the heat of the moment and often 
appeared to be good deal for both sides: one was rescued and the other got a bargain. 
Furthermore, providing of state-aid or even state-ownership, which happened as a result of 
failures, is equally intrusive as can be seen by the direct political interference in how RBS is 
run. 
However, a further step is needed to make it work. The UK cannot be alone in introducing 
this type of legislation. It would be too easy for banks with a retail presence in the UK to 
work around it by moving the bulk of their non-retail operations abroad, as is allegedly 
being considered by HSBC and Santander. Furthermore, at least within the EU but 
preferably also other major financial centres, including the US, such restrictions need to be 
the same, otherwise it has little chance of succeeding. The EU already has the plan in the 
form of the Liikanen report, mentioned previously, but does not appear to be keen on 
implementing it. One may further argue that a complete separation between different 
banking activities would not prevent failures such as Northern Rock, which was once a 
retail bank to start with. This argument misses the point: the objective of neither the ring-
fence nor a complete separation is to prevent a bank failure, it is to reduce overall systemic 
risk and to facilitate the orderly wind-down of a bank without causing great harm to the 
                                                          
20 Liikanen et al 100 
21 ibid 35 
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wider economy. It is clear that a clear cut separation would achieve this without the legal 
wrangling a ring-fence might cause.  
iii. Recovery and Resolution 
The major step to ensuring that banks can fail without causing detriment to the overall 
economy is to have an appropriate recovery and resolution regime in place. In other words, 
it must be recognised that the failure of a bank cannot be resolved by means of the 
ordinary insolvency laws due to the impact on the external stakeholders. If deposit holders 
fear that their savings are no longer secure then this will trigger a run on the bank. An 
example of this was presented in the case study of Northern Rock, which was done under 
the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008. The first step towards allowing an orderly failure 
of a bank must thus be the safeguarding of deposits. This has been implemented by way of 
the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”), discussed in Chapter four. The effect 
of the FSCS is that depositors have climbed up in the ranking of creditors in case of 
insolvency as protected deposits now rank equal with preferential debts. However, 
protecting deposits only is not sufficient as they need to remain accessible as well. The 
scheme therefore must include provisions which state that the bank liquidator must work 
closely together with the FSCS to facilitate prompt pay-outs to eligible depositors or to 
facilitate the transfer of deposits as a whole to another institution. 
The second part of an appropriate resolution regime is that it would allow for a failure 
whilst minimising its impact on the wider economy and without requiring emergency state 
support. The Special Resolution Regime, which forms part of the Banking Act 2009 and was 
discussed in chapter four, goes a long way in achieving this. It grants sweeping powers to 
the regulators, especially to the Bank of England, to intervene and transfer parts out of the 
failing bank or to trigger a bail-in. These powers come with appropriate limitations, linked 
to the objectives of the powers, and with appropriate rules on compensation of parties 
affected. As always, the effectiveness of these new powers will only be truly tested in case 
of a future bank failure. However, they are a significant improvement on the situation 
before the financial crisis, when no resolution regime was in place. Its absence contributed 
to the problems around the failures during the crisis, including the capital injection by the 
government and the resulting state-ownership. The point must be made that, if one 
accepts that bank failures will happen, then it is at least equally important to focus on 
drafting an appropriate resolution regime as it is to draft adequate capital requirements. 
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Finally, it must be noted that it is of equal importance that banks diligently prepare their 
recovery and resolution plans. The PRA has issued a statement on how it expects banks to 
do this, besides the relevant parts of the rule book and the relevant directives.22 The PRA 
expects these reports to contain a series of options for the bank, depending on the type of 
stress it is under, addressing severe capital or liquidity difficulties. It should also include a 
wind-down analysis. The key point is that writing such a detailed plan is a serious 
undertaking for a bank but it will also force it to critically analyse its business model, 
financial resources, risk management and controls during a stress scenario leading to 
failure. 
b. Fair Treatment of Clients and Customers 
Since the financial crisis, various cases of misconducts by bank employees have been 
reported. This misconducts flows directly from points made previously under internal 
corporate governance, especially in relation to culture, remuneration and the prioritisation 
of growth and profit. Most of these have resulted in heavy fines for the banks and 
individuals involved, as well as damage to the sector as a whole. These failures of bankers’ 
conduct, as discussed in chapter three, include the miss-selling of products, including PPI 
and interest rate swaps, money laundering and violating international sanctions, rogue 
traders and market manipulation. The regulators and other law enforcement agencies have 
come down hard on the financial institutions involved, handing out record fines. Some of 
the individuals involved are facing criminal prosecution. However, the underlying question 
is why it keeps happening. The argument that this is a hangover from the years leading up 
to the crisis does not hold. The exchange rate rigging took place after the crisis whilst the 
investigation into LIBOR rate rigging was making news headlines. The argument put 
forward by banks that it involves only a handful of bad apples is quickly becoming less 
convincing. Every time a new scandal breaks, a new handful of bad apples is found. 
Furthermore, the problem is not restricted to the individual culprits, but to their line 
management, the risk and control functions, the compliance functions and everyone else 
responsible for internal oversight. The argument becomes even less compelling when 
considering the PPI-scandal: these were bundled with products and were sold to many 
retail customers. Surely the whole retail sales network is not a bad apple. The problem is 
directly connected to the culture within the banks. 
                                                          
22 Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Recovery Planning: Supervisory Statement SS18/13’ (16 Jan 
2015) <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2015/ss1813update.pdf> 
accessed 4 July 2016 
231 
 
The Fair and Effective Markets Review conducted a review of the practices in the fixed 
income, currency and commodity markets in wake of the LIBOR and FX scandals.23 The 
report includes various observations, including a market structure presenting opportunities 
for abuse, failings of internal governance and controls and poorly designed remuneration 
and incentive schemes. The review makes several recommendations, including: increased 
individual accountability, especially with front-line staff; making the market itself 
collectively responsible for maintaining high standards; and maintaining a credible 
deterrence for when standards do slip.24 The report further recommends that the senior 
management regime, which was introduced for banks following the crisis, is extended to 
cover all companies which operate in these markets.  
The central point in all these scandals more generally is that the people involved, whether 
traders rigging rates or retail sales staff miss-selling PPI, had a clear personal financial 
incentive to do so. This highlights the link with the remuneration practices. In the case of 
the traders, the manipulated rates showed their trading positions in a more favourable 
light. This would normally directly affect their variable pay at the end of the year. In the 
case of a retail sales network, the targets are usually set in terms of selling a particular new 
product. It should be noted that PPI in itself is not a bad product and some people really 
need it. However, selling it to anyone because this product needs to be pushed, usually 
because it is profitable, is not appropriate. Earlier in this chapter, when discussing the 
culture within the bank, it was concluded that targets need to be based on more than 
financial measures. This observation very much holds here as well. Obviously, there are 
more issues, such as a conflict of interest for those who set rates and trade related 
products at the same time. These need to be addressed separately. But it does not 
invalidate the point that, besides making money, it is equally important how you make it. 
External stakeholders must be recognised and included in the targets and objectives set to 
staff. It must also be reflected in how staff is rewarded. The provisions in CRD IV on 
remuneration, which were discussed earlier, may apply to traders if they are significant risk 
takers but they certainly will not apply to retail staff. Perhaps it is possible to extend some 
parts of these provisions to all costumer facing staff.  
                                                          
23 HM Treasury, Bank of England, Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Fair and Effective Markets Review, 
Final Report June 2015’ (2015) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf > accessed 4 July 2016 
24 Tracey McDermott, ‘Fair and Effective Markets Review’ (2015) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/fair-and-effective-markets-review > accessed 4 July 2016 
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The outcome of the scandals has been record fines for the banks involved. These fines are 
usually part of a settlement with the enforcement agency, which include a discount on the 
fine and immunity from criminal prosecution. The question is what this actually achieves. 
The fines are effectively passed on to the shareholders of the bank as they reduce profit 
and thus reduce dividend payments. The regulator may even get worried about the height 
of the fine as it could have a negative impact on the capital position of the bank. And when 
the agreement includes immunity from criminal prosecutions, then nobody is held to 
account. This in part reflects the importance of the systemically important banks. They 
cannot be allowed to fail as a consequence of these malpractices, something that would 
certainly happen if they were found guilty and had their banking license revoked. Consider 
action brought against institutions that were not systemically important. Companies such 
as Arthur Andersen, WorldCom or Enron have all become insolvent. In 2002, Arthur 
Andersen, one of the world’s largest accounting firms, was found criminally liable in 
relation to its handling of Enron. The firm did not survive the damage done to its 
reputation. Both WorldCom and Enron were engulfed in scandals and filed for bankruptcy. 
It seems deeply wrong that, because a bank is deemed too-big-too-fail it should be allowed 
to escape criminal liability and, by implication, continue to operate as normal. This is 
another compelling reason to resolve the issue of too big to fail. 
c. Ownership 
Shareholders are often rather passive. At Northern Rock, it was not just the directors and 
the risk committee that had failed. The board had communicated its funding strategy 
clearly to its shareholders. It would appear that either the shareholders had not sufficiently 
scrutinised the plans themselves, or, if they had, then they had accepted the high risk in 
return for the promise of a high reward. It is of additional concern that some of the 
shareholders were employees. One would have expected them to scrutinise the business 
strategy in great detail as it affects not only their employment but also their capital. The 
employees had, in addition to the usual channels available for employees, an additional 
way to express their opinion on the strategy as shareholders. One may point out the rough 
analogy with Lehman Brothers, where employees had their pension and savings invested in 
the firm, yet failed to scrutinise the business strategy and challenge it. At RBS, the situation 
was even worse. The shareholders overwhelmingly supported the disastrous take-over of 
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ABN Amro.25 The question is why do shareholders act in this way and what can be done 
about it? 
One may simply state that the shareholders have invested their own money and, should 
things go wrong, they lose it. This is what happened with the shareholders of the UK banks 
that failed. So what is the real problem? This is answered by the UK Stewardship Code for 
institutional investors, one of the aims of which is ‘to promote the long term success of 
companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper’.26 In this way, 
the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders in the banks are aligned. It may 
well be possible that these guidelines, which are currently operated on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis, need to be strengthened for investments in financial institutions. This would 
recognise the importance of the stakeholders and the role of banks in our society. 
However, one must bear in mind the conclusions drawn by the US Financial Crisis 
Commission. In summary, everyone made errors in assessing the risks. So although 
corporate governance might be defective by not including all stakeholders, it must not just 
include them, but also ensure that the correct information reaches them to make informed 
decisions. 
The government is a special shareholder. As discussed in greater detail in chapter four, 
UKFI was created to manage the government’s stake in Northern Rock, RBs and Lloyds 
HBoS. Part of the rules governing the relationship between HM Treasury and UKFI are set 
out in the Shareholder Relationship Framework Document27 and the Investment 
Mandate.28 This includes the rule that investments will be managed on a commercial basis 
without much intervention by the government, which was to be kept at arm’s length. It is 
clear that this has not been the case for every bank in which the government had a stake. 
On one hand, there is Northern Rock, which has now successfully been reprivatized.  On 
the other hand, there is RBS, which has been the focus of public debate and has been, or at 
least appears to have been, instructed by HM Treasury to adopt certain strategies or 
reforms. It would appear that this is what led to the resignation of the CEO, Stephen 
                                                          
25 Reuters, ‘RBS investors back ABN deal’ (10 August 2007) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/10/us-abn-takeover-rbs-vote-idUSL1076842520070810> 
accessed 20 November 2015 
26 Financial Reporting Council, ‘The UK Stewardship Code’ (September 2012) 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-
Stewardship-Code-September-2012.aspx> accessed 20 November 2015 
27 UK Financial Investments Ltd, ‘UKFI Framework Document October 2010’ (2010) 
http://www.ukfi.co.uk/releases/UKFI_FD_20101001.pdf accessed 20 November 2015 
28 UK Financial Investments Ltd, ‘UKFI Investment Mandate October 2010’ (2010) 
http://www.ukfi.co.uk/releases/UKFI_IM_20101001.pdf accessed 20 November 2015 
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Hester, who was supportive of investment banking, and his replacement by Ross McEwan, 
an expert in retail banking. RBS is still a long way from a full return to the private sector. 
It is clear that the political interference has done RBS little good. It has led to instability 
both in board strategy and in board composition. The bank has performed badly in the last 
few years, although this is also partially to blame on bankers’ misconduct. Nonetheless, the 
comparison is there: Northern Rock has stayed out of the limelight and has been turned 
around successfully in a short timeframe. Likewise, the Japanese case study has shown that 
a swift reprivatisation of its nationalised lenders was the right decision. It is clear that the 
commercial objectives of a bank do not sit well either with the political objectives of a 
government, or the volatility of their objectives. The long term strategy of a bank must not 
be driven by the politics of the day. It is imperative that for a quick and successful recovery 
the reprivatisation must happen quickly. 
5. Conclusions 
There are several problems or themes that keep coming back in this research. There are 
three main themes that stand out. The first, which was discussed in this chapter as part of 
internal corporate governance, is the effectiveness of the board and the knowledge and 
experience of senior management. Especially the cases of RBS, Northern Rock and the Co-
operative Bank, discussed in chapter three, bring out this theme. The second and third 
themes were discussed as part of external corporate governance. The second theme is that 
of a culture placing profit and growth above risk management and stakeholders. Examples 
discussed in chapter three include the case studies of RBS and Barclays. The third theme is 
the creation of a bank insolvency regime, including the protection of depositors and the 
economy, which did not exist at the time of the crisis. The failures and required 
government rescues discussed in chapter three underline this point. It is the conclusion of 
this research, based on the case studies presented in the third chapter, that these three 
elements caused the main weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks at the time of 
the financial crisis. It is a further conclusion, based on the analysis of the short- and long-
term solutions in chapters four and five, that only the third element is being addressed 
sufficiently. This third element has been the focus of many reports as well as UK and EU 
based regulation. Whilst the second element is partially being addressed, through 
European legislation on remuneration as well as increased accountability, this falls well 
short of resolving the problem. The first element is hardly addressed at all. As with the 
second, it is partially addressed by increased accountability.  
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Perhaps the most interesting improvement is suggested by the Basel Committee in its 
recommendations for corporate governance at banks, discussed in chapter five. Their new 
principle thirteen, which appeared in the latest version of the report for the first time, is 
that in effect the financial regulators should take on the roles of custodians of corporate 
governance. It explains that the regulators should provide guidance for corporate 
governance at banks as well as supervise it. It further explains that this supervision must be 
done by way of comprehensive evaluations and regular interaction with boards and senior 
management. Regulators should require improvement and remedial action as necessary. 
This would be an extension of the role of the regulator as it currently stands. However, the 
first and second element, as outlined above, could well be improved and safeguarded by 
increased supervision from the regulators. 
Within the UK, the regulator best placed to perform this task is the FCA. In a response to 
the proposals by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, the FCA went out of 
its way, not only to outline the tools it already had, but in particular to point out its existing 
focus on supervision of standards, governance and culture.29 The FCA’s Director of 
Enforcement and Market Oversight, Mark Steward, recently delivered a speech on culture 
and governance.30 The problem, as he correctly pointed out, is that, although the regulator 
can draw up rules and standards, which describe the expectations and the boundaries, they 
do not create a situation in which good governance magically appears. He describes several 
things that are needed to achieve this, the main one being knowledge and expertise at 
senior management level. Acknowledging that culture is often intangible, he concludes that 
there are no prescriptions. However, as the Basel Committee points out, the regulator will 
get a good feel for what is happening at a bank through comprehensive evaluations and 
regular interaction with those at the bank. A further empowered FCA might well be the 
most effective custodian of corporate governance at UK banks. 
 
                                                          
29 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Tackling Serious Failings in Firms: A Response to the Special 
Measures Proposal by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards’ (June 2014) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/static/article-type/news/tackling-serious-failings-in-firms.pdf> accessed 20 
November 2015, 6-10 
30 Mark Steward, ‘Culture and Governance’ (11 November 2015) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/culture-and-governance> accessed 20 November 2015 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
 
1. The Principal Conclusions of this Research 
The hypothesis of this thesis, as defined in chapter one, is: corporate governance at UK 
banks before the financial crisis was weak and post-crisis reforms did not address these 
weaknesses. The three central research questions in chapter one were formulated 
accordingly: 
1 What weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks contributed to 
their failure? 
2 What is the effect of new legislation and other initiatives on corporate 
governance at UK banks? 
3 What is the effect of (part-) state ownership of UK banks on their 
corporate governance? 
The case studies in chapter three of UK banks that failed during the crisis reveal several 
main weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks, as discussed in the conclusions of 
chapter three as well as in the recommendations in chapter seven. The first weakness is 
that growth and profit are placed over sound risk management. The second weakness 
identified is the remuneration schemes and the culture it stimulated. This is directly linked 
to the first weakness. The targets given to individual members of staff are often based on 
short-term financial objectives. The third weakness identified is the lack of effectiveness, 
experience, knowledge and skills at board level and with senior management. At many of 
the failed UK banks, the board failed to provide effective oversight and challenge of senior 
management. The fourth weakness is the absence of an adequate insolvency regime to 
deal with the failure of a UK bank. Banks are a special case due to the large potential 
impact a failure has on its environment. Potential problems are deposits lost, cash-
machines running out of money, reduced lending to small businesses, and so on. This is a 
weakness in corporate governance at UK banks because it fails to recognise the importance 
of external stakeholders.  
This research makes the distinction between short-term measures, as discussed in chapter 
four, and long-term solutions, in chapter five. The short-term measures are those that were 
passed during the crisis to deal with the actual failure of some of the UK banks. They 
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include the Banking Act 2008 as well as the creation of UKFI and the interventions by the 
EU on state-aid and competition. UKFI is the vehicle created by the UK government to 
manage its interests in the nationalised banks. The EU interventions include the forced sale 
by some of the nationalised banks of some of their branches, in order to safeguard 
competition. The Banking Act 2009 is also categorised under the short-term measures, 
although it is not an emergency measure. The reason for doing so is that it provides the 
current mechanisms within the UK for dealing with the failure of a bank. It includes the 
Special Resolution Regime, with the relevant tools for the regulators, as well as the FSCS. 
The long-term solutions, discussed in chapter five, include those reports and measures 
drafted after the crisis when there had been time for reflection. The overall observation is 
that these reports and measures increase the complexity of managing a bank significantly. 
In fact, it must be noted that the minimum standard of the required elements of good 
corporate governance at banks had increased in the period leading up to the crisis.  
The recommendations in chapter seven, based upon the weaknesses identified and the 
measures already taken, are split in those for internal- and those for external governance 
and controls. For internal governance and controls, the three main areas for 
recommendations are: the balance between risk, profit and growth; remuneration and 
culture; and board effectiveness. For external governance and controls, the main areas for 
recommendations are: the tackling of too-big-to-fail through ring-fencing and recovery and 
resolution mechanisms; the treatment of customers; and behaviour of owners.  
An important overall recommendation, made in the conclusions of chapter seven, which is 
one of the new principles of corporate governance at banks as prescribed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, is that the regulator should be the custodian of 
corporate governance at UK banks. The most suitable regulator would be the Financial 
Conduct Authority, because they already provide oversight on management, governance 
and culture. Their role should be extended so they can perform the role of the regulator as 
prescribed by the Basel Committee. 
2. Future Developments 
a. Addressing the Weaknesses 
It is one of the key observations in this research that many of the weaknesses of corporate 
governance, discussed for example in the conclusions of chapter three, are not necessarily 
related to the bank-specific elements. It is acknowledged that they are probably of 
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increased importance in a bank, but nonetheless they are general elements of corporate 
governance. The first approach to tackle these weaknesses should therefore, logically, 
emerge from strengthening corporate governance in general, rather than introducing 
measures specific to banks. Given the enormous impact of the financial crisis, it seems only 
reasonable to question whether a corporate governance code can operate on a comply-or-
explain basis. In light of this research, it seems unrealistic to rely on this principle and 
adherence to the spirit of the code. If one really wants to address the weaknesses, then 
such a code needs to be further enshrined in legislation, adhered to and monitored. In the 
case of the banks, this monitoring could be done by the financial regulators. 
A similar argument holds for board reform. It is a general point of corporate governance, 
which in case of a bank merely amplifies. Instead of focussing on, for example, gender 
quotas, however important this might be in itself, it would be wise to ensure that a board 
has sufficient knowledge and experience to challenge senior management. In the case of 
banks, the regulators already need to approve new board members and these rules have 
sharpened up. Some additional requirements have been introduced by way of CRD IV, for 
example in the form of board committees. However, in light of the serious failings in board 
effectiveness during the crisis, it is necessary to introduce more general guidelines or 
requirements on board members. 
The cultural problems in banks are more difficult to resolve. Changing the culture within an 
organisation or company takes several years. In this case, it appears that the culture of an 
entire industry needs to change. This is especially concerning as some of the most effective 
measures on remuneration come from the EU, which the UK may well leave in the near 
future, as discussed later. There appears to be few measures emerging directly from the UK 
that would seek to correct the ethical standards in the industry. There is new legislation 
that specifically seeks to address the rigging of benchmarks and to ensure accountability of 
senior management, but there are no general measures aimed at tackling the problem at 
large. Accountability throughout the banks should be increased, although this is merely the 
stick rather than the carrot. Nonetheless, in order to hold staff to account their objectives 
and responsibilities need to be clearly defined and should go well beyond pure monetary 
targets to include directions on how targets should be reached. This may include, for 
example, the way the target market for products is selected or considerations regarding 
complexity and suitable during the design process of new products. 
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b. State-ownership 
Within this research, several case studies were examined in chapters three and four that 
dealt with failed banks ending up in state-ownership. The government created UKFI to deal 
with its investments at arm’s length. This was always a struggle as, in practice, it would 
always be difficult for politicians to resist meddling in the day-to-day affairs of the state-
owned banks. To a degree, this is perfectly understandable when the annual bonusround 
would come along and the media headlines would be dominated by payments made in the 
bailed-out banks. However, in the greater picture, the meddling has proven undesirable. 
The objectives of the politicians are simply incompatible with those of the banks and of the 
regulators. The politicians want the banks to lend more to stimulate the UK economy. The 
banks do not want to do that because, firstly, if someone has decent credit quality they 
would lend to him anyway, and, secondly, they would otherwise like to improve their 
capital positions to satisfy their regulators. The interference by the government, especially 
at RBS, appears to have created an unclear strategy which means that the banks as a whole 
has suffered. In contrast, the government appears to have interfered far less in Northern 
Rock, which has successfully been privatised within a few years. This seems to strengthen 
the case against state-ownership in banks and, for those that are state-owned, a swift 
return to the private sector. 
c. The Question of EU Membership 
The UK is experiencing an uncertain time in that it faces a general referendum on its EU 
membership by the end of 2017 whilst the referendum on Scottish independence is not yet 
forgotten. The outcome of the Scottish referendum is that the UK will stay together, but it 
is likely that there will be further devolution of power over time from Westminster to 
Scotland. Furthermore, the Scottish National Party does not rule out a future referendum 
on the same matter. This is significant for corporate governance at UK banks as discussed in 
this research. Several of these banks have their headquarters in Scotland. They may have a 
large customer base in Scotland or employ many people there. The future of the British 
pound, the role of the Bank of England and other regulators, membership of the EU and the 
use of Euro are all uncertainties that these banks face in the months and years ahead. 
The governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, has indicated that RBS may have to 
move its headquarters to England as EU rules require banks to be based in the same 
country as most of their business. He further claims that an independent Scotland would 
have to guarantee deposits held in England by Scottish-domiciled banks under EU law. 
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Similarly, Lloyds may have to move its headquarters to England. The first point to observe 
in this debate is that, had Scotland been independent at the time of the global financial 
crisis, it would most likely not have had the financial resources to bail out RBS, let alone 
both banks. The situation would be of comparable or worse scale than Iceland, which 
suffered from a bloated banking sector compared to the country’s GDP. The second point 
to note is that, depending on how negotiations for independence develop, Scotland may 
neither have a lender of last resort, such as the Bank of England, nor any other experienced 
regulators. This means that it could not provide emergency liquidity to troubled banks, nor 
could it adequately supervise them. 
The above arguments alone should convince the stakeholders in these Scottish based UK 
banks that a move to England is in their best interest, regardless of the legal position under 
EU law. As argued throughout this thesis, both transparency and accountability are 
essential elements of corporate governance. For that, an experienced central bank and 
experienced regulators are required. The other argument is that, if there would be 
problems at a Scottish based UK bank, the remedies are less obvious. A short-term liquidity 
problem could not be resolved. A run on the bank would be disastrous as no capital or 
guarantees could be provided. This impacts the stakeholders in the broadest sense. Beyond 
the depositors and customers, who stand to lose money directly in case of trouble, the 
impact on the Scottish economy could be devastating. As carefully argued by Paul 
Krugman, the situation would be worse than that faced by Spain in the recent crisis. It 
would thus seem prudent for Scottish based UK banks such as RBS, even if for the moment 
Scotland would remain in the UK, to move their headquarters to England.  
The referendum to be held before the end of 2017 on EU membership may result in the UK 
leaving the EU. This would raise many issues for the UK banks that are difficult to oversee. 
For the moment, it is worthwhile pointing out that several of the remedies to weakness 
identified in this research have come from EU legislation. The recovery and resolution 
mechanisms come from an EU directive, as do the mechanisms on remuneration. Overall, it 
would appear that the EU has contributed significantly to improving corporate governance 
at UK banks. 
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3. Future Research 
a. Corporate Governance at Banks as a Special Case 
Corporate governance at banks is often seen as a special case of corporate governance, as 
discussed in chapter two. The main reasons for doing so are: it includes significantly more 
regulation and supervision; it has a greater emphasis on risk management; and it has ‘debt-
management’. These differences also apply to what constitutes internal and external 
corporate governance at banks. Internal governance and controls at banks may additionally 
include a good corporate culture, behaviour and risk management. External governance 
and controls at banks will additionally include the regulators. These special elements often 
attract most attention, academically as well as in practice. 
In light of this research, it is suggested to have at least equal regard to the non-special parts 
of corporate governance at banks. It would be useful to investigate these general, or non-
special, parts on its own, but also how they interact with and drive the bank-specific 
elements. It is suggested this could also be done within the context of internal or external 
corporate governance. Future research could furthermore focus on general elements not 
discussed as part of this research as they did not establish themselves as weaknesses 
during the crisis, but they may have done so in other corporate crises. In fact, links could be 
discovered between weaknesses of general corporate governance in other corporate crises 
and the global financial crisis. 
b. Comparative Corporate Governance 
There were two major elements of comparative corporate governance within this research. 
The first is that of the case study of Japan in chapter six. It proved too difficult to cross the 
differences due to: the very different nature of corporate governance; the different role of 
the banks; and the difference in corporate culture and corporate organisation in general. 
As such, it was not possible to find useful functional similarities from which to draw strong 
conclusions. This clearly shows the limits of comparative corporate governance. This 
limitation must be considered when embarking on any future research in corporate 
governance of a comparative nature.  
The other major comparative element in this research, as introduced in chapter two and 
discussed in more detail in chapter seven, arises from the fact that much of UK financial 
regulation is derived from international reports and from EU directives and regulations. 
When studying corporate governance at UK banks, comparative problems emerging from 
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this are simply unavoidable. One must always consider the context of the international 
reports of how EU law is made. It might be beneficial to conduct more research in this area, 
as not only will it affect corporate governance at banks, it impacts all of the financial 
regulation. 
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